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Namibia established a second-generation road fund with the aim of implementing a user-pays 
system by ensuring that road users pay for their consumption of road services. The national 
road network covers approximately 48 399 km and serves a vehicle population of 
approximately 371 281. Somewhat implicit in these road funds is the confidence that the Road 
User Charge System (RUCS) will deliver sufficient funding for the road sector. This exploratory 
case study investigated the funding and financing of the national road network in Namibia. 
The national road network constituted the population from which the hypothetical road 
samples were drawn. Several data-collection methods were employed, including document 
analysis and secondary data analysis. The research employed the Highway Development and 
Management (HDM-4) model to estimate the external costs of road use.  
This research evaluated the relationship between the road-generated revenue (RGR) and its 
allocation towards the national road network expenditure and related these to international 
standards. The findings indicate that the Road Fund Administration (RFA) possesses high 
transparency in allocating RGR towards the preservation of the road network. This places 
Namibia among countries with high dedication of 80% and above towards road expenditure, 
together with the United States of America (USA) and Switzerland when compared to 
international standards. While revenue generated from road users are highly allocated to the 
preservation of the road network (0.96 ratio), a wide gap remains between the required funds 
and resources available for road expenditure. Financing for road expenditure was found to be 
a dilemma facing many developing countries, where revenue from road users does not cover 
the total road costs due to limited capacity and economics of use. Additional funding sources 
are therefore required to fund these deficits.  
The research also demonstrated the applicability of the Highway Development and 
Management (HDM-4) model, to determine the Marginal External Costs (MEC) of road use. 
The results indicate that heavy vehicles impose the highest costs in terms of infrastructure 
damage and environmental costs when using the network. When applying marginal costing, 
the results indicate that heavy vehicles contribute approximately 98% (district road), 97% 
(main road), and approximately 98% (trunk road) in terms of external costs when using the 
respective network. Overall, light vehicles contribute the most to congestion and accidents 
costs when using the national road network. Although the results presented the national road 
network to be congestion free, relatively low congestion was traced on the trunk road, thus 
increasing the overall cost contribution for light vehicles from 2% (district road) and 3% (main 
road) to approximately 19% when using the truck road network. The findings indicate that 
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motorists impose some externalities when using the road network and it would make economic 
sense to internalise such costs to road users.  
The research further assessed the implications of setting Road User Charges (RUC) at the 
Short-Run Marginal Costs (SRMC) of road use. The results indicate that setting RUC equal to 
correct prices leads to an estimated road funding deficit of N$5 062 746 on the sampled trunk 
road. These findings indicate that a marginal pricing approach in the Namibian context 
(expansive road network serving few users) might not necessarily raise the revenue required 
for the investment and maintenance of the network. This situation calls for an alternative 
approach to marginal pricing.  
In exploring the second-best RUC suitable to the Namibian funding circumstances, this study 
explored what Namibia could learn from other countries with expansive road networks such 
as Australia and New Zealand. The findings presented the efforts Namibia that has made in 
terms of policy formulation and noteworthy institutional frameworks, which have made 
Namibia the leading country in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of road-quality rankings. However, 
Namibia needs to embrace technologies towards charging vehicles per kilometre. The existing 
Mass Distance Charges (MDC) attempted to solve the challenges associated with charging 
heavy vehicles according to distance travelled; however, the current MDC is a blunt instrument 
that does not adjust charges according to weight, time, and location. Reforming the current 
system with the focus on distinguishing suitable charges for light and heavy vehicles to 
account for their use of the road network per vehicle per kilometre according to time and 
location is something that Namibia could learn from Australia and New Zealand. Collaborating 
efforts from both the public and private sectors could be another step toward a road financing 
solution.  
The contribution of this study revolves around adding to the existing knowledge relating to 
financing expansive road networks that serve a small vehicle population by assessing the 
RUCS with a particular focus on the user-pays principle and by estimating the MEC of road 
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1.1  BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Namibia, have established second-generation 
road funds for funding the road sector with Road User Charges (RUC) revenue streams that 
are deposited into a designated account. The aim of setting up second-generation road funds 
has been to commercialise the road sector (Heggie, 1995), by using a fee-for-service concept 
as applied in other services such as water and transit (Bird & Slack, 2017). The road sector is 
commercialised through the superficially economic concept of the user-pays principle, which 
ensures that road users are charged at the marginal social cost (MSC) rate. The MSC principle 
is justified by many researchers on the notion that consumers of a scarce resource (roads) 
should be held liable for the costs they impose on the road, and on other users by means of 
congestion and accidents and to the rest of society (Freeman, 1982; Nash & Mathew, 2005; 
Quinet, 2005). Despite the notion of bringing the road to the market place and running it like a 
business, many second-generation road funds, especially in developing countries, have been 
faced with a shortage of revenue for road maintenance, leading to an ever-growing backlog of 
deferred maintenance (Heggie, 1999; Heggie, 2003; Tembo, 2010). Although most countries 
have RUC instruments in place, many are yet to fully implement the user-pays concept, or 
introduce charging instruments that are set to reflect the additional cost that users impose on 
“Namibia is a large country with a small population which makes it likely that her costs of 
road building and maintenance will be higher than elsewhere. The question is: what is the 
best way of funding the road network? The original intention of making those who use the 
road to pay for them was to have solved this problem but it appears to have run into serious 
problems. However, it is not clear whether this is because road users are simply not 
prepared to pay full cost of the road network or because the current system of 
management and administration is inefficient or users are paying and the current system 
is ok. The Road Fund Administration (RFA) Act is clear on this issue: road users should 
pay to the extent that costs can be justified on the grounds of economic efficiency. 
Government has to step in and contribute when this is not the case. The danger is that, 
for political reasons, government will continue to expand the road network at the expense 
of road maintenance where it really matters” (Sherbourne, 2017:367). There is a strong 
case to re-examine the current system with a view to estimate MEC toward internalisation 




society, namely costs associated with kilometres travelled or additional trips made, without 
considering the infrastructure capacity increase (Nash, 2003).  
Several policies, legal frameworks, and funding schemes to address the demands for road 
maintenance, rehabilitation, and new development have been drafted (National Planning 
Commission [NPC], 2015; Republic of Namibia, 1999c; Roads Authority [RA], 2015). The 
general theme of these policies seems to be the belief in the user-pays principle as the best 
option to fund roads. For example, the Namibian Transport Policy (Ministry of Works and 
Transport [MWT], 2017) recommends implementation of the user-pays principle in order to 
promote economic efficiency. The efficiency principle entails that RUC should be set to fully 
recover road-use associated costs from the road users. Economists refer to an efficient price 
of transportation as the one set at the short-run marginal costs (SRMC) associated with the 
use of roads. The equity criterion implies that capital costs not recovered through the marginal 
cost principles should be proportionally recovered from the road users who stand to benefit 
from the road system (Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication [MWTC], 2000). 
“User-pays” is therefore an umbrella term for efficient and equitable RUC that guide the setting 
of road pricing that is economically justifiable.  
Economic theory suggests prices set to reflect MSC to be the optimal pricing for charging for 
the use of transport infrastructure (Stewart-Ladewig & Link, 2005). RUC that reflect the 
additional infrastructure and external costs signal to road users and the authorities the 
appropriate road prices drivers ought to pay. The social costs associated with road users 
travelling include operating costs of the road infrastructure, the traffic congestion they impose 
on other users, as well as the impact on the environment and society that arises from 
undertaking a journey (Rouhani, 2016). It is therefore essential to place monetary value upon 
externalities that arise from the use of roads and incorporating them into price mechanisms 
by directly charging the road users or when subsiding the road sector. In so doing, externalities 
costs will be taken into account by all stakeholders.  
The Namibian White Paper on Transport Policy (MWTC, 1995) supported the creation of the 
Road Fund (RF) into which revenue generated from Road User Charges (RUC) should be 
deposited. Somewhat implicit in these policies and documents is the confidence that the user-
pays principle will deliver sufficient funding for the road sector. The challenge with efficient 
prices, set at SRMC, is that under circumstances of low demand and excess capacity, these 
prices do not cover fixed costs (notably return on capital investments) that must be earned by 
the roads agencies (Kahn, 1988).  
Issues of insufficient revenue generated from RUC have been observed in Namibia. In 
response to the plight of the road sector, the government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN), 
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and the RFA in particular, has released press statements in the local media, seeking 
mechanisms and ways to improve revenue collection, including the possibility of establishing 
toll roads in Namibia. According to Gwilliam and Shalizi (1999), insufficient or uncertain budget 
allocation towards road networks leads to deteriorated roads with possible compensations and 
significantly increases the production and distribution costs of other economic activities. 
Experience shows that transport infrastructure is likely to have a longer life span if well 
maintained. However, unmaintained transport infrastructure mostly deteriorates rapidly, 
especially under harsh climatic conditions (World Bank, 2008).   
Financing for roads rests on revenue generated from the RUC (earmarked taxes) versus the 
funds required for road expenditure. On the revenue side (supply), second-generation road 
funds or governments have decided on how to charge the road users, and thus have 
established appropriate RUC instruments. This intention of making those who use the service 
pay for their usage was intended to solve the challenge faced by many developing countries 
on how to fund their roads (Sherbourne, 2017). Somewhat implicit in implementing these 
second-generation road funds is the confidence that the RF, based on the user-pays principle, 
will deliver sufficient funds for the road sector.  
On the expenditure side (demand), Bousquet and Queiroz’s (1996) argument is based on the 
fact that funds allocated to road maintenance and rehabilitation are insufficient in many cases. 
Furthermore, uncertain budget or insufficient budgetary allocations to road maintenance have 
resulted in road deterioration, with a significant increase in transportation costs and a 
subsequently negative impact on the economy (Gwilliam & Shalizi, 1999). Limited financial 
resources provided to the roads agencies are the main constraint, which has created backlogs 
in road preservation for many roads agencies or authorities. The above-noted issues and 
arguments encouraged the researcher to conduct a study and explore funding for roads in 
Namibia according to a perspective of road pricing, revenue generation, distribution, and 
expenditure. During the 2016/2017 financial year, the RA, an organisation mandated to 
manage the national road network in Namibia, experienced a total shortfall of approximately 
N$1 311 206 000.00 of the required budget for road preservation submitted to both the RFA 
and to the State Revenue Fund (SRF) (government) through its line ministry, the MWT. The 
RA (2016b), in its Budget 2016/17, states: 
“The initial Roads Authority proposed budget for the FY 2016/17 submitted to the 
Ministry of Works and Transport and the Road Fund Administration for possible funding 
amounted was estimated at N$4,654,424,000. The proposal submitted to the 
Government of Republic of Namibia (GRN) through the SRF resides under the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF), including grants and loans, was estimated at N$2,584,760,000. 
However, of the total fund requested only N$1,608,058,000 was allocated to the Roads 
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Authority, resulted in to N$976,702,000 budget shortfall. Similarly, the RFA could only 
allocate N$1,781,147,000 of the N$2,115,651,000 required budget, which resulted in 
to a shortfall of N$334,504,000. Therefore, the total shortfall for the 2016/17 Roads 
Authority annual budget resulted to N$1,311,206,000.00.”  
Given the presented scenario, it is worth investigating road funding for Namibia, by 
understanding the constraint the RFA is faced with in generating revenue from the RUC and 
the allocation of such funds to the approved authorities for road expenditures. On the other 
hand, the RFA is mandated to manage the RF and the Road User Charges System (RUCS) 
in a manner as to secure and allocate sufficient funding for the payment of road expenditure. 
However, the RFA depends on the RUC to fulfil its mandate based on the user-pays principle. 
RUC are imposed on road users utilising the road network, inter alia, through Fuel Levies (FL), 
Annual Vehicle License and Registration Fees (AVLRF), Mass Distance Charges (MDC), 
Cross-Border Charges (CBC), and Abnormal Load Fees (ALF). Chapter 5 provides a detailed 
discussion on the RUCS in Namibia. 
1.2  RESEARCH STATEMENT 
In Namibia, the potential for a self-funded road sector is not yet being fully exploited. Among 
other constraints to insufficient revenue generated from the RUCS is the inability of RUC to 
meet the national road network expenses. Despite implementing a seemingly sound 
institutional framework and having a sound policy on how to secure funding through RUC 
based on economic efficiency, the Namibian road sector is quite extensively served by a small 
vehicle population of 374 710 registered vehicles (RA, 2016). This implies that Namibian road 
users are likely to pay more, which spreads the costs of a large network over fewer users than 
elsewhere (Sherbourne, 2017). Namibia established a second-generation road fund 
supported by earmarked revenue generated from the implemented RUC. The common 
problem with the second-generation road funds is that they create the impression that all the 
revenue generated from the RUC should be sufficient to cover the road network expenditure.    
The Namibian road fund approach differs from those found in other countries in that the 
legislation states that RUC should cover costs to include or also to cover expenditure to be 
incurred when undertaking justified new investments in the road sector (Bruzelius, 2000). The 
current RUC based on the stated principle of economic efficiency appeared to have run into 
serious problems and have proven to generate insufficient revenue to meet the investment 
needs of the current national road expenditure. The government must step in and subsidise 
the road sector (Sherbourne, 2017). However, government funds appear to be channelled 
towards developmental projects (construction of new roads) and not towards road 
maintenance, where funds are required for preserving the existing road network. There is 
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therefore a strong case to conduct an empirical investigation into the current issues 
surrounding the road-funding model in Namibia and to address the existing gap in the 
conventional user-pays principle. The Namibian Transport Policy calls for the refinement of 
the current road user charges system to assess the feasibility of implementing the user-pays 
principle, and to ensure full-cost recovery from those who consume the road network for 
economic justification of road projects and programmes (MWT, 2017). The user-pays principle 
aims to hold road users accountable for the costs they impose on the infrastructure, on other 
drivers using the same facility (in terms of congestion and accidents risks), and on society.  
Most countries in sub Saharan Africa use the Highway Development and Management (HDM-
4) model to derive strategies for the maintenance and investment needs of the road network. 
Road authorities, however, have not used the software to assist in setting road pricing or to 
estimate the external rod user cost. Using a case study design approach, the study employed 
HDM-4 to estimate the marginal external cost (MEC) of road use. These MEC estimates could 
subsequently be used as input in setting road users charge tariffs. This process allowed for 
the internalising of external costs in the road user-funding framework. The main contribution 
of this work is therefore to demonstrate the applicability of the HDM-4 in to estimate marginal 
external cost of road use and as input in setting road use tariffs. 
1.3  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study addressed specific questions, namely: 
1) What are road users currently spending on road use and what portion of road-
generated revenue (RGR) is allocated back to preserve the national road network? 
2) What are the efficient RUC for Namibia based on the principle of MSC? 
3) What is the magnitude of the financial gap in financing the national road network and 
what are the implications of implementing MSC principles? 
1.4  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Following the research questions, the research addressed specific objectives, as follows: 
1) To determine what Namibian road users are currently spending on road use and to 
ascertain how much of these funds are allocated to road infrastructure (maintenance, 
upgrade, and new construction) and relating these to international standards. 
2) To estimate the financial implications of implementing MSC as RUC and to determine 
the magnitude of the possible financial shortfall in financing the national road network 
from this first-best RUC principle. 
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3) To explore possible second-best RUC based on the specific circumstances of Namibia 
to address the road funding challenges. 
1.5  RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION AND RATIONALE FOR EACH OBJECTIVE  
In 2000, Namibia undertook a road subsector reform, which resulted in the formation of three 
public enterprises. According to the MWTC (2000), this new reform and structure arrangement 
entailed the following:  
 A self-financed road sub-sector, financed by the RUC. The self-funded system 
comprises of the RUCS and the RF managed and administered by an autonomous 
state agency under the MoF, known as the RFA. 
 The Roads Authority (RA), another autonomous state agency under the MWT with the 
mandate to manage the national road network. 
 The Roads Contractor Company (RCC), to execute the maintenance and rehabilitation 
of the national road network based on competitive bidding procedures with private 
companies.  
The road sub-sector reform was conducted in order to redirect the sector’s focus from one 
funded by means of general taxation (consolidate budget) to one being funded through the 
RUCS. The main fundamental that initiated the drive was a motive of securing adequate 
funding for the road sector in order to preserve the national road network and other roads. In 
so doing, Namibia could better serve the needs of its neighbouring countries. The Fourth 
National Development Plan (NDP4) emphasised the country becoming a logistics hub and a 
gateway to international markets. During the period of 2012 to 2016, transport and logistics in 
general contributed approximately 4.7% to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP); 
however, the sector has the potential to contribute more to the country’s GDP (NPC, 2017). 
Transport is a catalyst for the NDP to realise its targets in other sectors, including mining, 
agriculture, manufacturing, fisheries, tourism, and rural and urban development.   
It is in light of the above that NDP5 embarked upon a holistic and integrated multimodal and 
intermodal approach to transport planning in handling goods and services, thus meeting the 
domestic and regional transportation needs (NPC, 2017). The road mode in most African 
countries accounts for 80% to 90% of the total trade in goods and services (Pinard, 2015). In 
Namibia, roads are one of the dominant transportation modes, trading approximately 59% of 
the country‘s imports (Namibia Statistics Agency [NSA], 2016b). However, the imbalance 
between road preservation and new infrastructure development is one of the challenges that 
hampers the sub-sector’s sustainability. In addition, the optimal allocation required by the RA 
to preserve the national road network is another challenge that is yet to be resolved.    
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“The Medium to Long-Term Road Master Plan of 2012 (MLTRMP) advocated for the 
optimal funding for the road infrastructure within the RUC during the financial year 
2015/16 at N$3.45 billion. However, the Road Fund could only avail N$1.98 billion. 
This has resulted into a funding gap of about N$1.47 billion initially required to cover 
the backlog in road preservation” (Road Fund Administration [RFA], 2015).  
In his statement, while addressing the African Road Maintenance Funds Association, the 
chairperson of the RFA board of directors emphasised that the funding gap in road 
maintenance has accumulated for some years, especially because the funds must be 
balanced between road maintenance and new roads development (RFA, 2015). This is an 
important concern, as road sectors in most African countries suffer from a large and growing 
backlog of deferred maintenance (Heggie, 2003). Previous literature shed light and provided 
useful information concerning the growing gap on road funding and financing. Creightney 
(1993) indicates that the identified gap has been influenced by several factors, including 
absence of clear RUC (as per road use), inefficient user-pays policies (with references to 
equity, heavy vehicles, and fuel levy), and the nature of tax in place. This calls for strategic 
project planning and RUC that are set at the SRMC.  
The interest of the Namibian Transport Policy (MWT, 2017) to reform the current RUC to 
accommodate the negative externalities that arise from the road use encouraged the 
researcher to investigate whether estimating the MSC or road use could yield results in road 
pricing for Namibia. While road authorities use the Highway Development and Management 
model HDM-4 to strategise on maintenance expenditures and motivate investment required 
for the national road network, the use of the HDM-4 to influence the present and future road 
pricing remains a grey area in the authorities’ domain. 
Academically, there is a dearth of available research and published articles on road funding 
for Namibia (Bruzelius et al., 2000; Tekie, 2012; Runji, 2003; Bruzelius, 2010; Tekie, 2014). 
Given the importance of roads to Namibia’s vision of becoming a logistic hub and a gateway 
to international markets, and to that of contributing to the Namibian economy at large, it is 
worth conducting an empirical investigation to understand how revenue for road funding in 
Namibia is generated and to determine the allocation of these funds to “Approved Authorities” 
for road expenditure.  
At sub-Saharan level, the World Bank has conducted several studies that tended to focus on 
strengthening institutional arrangements, the establishment of the so-called second-
generation road funds, and cost recovery (Freeman, 1982; Heggie, 1995; Heggie & Vickers, 
1998; Gwilliam & Shalizi, 1999; Gwilliam et al., 2008). This study therefore aimed to contribute 
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to the body of knowledge concerning road financing both from optimal revenue generation and 
from optimal funds allocation.  
This study explored the road funding in Namibia by focusing on the RUCS and the RF in terms 
of optimal revenue generation and the optimal allocation of funds towards the preservation of 
the national road network. The study predominantly focused on the RFA and the RA. 
Moreover, relevant information required to achieve the objective of the study was gathered 
from pertinent stakeholders such the MoF, MWT, Motor Vehicle Accident (MVA) Fund, Ministry 
of Mines and Energy (MME), as well as relevant Approved Authorities. The term “road-user 
charges” was used broadly in this study to refer to the user-charging instruments to charge for 
road use. Although the RFA also allocates funds to local authorities for urban street 
maintenance, this study only covered the national road network and referred to local 
authorities where it was deemed necessary.  
The original contribution of this study can be regarded in the following ways. Firstly, there is a 
dearth of scholarly and academic research on MSC of road use in sub-Saharan Africa and in 
particular in Namibia. Extant research conducted in transport and logistics and in particular 
the road sub-sector in Namibia focused on road sector reform and road management systems 
(MWTC, 2000; Bruzelius et al., 2000; Tekie, 2012; Runji, 2003; Bruzelius, 2010; Tekie, 2014). 
This study placed it focus on road financing aspects by focusing on the revenue-generation 
side and the road expenditure side. Furthermore, the research also focused on funding for 
roads in Namibia by relating the current RUCS to efficient RUC that are based on MSC.   
Secondly, the RF and RUCS have been in place for more than a decade in Namibia. However, 
to the researcher’s best knowledge, there has never been any empirical assessments of the 
current road funding model with a particular focus on the user-pays principle estimating the 
MSC rate of charging users and the implications it may have for the road budget. This study 
thus addressed this urgent need by providing valuable empirical knowledge needed not only 
to ensure that RUC are charged as per the economic principle and set equal to SRMC, but 
also for the overall growth and development of the sector. If the user-pays principle, 
recommended by the Namibian Transport Policy (MWT, 2017), ought to be implemented and 
if the SRMC is perceived relevant for road pricing, then existing RUC require information on 
MSC for a true reflection of road use. This study thus revisited the economic theory of setting 
road charging at efficient pricing, which makes efficiency pricing as a policy strategy that links 
demand, price, investment revenues, and capital funding something that has been overlooked 
for many years in Namibia. This study also contributes to the body of research on MSC 
estimation by presenting estimates of the Namibian national road network. 
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Thirdly, the research initiates a new dimension to the press statement released by the RFA in 
seeking better methods to improving revenue collections for the road sub-sector.  
This information is very much timely and an important input into the RFA Business Plan 
Review for the period of 2015 to 2022 (RFA, 2016).  
Finally, the study utilised the World Bank Road User Model to demonstrate the applicability of 
the Highway Development and Management (HDM-4) in estimating MSC using case studies 
of a particular section of the Namibian national road network. The uniqueness of this study 
lies in using the data from the Road Management System (RMS) division of the RA. The 
results could be easily synchronised to influence present and future road pricing. It is 
anticipated that the estimation will provide guidance for planners, policymakers, researchers, 
and others involved in the transportation sector in order to create evidence-based solutions to 
the challenges faced by the sector.   
This study’s significance lies in its prospect of assisting policymakers in decision making, 
especially with regard to the transport and logistics sector. The main desired outcome of the 
NDP5 (2017-2022) is for Namibia to have a sustainable transport system supporting an 
excellent logistic hub connecting the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to 
international markets by 2022. In light of these views, Chapter 5 addresses the first objective 
and focuses on understanding the road funding regime in Namibia and compares Namibia to 
international practice. This was done by focusing on RGR from the RUC and optimal allocation 
to the relevant authorities. This chapter explored Gomez and Vassalo’s (2014) financial 
techniques to analyse the funding regime in Namibia, which showed the RGR earmarked for 
maintenance and rehabilitation funds spent on Namibian roads on rehabilitation and 
maintenance for every dollar road user spent, and the relation between road expenditure and 
the national GDP.  
Chapter 6 explores the possibilities of using the HDM-4 commonly used by road authorities 
for planning to estimate the MEC of road use in Namibia. The chapter attempts to address the 
gap between the recommended user-pays principle as a road pricing policy and strategy 
towards its implementation. In light of these views, the chapter envisages demystifying 
marginal externality cost estimations in order to help the road authorities to grasp the concept, 
as well as to internalise such externalities into road pricing.  
Chapter 7 addresses the second and third objectives. The chapter assesses the implications 
of implementing RUC at MSC using fuel levies and MDC as a proxy to determine the revenue 
generated from the hypothetical case studies. These results are then compared to the MEC 
estimated in Chapter 6. It further explores the second-best RUC suitable for the Namibian 
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case (expansive road network served by a small vehicle population) by deviating from the 
MSC principle while drawing some lessons from Australia and New Zealand.  
The study will potentially act as a benchmark in creating awareness and availing information 
on road funding in Namibia and how the country could better utilise the Highway Development 
and Management (HDM-4) model of the World Bank in order to influence setting tariffs that 
internalise the external costs of road use.  
1.6  ORGANISATION OF THE CHAPTERS 
This dissertation is organised around three main themes within road funding in Namibia, 
namely road pricing, RGR, allocation, and expenditure; efficient RUC for Namibia based on 
MSC; and determining the second-best RUC.  
The study began with the first chapter to introduce the subject matter and to highlight some 
debates around road funding. The overview of road funding in Namibia is presented in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the literature that guided the study on a broader level. Chapter 
4 presents the overall research methodology; however, each main chapter employed its 
specific methodology. Chapter 5 begins with the empirical investigation into the road fund by 
calculating the RGR, the road allocation ratio, and the road expenditure ratio for Namibia and 
making comparisons to selected countries. It thus provides information on how much road 
users are currently spending on road use and how much of the road revenue is allocated back 
to road preservation of the road infrastructure. Chapter 6 explores efficient RUC for Namibia 
based on the principle of the MSC. Chapter 7 focuses on exploring the second-best road 
pricing approach for Namibia, thus deviating from the first-best road pricing approach while 
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CHAPTER 2:  
THE TRANSPORT AND ROADS SECTOR IN NAMIBIA: A NARRATIVE 
OVERVIEW 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a brief background on the Namibian economy with focus on the 
transportation sector. It further presents an overview of the Namibia transport and logistics 
sector with a particular focus on the road subsector, with descriptions of the road subsector. 
Furthermore, the chapter discusses the RUCS and its practice in Namibia. As informed by the 
motive behind this research, which was to conduct an empirical investigation into road 
financing in Namibia, it is deemed necessary to narrate the road subsector in Namibia with a 
particular focus on the national road network under the auspices of the RA. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the role of the transport sector in the economy.   
2.2  OVERVIEW OF NAMIBIA  
The Republic of Namibia is among the youngest economies in the world, having gained 
independence from neighbouring South Africa in 1990. Namibia is categorised as an upper-
middle-income country, with a GDP estimated at US$10.3 billion and a per capita income of 
US$4 140 [N$55 144] (World Bank, 2016). Namibia is a vast country with 2.3 million 
inhabitants, with approximately 52% of the population residing in the rural areas of the 14 
regions of country (NSA, 2017). The country has a total coverage area of 825 615 km2 
(population density of approximately 2.6 person per km2). It is an arid country bordered by the 
Atlantic Ocean and the landlocked countries Botswana and Zambia, as well as Angola and 
South Africa. During the period 2012 to 2016, the Namibian economy recorded a growth rate 
of 4.6% per annum. Although the country recorded a relatively high GDP per capita and steady 
economic growth, Namibia registered the highest unemployment rate among other countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. The 2016 Namibia Labour Force Survey report recorded the 
unemployment rate (broader definition) at 34%, approximately 6.1% higher than the 2014 
unemployment rate of 27.9% (NSA, 2017).  
2.2.1  The Namibian economy 
Namibia is rich in natural resources and quite stable in terms of political and macroeconomic 
agendas. The country recorded slow growth in the 2000s; over the period 2012-2016, the 




Figure 2.1: Real gross domestic product growth rate 
Source: NSA (2016b) 
 
Sector wise, tertiary industries have contributed the highest percentage to the Namibian 
economic growth. According to the NSA (2016b), tertiary industries contributed 57% to the 
GDP, followed by the primary and the secondary industries, with an overall contribution of 
17.6% and 17.4% respectively (see Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2: Industries’ contribution to gross domestic product: Namibia 2016 
Source: Author (Data from NSA, 2017) 
 
Over the past decade, the mining and manufacturing sectors have been the country’s largest 
contributors to the GDP (see Figure 2.3). According to the Bank of Namibia (2016), the 
construction sector has been growing at a steady rate but slowed down in the preceding years 
due to a decline in the construction investment programmes by both the public and private 
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Transport activities have been increasing over the years despite the decline recorded in the 
export volumes and some mineral products. The increase in cargo volume was mainly 
reflected in sea cargo transhipment, as well as in road transportation (Bank of Namibia, 2016). 
 
Figure 2.3: Percentage share of selected sectors’ contribution to gross domestic product: 
2007-2016 
Source: Author (Data from NSA, 2017) 
 
In contrast, external shocks, sluggish economic growth coupled with weak demand, a decline 
in commodity and oil prices, and the unfavourable exchange rate are some of the challenges 
faced by the Namibian Ports Authority (NAMPORT, 2017). These have resulted in a decline 
in cargo volume (from 6.5 million tonnes in 2012 to 5.6 million tonnes in 2016) handled by the 
Port of Walvis Bay over the past few years (see Box 2.1). The Namibian railway subsector is 
concomitant with aged and obsolete locomotives, as well as dilapidated infrastructure (NPC, 
2017a). This resulted in shifting of heavy bulk transportation from rail to road, which placed 
immense pressure on road infrastructure. In Namibia, the transport industry relies heavily on 
the road sector for imports, moving approximately 62% of imports and exports of 
approximately 23% (NSA, 2018:22). Sea mode tops the country’s exports, accounting for 
approximately 44% of Namibia’s total exports, which is a positive indication towards attaining 
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Box 2.1: Namibia’s economic corridors 
 
Namibia has four main economic corridors of high-quality roads with the potential to provide the shortest 
route for Namibia to the international markets and becoming a logistics hub given its geographical 
location. The Port of Walvis Bay is the largest commercial port in the country, linking multimodal transport 
corridors to the domestic and regional (SADC landlocked) countries and international markets. According 
to Namibian Ports Authority (NAMPORT, 2017), the Port of Walvis Bay handles approximately five million 
tonnes of cargo and receives around 3 000 vessels each year. Namibia’s port infrastructure ranks 26th 
on the international level (Schwab, 2018), positioning it among the best in Africa and offers competitive 
tariffs. Compared to its rivals in East and Southern Africa, the Port of Walvis Bay is less congested. The 
transport corridor network links the country’s main port (Port of Walvis Bay) with the Southern African 
countries and in principle comprises: 
 The Walvis Bay-Ndola-Lubumbashi Development Corridor, previously known as Trans-Caprivi 
Corridor: This route is accessible by both rail and road, and facilitates imports and exports to 
Zambia, the Southern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe. 
 The Trans-Kalahari Corridor: The route is served by both road and rail mode, mainly utilised by 
Botswana and the northern provinces (mainly Gauteng) of South Africa.  
 The Trans-Cunene Corridor: The route facilitates trade with Angola and is accessible by both 
road and rail.  
 The Trans-Oranje Corridor: The route is accessible by both road and rail, facilitating 
consignments from both the Port of Walvis Bay and that of Lüderitz, mainly to South Africa’s 
Northern Cape province.  
During the period of 2012 to 2016, Namibia underwent a significant decrease in cargo volumes from 
337 000 Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) to 206 000 TEUs between 2012 and 2016 (NAMPORT, 
2017). This decrease has been attributed to a reduction in container volume designated to Angola, which 
comprised approximately 30% of cargo volume at the Port of Walvis Bay. Since 2012, the Angolan 
government has upgraded its ports and thus made use of its own resources at hand, as opposed to the 
Namibian port. In addition, bigger vessels also started calling at other ports in the region that offer deeper 
draft, the latest equipment, and are faster and more efficient compared to what the Port of Walvis Bay 
offers. For the period of 2012 to 2016, the transhipment declined from 218 000 TEUs to 106 000 TEUs 
in 2017, a decrease of approximately 51% over the period under evaluation. In addition, transit traffic 
declined from 52 000 TEUs to 49 000 TEUs, which is approximately 6% per year over the same period 
(NAMPORT, 2017).  
In order for Namibia to achieve its vision of becoming a logistics hub, strategic and infrastructure 
improvement is required to sustain the growth in the utilisation of the corridor. These include infrastructure 
investment of all modes, comprising (i) the Port of Walvis Bay expansion in order to respond to the ever-
increasing freight demand; (ii) upgrading and replacing the railway infrastructure, thereby improving 
speed level, frequency, axle load, reliability, and safety and addressing the challenges of ageing and 
insufficient rolling stock the railway subsector is faced with; and (iii) upgrading and rehabilitating the road 
network, thus ensuring efficient flow of consignments to its neighbouring countries.  
To date, the GRN has taken giant steps whereby it embarked on expanding the Port of Walvis Bay to 
accommodate a container throughput capacity from 355 000 TEUs to 1 005 000 TEUs per annum funded 
by the African Development Bank. Another strategic giant step was acquiring new locomotives. Finally, 
for the road subsector, the main contributor to imported goods, the government has initiated the policy 
review process of the “White paper transportation policy and emphasised that road users should pay for 
their consumption of the road infrastructure”. All strategies taken towards transport and logistics sectors 
have the potential to induce trade flows, while taking advantage of rapid economic growth in a number of 
SADC countries. This is indeed one of the great opportunities for the country to position itself as a logistics 
hub. In conclusion, the transport and logistics sectors at large are likely to create employment 
opportunities for Namibians (African Development Bank, 2014:7). 
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The ultimate goal of attaining and sustaining economic growth is to yield improved 
socioeconomic development through employment creation, high income per capita, equitable 
income distribution, and poverty eradication (Nakale, 2016). Over the past decades since the 
country’s independence, Namibia’s economic growth translated into moderate per capita 
GDP, which resulted in its upper-middle-income status by 2009. Despite the country’s 
satisfactory macroeconomic performance, Namibia is among the countries with a high unequal 
distribution of income as reflected by a high Gini coefficient of 0.572 (NSA, 2016a). In contrast, 
the poverty rate declined by approximately 10.7% from 28.7% in 2009/2010 to 18% in 
2015/2016, meaning nearly 18% of the population lives in poverty (NSA, 2016a).  
In comparison, unemployment rates remain high in Namibia. The 2016 Namibia Labour Force 
Survey recorded 34% unemployment as compared to 28% in 2014. Overall, the youth age 
group constitutes the highest unemployment rate. Approximately 54.9% of youths between 20 
and 24 years of age are unemployed (NSA, 2017). The 2016 Labour Force Survey identified 
a skills mismatch as one of the contributing factors to the unemployment crisis in Namibia 
(NSA, 2017).  
On the other hand, the manufacturing sector has the potential to contribute to sustainable 
economic and employment creation. However, the sector is somewhat small and limited in 
terms of export diversifications. Small manufacturing bases and low levels of diversification 
coupled with skill deficiency and policy constraints are some of the factors identified by 
Godana and Odada (2002) as hindering economic growth in Namibia. Seneviratne (2009) 
posits that an insufficient level of investment, especially those below 25% of the country’s 
GDP, limits the possible potential towards economic growth.  
2.2.2  The transport sector 
Namibia is well positioned along the west coast of the Atlantic Ocean and has four main 
economic trade route corridors linking its neighbouring landlocked countries, as well as South 
Africa and Angola, to its ports. In Namibia, the transport and logistics sector plays a crucial 
role in the country’s economic development.  
The transport and logistics sector in Namibia covers not only road but also air, rail, and 
maritime modes. The railway sector is faced with dilapidated infrastructure and aged and 
obsolete locomotives (NPC, 2017). A shift of heavy bulk transportation from rail to road has 
put immense pressure on the road infrastructure. Although the transportation sector comprises 
maritime, roads, rail, and aviation subsectors, this research focused mainly on the road 
subsector, in particular the national road network managed by the RA. 
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Given Namibia’s vastness and sparse population, the transportation mode is of great 
importance to its economy. Namibia is a unique country in terms of geographical size, with a 
relatively large road network covering 48 399 km (RA, 2016). The country has a small 
population of 2.3 million inhabitants (NSA, 2017), with around 371 281 registered motor 
vehicles (RA, 2017) and 266 673 foreign registered vehicles (RFA, 2017), travelling 
approximately 3 667 million km (RA, 2016) per annum. Approximately 7 165 km of the road 
network is paved and 39 212 km is unpaved. The replacement value of the top layer of the 
paved road network in Namibia stood at N$33 326 billion by 2015 (RA, 2015). 
Namibia seeks to become a logistics hub and a gateway to the SADC region. The country 
appears to be on the right track as it is ranked 35th (out of 141) in terms of its efficiency of 
seaport services (Schwab, 2019). There is, however, still more room for Namibia to improve 
its airport connectivity, ranked 120th (out of 141), as well as mobile/cellular telephone 
subscriptions and fixed-broadband subscriptions per 100 of the population, ranked 81th and 
103th (out of 141) respectively (Schwab, 2019). Namibia ranks 79th (out of 160) on the 
Logistics Performance Index (LPI) global ranking in comparison to its neighbours, South Africa 
and Botswana, who rank 20th and 57th respectively (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4: Global Logistics Performance Index comparing Namibia to South Africa and 
Botswana 
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2.3  THE NAMIBIAN ROAD SECTOR 
 
The Namibian government inherited a good road network at independence in 1990. During 
the South African regime, in particular the 1970s until the mid-1980s, infrastructure, including 
roads, was built with the motive to strengthen the ties between Namibia and South Africa, as 
well as to promote the apartheid policy (Bruzelius, 2000). Although road taxation was in place, 
in no way was the revenue from the road taxation earmarked for road maintenance (Runji, 
2003). The government department responsible for road projects and programmes would 
therefore receive its annual budget allocation through general budget processes via 
parliamentary debate and approval. Namibia has some of the best roads in Africa; very 
extensive, high standard, and generally well maintained. The GRN therefore treasures the 
asset (road infrastructure) at hand and in a fundamental way thought of reforming the 
institutional arrangements in the road sector in order to earmark the road charges and 
implement a proper road network management. 
Since Namibia gained its independence from South Africa in 1990, the road infrastructure has 
been under the management of the MWTC and financed through the SRF, with revenue 
generated from various taxes and tariffs (Chapter 5 discusses road funding in detail). The 
budget presented in the form of Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is allocated to 
several implementing agencies such as ministries, government offices, parastatals, and 
regional and local authorities, and is done based on priority projects and programmes with 
high potential to contribute to the country’s development agenda (NPC, 2017b). However, the 
national budget is subject to parliamentary debates and approval, as noted by Runji (2003). 
In addition, the allocation to the implementing agencies is done according to the availability of 
funds. Among other implementing agencies, the MWTC, prior to the road sector reform, 
executed all road-related construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of the national road 
network, and received the annual road infrastructure budget, among others. In contrast, urban 
roads under the regional and local authorities’ jurisdiction depended on miscellaneous sources 
of revenue. Apart from the so-called municipal rates and taxes, and fees imposed for services 
and allocation from the SRF, the authorities did not have any kind of mechanism or structure 
to charge for the provision or use of roads.  
In 1993, the MWTC submitted a proposal on RUC, which the cabinet subsequently approved 
(Runji, 2003). The proposal paved the way for the formalisation of policy with the intention of 
de-linking the road financing from the SRF. Subsequently, cabinet approved the review of the 
draft White Paper on Transport Policy, adopted by the government in 1995 (Runji, 2003). The 
policy focuses on identifying fundamentals and the long-term policy objectives of the roads’ 
function that should be provided and maintained at the minimal total costs of transportation, 
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both to the supplier (infrastructure costs) and to the demand (road users, such as vehicle 
operating costs [VOC]). However, this necessitates a sound revenue stream, which was 
realised by the implementation of the RUCS. Runji (2003) argues that the RUC, which raise 
less-than-optimal funds required for road infrastructure, would at any point create a 
dependency on the SRF. Bearing that in mind, the White Paper recommended the economic 
(user-pays) principle of full cost recovery from road users (MWTC, 1995). In addition, the 
White Paper supported the creation of the RF, in which the revenue generated from RUC 
should be deposited. This RF should be legislated to secure its management and application 
(Republic of Namibia, 1999c).  
2.3.1  Road sector reform 
The Namibian government conducted a road sector restructuring in 1995 to ensure that 
efficiency is maintained (MWTC, 2000). In order to ensure adequate revenue and proper road 
network management principles for the road sector, the government established three key 
institutions with specific responsibilities towards the national road network. On 1 April 2000, 
the reform led to the formation of the three public enterprises, namely the RFA, the RA, and 
the RCC (Bruzelius, Poolman & Ravenscroft, 2000).  
2.3.1.1 The Road Fund Administration  
The RFA was established in accordance with the RFA Act (No. 18 of 1999) to manage the 
RF, to raise revenue through the RUC (licences and vehicle registration fees, fuel levies, MDC, 
CBC, and abnormal fees), and to regulate road funding based on the user-pays principle 
(Republic of Namibia, 1999c). The RFA imposed direct charges on motor vehicle owners using 
the Namibian roads.  In addition, the RFA allocates funds towards sustaining and improving 
the national road network, as well as major urban arterials. Furthermore, the RFA allocates 
funds towards traffic law enforcement and traffic information systems, road research, and RFA 
and RA administrative costs (RFA, 2016).  
2.3.1.2  The Roads Authority  
The RA was established through the RA Act (No. 17 of 1999) and is mandated to manage the 
national road network, including planning, construction, and maintenance of all national roads. 
The RA uses the RMS to identify, quantify, and prioritise needs for the planning and 
management of the national road network. The RA does not carry out road maintenance, 
construction, or rehabilitation itself, but assigns such work to the RCC and other service 




2.3.1.3  The Roads Contractor Company   
The RCC was established through the RCC Limited Act (No. 14 of 1999) and is responsible 
for construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation of the road network on a competitive basis 
with other service providers (Republic of Namibia, 1999a). 
2.3.2  Institutional arrangements 
The Namibian governance structure and road sector policy framework inherited a broader and 
more comprehensive approach that takes into consideration combined efforts by the political 
and administrative responsibilities of both government and ministerial (departments) and 








Figure 2.5: Namibian road sector governance structure in Namibia 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 2.5 depicts the main institutional arrangement of the national road network and does 
not include the local authority component responsible for urban and arterial roads network. 
The local authorities receive a budget from the SRF through the Ministry of Urban and Rural 
Development. In addition, approved authorities also receive a budget from the RFA revenue 
generated through RUC. 
The Namibian road sector reform is one of the most far-reaching of its kind undertaken to date 
(Runji, 2003). The country is known for its noteworthy RFA, established according to the 
principles of the second-generation funds. These principles are discussed by Gwilliam and 
Ajay (2003) and entail (i) an RF managed through the RFA entity, responsible for managing 
the RUCS and channelling funds to the road authorities, (ii) independent board members 
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comprise public-private nominees to oversee the RF, and (iii) generate revenue through the 
RUCS, among others fuel levies, AVLRF, ALF, MDC, and CBC. 
Namibia has a dedicated RF under the umbrella of the RFA, where all revenue collected 
through charging instruments (RUC) are directed. The current RUCS in Namibia includes 
techniques to charge users, namely fuel levies, AVLRF, MDC, CBC, and ALF, as indicated in 
Box 2.2. Namibia has five RUC instruments in place, which, if adequately implemented, can 
be used as a starting point in promoting trade and sustainable travel and stimulating economic 
activities in the country and beyond.  
The importance of this role has been recognised by the Namibian government, thus 
establishing the RFA mandated by the RFA Act of 1999 to establish and manage the Namibian 
RUCS and the RF. The RFA is also responsible for distributing and allocating funds to the 
approved authorities for the implementation of road projects and programmes. The revenue 
generated from the RUC is directed to the RF. According to the available audited financial 
reports and business plans of the RFA and RA, the current charging instruments have 
frequently delivered insufficient income for road maintenance. Lately, the RFA has issued 
several press releases calling for better instruments and mechanics on how to improve the 
revenue collection from road users. This confirms that the Namibian RUCS in its current state 
is not stable in terms of revenue-generation streams. 
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2.3.3  Road User Charge System: The Namibian experience 
The RUCS was established in 1999 as a means of collecting revenue from road users. The 
principles underlying the present method of road pricing in Namibia are largely those stipulated 
in the RFA Act of 1999. The Namibian approach to road pricing has been shaped by two major 
parliamentary decisions. The RFA Act of 1999 and the Namibian Transport Policy (2017) state 
that road users should pay the full cost of their consumption (Republic of Namibia, 1999c; 
MWT, 2017). The RFA from time to time in consultation with the MoF may determine the level 
of charges to be imposed and issue a notice in the Government Gazette. While the RFA 
attempts to incorporate the latest knowledge in its calculation, stability in the method is also 
Box 2.2: Definition of Road User Charge System, objectives, and current charging instrument 
in Namibia 
 
Definition of an RUCS 
The RUCS is a system for independent regulation of road funding in accordance with economic 
efficiency criteria and full cost recovery from the road users (RFA Act, No. 18 of 1999).  
The objective of the RUCS 
The RUCS in Namibia was developed to economically recover the full costs of road expenditure from 
the consumers of roads in an equitable manner. In accordance with the user-pays principle, the system 
determines the amount and manner of funds to be raised from the road users and successively 
determines the charging instruments to be imposed. The RUCS is intended to attain the following, 
among others: 
 Ensure that revenue required to upgrade and maintain the roads is raised from the road users 
as opposed to general tax revenue. 
 Pricing the use of roads, thereby improving economic efficiency in the road transport sector, 
removing price distortion, and charging users as per their consumption. 
 Promote equity within the road sector (per categories). 
 Fair competition between road/rail transport sector. 
The RUC include: 
 the determination of funding for road projects and programmes submitted to the RFA for 
funding; 
 the determination of the rates of RUC as stipulated in section 18a of the RFA of 1999; 
 the imposition and collection from the RUCS into the RF; 
 refunding of the fuel levies on fuel used off-road; and 
 the management of the RUC and RF by the RFA. 
The current Namibian RUCS comprises: 
 Fuel levies; 
 AVLRF; 
 CBC;  
 MDC; and  
 ALF. 
Source: (Republic of Namibia, 1999c) 
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required, as fluctuations would create uncertainty and mask historic trends (Sansom et al., 
1998). The Namibian Transport Policy (2017) recommends that road expenses should be fully 
recovered from the users, and it desires that each vehicle class should pay their costs 
accordingly (MWT, 2017). The present method is therefore based on a twin approach: one, 
on the evaluation of road expenditure; and, two, on the allocation of road expenditure to 
vehicle classes according to each class’ responsibilities for road expenses. Road expenses 
are discussed in Section 5.5 of Chapter 5.  
2.3.3.1  Road User Charges in practice 
The current RUC applied to motor vehicles using the Namibian road network are based on 
distance travelled, which could be based on the mass, length, width, or height of the vehicle 
or its loading and axle numbers, or a combination of these factors (Republic of Namibia, 
1999c). The charges are associated with an entry fee for vehicles not registered in Namibia 
and using the Namibian road network in the name of CBC, AVLRF for Namibian-registered 
vehicles, and heavy vehicle-based charges and fuel levies. These charges are set based on 
cost recovery for the national road network managed by the RA and other roads managed by 
the respective local authorities. The revenue generated from the RUC accrues to the RF 
managed by the RFA (see Chapter 5). This arrangement was enforced by the RFA Act of 
1999 to ensure that revenue generated from the RUC is allocated back towards road-related 
expenditure (Republic of Namibia, 1999c). This arrangement foresees the established of the 
RF with the expectation for the RUCS to bring about desired results in terms of funding the 
road network from the revenue generated from the RUC.  
2.3.3.2  Fuel levy 
In Namibia, petrol and diesel are subject to a range of taxes and levies. In addition to value-
added tax (VAT) is the customs and excise duty paid to the Southern African Custom Union 
(SACU). Other charges include the RFA and MVA Fund and the storage levy paid to the 
National Energy Fund (NEF). Existing evidence indicates that the pump price for petrol stands 
at N$12.95 (MME, 2019). From the pump price, N$1.36 per litre accrues to the RFA, N$0.503 
per litre is channelled toward the MVA Fund, N$0.98 per litre accrues to the NEF, N$0.65 per 




Table 2.1: Petrol and diesel taxation in cents per litre 
Valid as of 
Unleaded petrol (95) Diesel (500) (50) 
Fuel tax RUC Fuel tax RUC 
1.2.18 40 122 40 122 
1.3.18 40 122 40 122 
1.4.18 40 122 40 122 
1.5.18 40 122 40 122 
1.6.18 40 130 40 130 
1.7.18 40 130 40 130 
1.8.18 65 130 65 130 
1.9.18 65 130 65 130 
1.10.18 65 130 65 130 
1.11.18 65 130 65 130 
1.12.18 65 130 65 130 
1.1.19 65 130 65 130 
1.4.19 65 136 65 136 
Source: Author (Data from MME, 2019) 
 
Table 2.1 shows the RFA fuel levy per litre for selected months. The values indicate that the 
fuel levy increased with the same percentage for both petrol and diesel in 2018 and 2019. 
However, raising the fuel levy to address the road transport funding gap will not ensure that 
users pay their fair share (Jones & Bock, 2017). A study by the World Bank (2008) found that 
40% to 60% of people in developing countries live more than 8 km away from a health facility, 
financial services, and shopping centres. In Namibia, more than half of the population resides 
in rural areas (NSA, 2017), therefore raising the fuel levy is likely to place a heavy burden on 
low-income households (who may not be able to afford fuel-efficient and hybrid vehicles) and 
those who must drive longer distances in order to access other services, including hospitals 
and financial services. A recent study recommended distance charges as the best alternative 
to a fuel levy when charging users for road services (Jones & Bock, 2017). A lesson can be 
drawn from an Oregon experiment of per-mile fees as the best alternative to a fuel levy. The 
purpose of the experiment included to align transportation charges with road use, thus making 
drivers pay for road service consumed per mile: “For each mile driven, a driver contributes 1.5 
cents, regardless of rural or urban location or whether the vehicle’s fuel efficiency is 150 mpg 
or 20 mpg. Each driver’s contribution on miles driven is equitable and sustainable” (Jones & 
Bock, 2017:3). 
Currently, the fuel levy for both light and heavy vehicles could be taken as a proxy for distance 
travelled, given the rough approximate that the longer the distance travelled, the more costs 
the drivers could incur to fuel their vehicles. The problem with such a proxy is that it does not 
capture the location as the efficiency pricing does. However, the fuel levy as the main revenue 
contributor in many nations might see short-term success as hybrid and electric vehicles 
increase their market share, as these traditional charging instruments are projected to have a 
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relative share of actual road use (Teodorovic, 2016). Smith (1975) alluded that qualified prices 
of diesel or petrol per litre of vehicle travelling on the network should reflect the relative costs 
of the trip. Smith (1975) further recommended that for the fuel levy to cover the variable 
maintenance costs of road use per trip, the fuel levy on diesel per litre should be higher than 
that of the petrol.   
In the Namibian case, this could, however, be justified by the factor that most diesel-powered 
vehicles are commercial by nature and a huge portion represents heavy goods vehicles 
(HGVs) that also pay MDC and their vehicle licences fees are set to a certain degree to 
account for their weight (GRN, 2019). The ongoing debate points out that a fuel levy is best 
suitable for other objectives than that of setting road-use prices equal to the efficient price of 
SRMC. As fuel levy-generated revenue falls, new directions are pointed towards alternative 
funding instruments such as motor vehicle sale taxes and bonds, which are independent of 
network use and could lead transportation pricing and financing gears away from the desired 
marginal cost pricing (Teodrovic, 2016). Litman (2011) made an argument that such actions 
could lead to inefficient markets, where demand is independent of true transportation costs.   
According to recent studies, revenue generated from a fuel levy is likely to shrink with the 
progression of fuel-efficient and electric vehicles (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2019). There is therefore a need to anticipate the potential decline in 
fuel levy revenue and gauge alternative measures. There are currently no environmental taxes 
on fuel in Namibia. However, an environmental duty of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions applies 
to motor vehicles when manufactured in or imported in Namibia1 (GRN, 2016). 
2.3.3.3  Annual vehicle licence and registration fees 
Every registered vehicle in Namibia, according to specified vehicle classes, pays annual motor 
vehicle licence and registration fees. The annual motor vehicle licence fee is related to the 
vehicle weight (see Table 2.2). Registration and licence fees are decided by the roads 
agencies in consultation with the MoF, which grants increases to the rate to be imposed. The 
revenue accrues to the RA and is then paid over to the RF (Republic of Namibia, 1999c).   
  
                                               
1  The environmental duty does not apply to vehicles imported by a tourist, visitor, and those in diplomatic missions 
(GRN, 2016). CO2 emission is calculated using the emission stated in the CO2 certificated obtained from the 
manufacturer of the motor vehicle.  
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Table 2.2: Annual motor vehicle licence fees 
Vehicle class Annual licence fee (N$) 
Motor car 
0 <kilograms>750 463 
12 001<kg>12 500 48 913.00 
19 501<kg>20 000 92 756.00 
20 000 kg< (increase by N$2 928.00 for every 500 kg)  
Trailers and semi-trailers 
0<kg>1 000 275 
10 001<kg>11 000 30 113.00 
19 001<kg>19 500 69 989.00 
Source: Author (Data from GRN, 2019) 
 
Table 2.2 presents a case where the vehicle licence and registration fees could be taken as a 
rough proxy for vehicle mass (loading), thus the licence varies with the weight. For instance, 
lighter vehicles (with tare kilograms less than 12 001 and greater than 12 500) pay 
N$48 913.00, which is less than a truck with tare kilograms less than 19 501 and greater than 
20 000, which pays N$92 756.00 for its annual licence fee. The argument made with the fuel 
levy, however, applies in the sense that these proxies do not capture costs that are associated 
with the space and time that the vehicle utilises the network.   
2.3.3.4  Mass Distance Charges 
The paramount motivation for charging travelling distance is to capture and allocate the 
maintenance costs associated with heavy vehicle use of the road network (Rothengatter & 
Doll, 2002). In Namibia, heavy vehicles using the road network are subject to travelling 
distance charges. The travelling distance charges apply to every vehicle with a weight of more 
than 3 500 kg. In this study, the vehicles are categorised into four classes. Level 1 includes 
heavy vehicles with a weight of more than 3 500 kg and less than or equal to 7 000 kg and 
pays a charge of N$7 per 100 km. Level 2 consists of heavy vehicles with a weight value of 
more than 7 000 kg and less than or equal to 16 000 kg, which are charged N$8.40 per 
100 km. Heavy vehicles of more than 16 000 kg and less than or equal to 34 000 kg under 
level 3 pay N$15.30 per 100 km. Trucks over 34 000 kg and less than or equal to 44 000 kg 
under level 4 pay N$30.80 per 100 km (see Table 2.3). Final heavy goods under level 5 weight 
of more than 44 000 kg pay more N$46.10 per 100 km (GRN, 2019). The current system is 
based on odometer readings as a main factor to determine the distance driven. However, such 
a system cannot serve as an efficient pricing system as its rates do not vary with location, nor 
do they reflect congestion imposed by a heavy vehicles utilising the road network. This implies 
that drivers are not receiving the right price signals that reflect the marginal damage heavy 
vehicles impose on the road surface (Mclnerney et al., 2010).  
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Table 2.3: Travelling distance charges for fiscal year 2019/2020 
Travelling distance charges 
Vehicle Type Description Charges (N$) per 100 km 
Heavy goods truck V/D2 value <3 500 kg and ≤7 000 kg 7.00 
Heavy passenger bus 
Heavy goods truck 
V/D value <7 000 kg and ≤16 000 kg 8.40 
Heavy goods bus 
Heavy goods truck 
V/D value >16 000 kg 
V/D value >16 000 kg and ≤34 000 kg 
15.30 
Goods vehicle truck-tractor D value >16 000 kg and ≤34 000 kg 15.30 
Goods vehicle truck D value >34 000 kg and ≤44 000 kg 30.80 
Goods vehicle truck-tractor D value >44 000 kg 46.10 
Source: Author (The Government Gazette GRN, 2019) 
 
The OECD (2019) suggested a Global Positioning System (GPS) as an alternative instrument 
to odometer readings. The GPS has the ability to track vehicle location and can accommodate 
differentiated rates. From Oregon’s distance-based charging experiment, GPS-based rates 
raised privacy concerns. However, privacy issues from both the Oregon experience and 
German trucking were addressed by destroying the drivers’ information as soon as payment 
was made (Kirk & Levinson, 2016). The existing MDC attempts to ensure that heavy vehicles 
pay for the damage they inflict on the road network surface. However, it is a blunt instrument 
that does not adjust for the weight of the truck or the type of road the heavy vehicle drives on. 
Therefore, a travelling distance charge that is adjusted to time, location, and distance would 
have a huge advantage over the current system.  
2.3.3.5  Abnormal Load Charges 
Abnormal motor vehicles driving on the Namibian road network are subject to a permit fee that 
includes congestion cost of N$0.24 per km, E80 costs of N$0.65 per km, and a police escort 
fee of N$18.77 (see Table 2.4). Alternatively, a fixed permit can be purchased monthly, once 
every three, six, or 12 months. 
Table 2.4: Abnormal Load Charges for the fiscal year 2019/2020  
Abnormal load charges 
Cost description (N$/km) 
Congestion cost 0.24 
E80 cost 0.65 
Police escort fee 18.77 
Fixed permits (minimum N$) 
1 month 477.64 
3 months 557.62 
6 months 1035.26 
12 months 1455.14 
Police escort fee 674.25 
Source: Author (Data from GRN, 2019) 
                                               
2  D value implies the vehicle is not equipped to draw, and V value implies that the vehicle is equipped to draw. 
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2.3.3.6  Cross-Border Charges  
Every foreign registered vehicle entering Namibia pays a fee according to specified vehicle 
categories, including MDC for all vehicles with a mass exceeding 3 500 kg. As it applies to 
domestic vehicles, MDC on foreign vehicles are aimed at recovering variable costs not 
recovered using fuel levies. Upon entering Namibia, the driver of the foreign registered vehicle 
is required to visit the RFA office at the respective border of entry and acquire the necessary 
permit to use the Namibian road network (see Appendix A for the fees applicable to different 
vehicle classes).   
2.3.4  The national road network 
 
The Namibian road network can be categorised into three main groups, namely the national 
road network, the urban roads, and the minor roads. The national road network comprises 
corridor (truck) roads (connecting Namibia with neighbouring countries), main roads (linking 
important centres in Namibia), district roads (carrying reasonable traffic), and farm roads 
(connecting important farming areas and other land uses). 
2.3.4.1  Road type distribution 
The Namibian road network consists of 48 399 km of roads, of which 7 165 km are paved 
roads and approximately 39 212 km are unpaved (RA, 2016). The national road network 
comprises 7 568 km bitumen roads, 25 675 km gravel roads, earth roads of 13 022 km, 
304 km salt roads, and approximately 1 829 proclaimed roads (see Figure 2.6 and Table 2.5). 
The road network in Namibia is built to standards, in comparison to the best practice, and is 





Figure 2.6: The Namibian road network per road category and surface type 
Source: RFA (2016) 
 
Since independence in 1990, the country has made substantial progress towards national 
road network development. The road network grew from 41 815 km (RA, 2015) at 
independence to 48 399 km in 2016 (RA, 2016), which is an increase of 15.7%. In contrast, 
the bitumen road network grew from 4 572 km at independence to 7 568 km by 2016 (RA, 
2016). Table 2.5 presents the national road network statistics, which comprise approximately 
15.6% of paved road (bitumen), 81% of unpaved roads (gravel, earth, and salt), and 
approximately 3.4% of proclaimed roads. While the RA manages the national road network, 
individual municipalities or town councils manage the urban roads, approximated at 6 387 km 




Table 2.5: Namibia road network by road type 







Bitumen  6 664 7 165 7 568 
Gravel  25 709 25 921 25 675 
Earth  11 460 11 541 13 022 
Salt road 288 304 304 
Proclaimed road  1 524 1 446 1 829 
Total 45 645 46 378 48 399 
Source: Author (Data from RA, 2012) 
2.3.4.2  Vehicle population and traffic distribution 
In 2015, the total vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT) on the national road network was 
estimated at 3 667 million per annum (RA, 2016). Although the biggest portion (81%) of the 
road network is unsealed, such roads constitute only approximately 19% of total traffic volume. 
The distance travelled on bituminous roads (7 568 km) constitutes 81.69% of the traffic. HGVs 
make up 20% of the traffic (RA, 2016). The Namibian vehicle population increased by 12 705 
to 374 710 (see Figure 2.7), which represents 3.5% annual growth (RA, 2017). An increase in 
traffic volume can be translated into a positive sign of a growing economy.  
 
Figure 2.7: Namibian vehicle population growth in percentage 
Source: Author (Data from RA, 2016) 
 
The national road network comprises 7 892.7 km of paved roads and 26 046.5 km of unpaved 
road3 (RA, 2018). Approximately 84% of the national road network is unsealed and consists 
of low-volume traffic of approximately 19% of travel. An interesting aspect of Namibian roads 
is that, apart from the bituminous trunk roads, almost 61% of the road network carries less 
                                               
3  Unpaved roads exclude 299.9 km of salt roads and 13 315.6 km of earth roads. The total road network amounts 
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than 50 vehicles per day (see Figure 2.8). The RA (2018) recorded that only 1% of the road 
network carries over 3 000 vehicles per day. This implies that Namibian roads are not 
congested.  
 
AADT = Annual average daily traffic; VPD = Vehicles per day 
 
Figure 2.8: Daily traffic on national road network 
Source: RA (2017) 
 
2.3.4.3  Motor vehicles per 1 000 people 
Namibia is compared to South Africa, which is a top performer in the region with regard to 
motor vehicles per 1 000 inhabitants. Although these two countries differ significantly in terms 
of population and GDP, they fall in the same income group category (upper middle income). 
Out of 191 countries, South Africa is ranked 83rd, with 165 motor vehicles per 1 000 of the 
population. However, Namibia can also be compared to other countries in the same income 
group and population range. Botswana outperformed Namibia, being ranked 94 th in the world 
with 133 motor vehicles per 1 000 people. Namibia is ranked 102nd in the world in terms of 
vehicles per capita. This translates into 107 motor vehicles per 1 000 inhabitants. Namibia 
outperformed Lesotho, which ranks 184th with four motor vehicles per 1 000 people (see 
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Figure 2.9: Cumulative number of countries’ vehicles per 1 000 of the population 
Source: Nation Master (2014) 
 
In summary, it is therefore evident that a relatively smaller vehicle population servicing 
Namibia’s extensive road network (see Figure 2.10) could have implications for road-user cost 
responsibility and ability to pay for their road use. The divergence between the road network 
size in terms of the supply versus the number of vehicles (demand) implies that funding 
requirements for routine and periodic maintenance, rehabilitation, and upgrading will be 
proportionally more for Namibia as compared to countries where the road network and road 
users are balanced. A desired position for any country will be for a bigger road network with 
relatively more road users, otherwise few road users will pay more charges in countries with 
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Figure 2.10: Cumulative countries’ total kilometres of paved and unpaved road network 
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Although Namibia is a country with few inhabitants and quite an extensive road network with 
a small vehicle population, the country is fairly aligned with the best international standards in 
terms of its road network. Namibia takes pride in the fact that it is leading in sub-Saharan 
Africa in terms of quality road infrastructure. The Competitiveness Report for 2017/18 
(Schwab, 2017) ranked Namibia at 31st position of the quality of road infrastructure out of 137 
countries assessed. Although Namibia moved from the 23rd position (out of 138) countries 
assessed in 2016/2017, it is still at the top of sub-Saharan African countries in terms of the 
road infrastructure quality index (see Table 2.6).  
Table 2.6: Top 10 African countries with quality roads 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 
 
 2016/2017 World Ranking  2017/2018 World Ranking  
# 
Countries Score out of 7 
World Ranking 





(out of 137) 
1 Namibia 5.2 23 1 Namibia 5.0 31 
2 South Africa 5.0 29 2 Rwanda 5.0 32 
3 Rwanda 5.0 31 3 Swaziland 4.7 39 
4 Cote d’Ivoire 4.7 42 4 Morocco 4.5 43 
5 Mauritius 4.7 44 5 Mauritius 4.5 48 
6 Morocco 4.4 55 6 South Africa 4.4 50 
7 Kenya 4.2 61 7 Seychelles 4.4 53 
8 Botswana 4.1 62 8 Kenya 4.3 60 
9 Cape Verde 4.1 66 9 Cape Verde 3.9 77 
10 Senegal 4.0 71 10 Botswana 3.8 80 
Source: Author (Data from Schwab, 2018) 
 
Roads are the dominant mode of transport in sub-Saharan Africa, carrying over 75% of both 
freight and passengers (Beuran, Gachassin & Raballand, 2013). Namibian road quality 
outperforms other indicators such as GDP per capita and GDP purchasing power parity, which 
ranked 128th and 134th (out of 191) respectively. The country’s position and logistics 
performance at the international level indicates that policy interventions must be directed at 
physical infrastructure with the aim of equalising the basic provision of infrastructure 
domestically, linking the country to the greater Southern African region, thereby promoting 
regional trade and cooperation (Runji, 2003). Given the broader picture on the Namibian 
economy and the transport sector, it is important to understand the importance of transport 
investment and associated benefits. The next section discusses the significant role of 
transportation in the economy. 
 
2.4  CONTRIBUTION OF ROAD TRANSPORT TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
This section sets out the significant role of transportation in and its impact on the overall 
economy. As the motivation behind this research was to conduct an empirical investigation 
into Namibian road sector funding, it is deemed necessary to outline the relationship between 
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road and economic development and indicate whether transport effects bring about long-, 
medium-, or short-term improvements.  
2.4.1  The significant role of transportation in the economy 
The NDP4 (NPC, 2012) revealed the country’s aim of becoming a logistics hub and a gateway 
to the SADC region. This vision has led to a significant investment in transport infrastructure 
(maritime, rails, roads, and aviation) to meet international standards (Walvis Bay Corridor 
Group, 2016). Transport infrastructure investment also drives the country’s long-term logistics. 
This acts as a catalyst to productivity, growth, job creation, improving social prosperity, and, 
to a greater extent, intra-trade within the continent (NPC, 2017a).  
In its own right, it suffices to say that the transport and logistics sector plays a significant role 
in the economy. According to the Namibia Labour Force Survey, the overall transportation 
sector employs approximately 22 175 persons, which accounts for 3.3% of the total work force 
in Namibia (NSA, 2017). In addition, the transport and logistics sector contributes 
approximately 4.7% to the country’s GDP (NPC, 2017a). 
The transportation sector can have a wider effect on the economy both at the investment and 
operational (expenditure for operating a vehicle) levels. The direct effects of transportation 
investment are to reduce the operating costs of transport and lead time and enhance access 
to destinations within the network4. In addition, transportation investment may also lessen 
economic disadvantages in the case where upgrading infrastructure may result in congestion 
and accident reduction in a particular road network. Transportation investment benefits are 
measured through cost-benefit analysis (Ustaoglu & Williams, 2019). For example, the 
expansion of road infrastructure from single lane to dual carriage may reduce congestion and 
accidents. Effects on productivity and the spatial pattern of economic development are other 
indirect significances of transport investments. Improved transport links business to their 
suppliers and provides access to regional markets. Increased access and connectivity result 
in trade opportunities, competition, and specialisation, which bring about longer-term 
productivity gains. Improved transport will stimulate efficient spatial patterns of households 
and businesses, which potentially spur economic development (Banister & Berechman, 2000; 
Quium, 2019). However, unless necessary transport investment is undertaken, development 
will be stunted.  
                                               
4  Improved transport links services, lower cost, and enhances market accessibility for businesses to access raw 




In developing countries, public investments are likely to have a multiplier effect on GDP in the 
short run (Meersman & Nazemzadeh, 2017). Moreover, the multiplier effect is likely to be 
higher in countries with insufficient infrastructure; for example during the road construction 
phase, activities such as employees required for construction; surveyors to map the site, site 
manager, engineers, and accountants; and purchasing of all kind of equipment needed, trigger 
economic activities in the short run (Meersman & Nazemzadeh, 2017).   
Most countries commit to increasing substantial resources in the road sub-sector. In so doing, 
the road network is improved, which subsequently enhances road-user safety and reduces 
vehicle operating cost, increases production, and lowers commodities’ prices (Heggie, 1995; 
Orondje, Rambo & Odundo, 2014). Historically, transport provides access both for business 
and household sectors between spatially separated locations. For the business sector, 
transport connects businesses to their source of input and to their markets and provides 
interaction opportunities for business-to-business trading. For the household sector, this 
involves access to employment opportunities, medical and education facilities, recreation 
places, shopping centres, and a medium to their holiday destinations. 
In line with the Transport Master Plan and Master Plan of an International Logistics Hub for 
SADC Countries, the NDP5 (NPC, 2017a) embarked on a holistic and integrated approach to 
transport planning that is both multimodal and intermodal for transporting people and service 
provision. Although there is no doubt that the transportation and logistics sector can support 
economic development, especially in Namibia and other developing countries, the relationship 
between transport and economic development should be understood. Transport facilitates a 
wide range of social and economic interactions. The quality of transport links intermodal and 
multimodal transfer facilities, which can effect relative competitiveness of an area over another 
area, lowers costs to markets and resources, facilitates access to larger markets, and 
improves quality of life.  
In most developing countries, like Namibia, transport plays an important role in the economic 
development of the country. Moreover, further investment in a well-connected transport 
infrastructure network of high quality expands industrialisation and trade, which instantly leads 
to economic growth. Reliable transport infrastructure reduces the inventory cost of firms, which 
leads to just-in-time delivery, allows firms to realise economies of scale, and interregional and 
global specialisation. Cheaper transport ushers the industry into better accessibility to demand 
and supply markets, firms discovering new markets, access to skill labour, and better and 
cheaper raw materials (Meersman & Nazemzadeh, 2017). On the contrary, a weak 
infrastructure network is likely to bring about inefficiency in the transportation of production 
inputs, as well as potentially leading to increases in their prices. Therefore, the limitation of 
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basic infrastructure (which links producers to the source of raw materials and their customers), 
inefficiencies, and competitiveness may impede economic development (Demurger, 2001). 
Infrastructure enables private businesses and individuals to produce goods and services more 
efficiently (Stupak, 2018). In the short run, infrastructure development is likely to stimulate 
demand and subsequently result in increased overall productivity in the long run.  
2.4.2  The relationship between roads and economic development 
Transport is demand driven; its demand arising either from economic or social activities (There 
is a need for raw materials (production inputs) to be transported to production centres, which 
creates demand for freight services; whereas households require transport to work places, 
shopping centres, medical and education facilities, as well as for social needs. Transport 
investment is necessary; however, on its own it is not sufficient to generate significant growth 
at national or regional level. Broader interaction takes place within the firm and between firms, 
within sectors and between sectors, as well as between households and organisations, as 
noted by Lakshmanan (2011). Transport investment such as constructing new road 
infrastructure, rehabilitating, and upgrading existing road infrastructure opens up markets and 
create conditions of spatial agglomerations and technical change, which may lead to improved 
economic wellbeing, thus generating longer-terms benefits.  
Economic benefits that may arise from transport investments can best be understood from a 
broader perspective. Figure 2.11 presents the relationship between transport intervention, 
funding, social wellbeing, and economic development.  
 
Figure 2.11: Relationship between transport investment and economic development 
Source: Saunders and Dalziel (2014) 
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Lower transportation costs and improved accessibility promote market expansion and 
encourage businesses to flourish. Increased accessibility and connectivity present trade 
opportunities, which can lead to business competition and specialisation and result in long-
term productivity gains. In the long run, sustainability in transport infrastructure and technology 
stimulates structural changes in national and regional economies. Table 2.7 provides a 
summary of the effect of transport infrastructure investment.  
Table 2.7: Effect of transport infrastructure investment 
Features Short-term effects Medium to long term Long term 
Effects 
 
 Reduction in congestion. 
 Lower VOC. 
 Enhanced accessibility.  
 Just-in-time delivery. 
 Increased demand and 
output. 
 Reduction in inventory costs. 
 National and regional growth. 
 Employment creation 
(construction sector). 
 Expansive market for 
products, labour, and 
services. 
 Enhanced export 
opportunities. 
 Free entry and exit of firms. 
 National and regional 
integration. 
 Industrial cluster formation.  
 Commercial cluster 
formation. 
 Promotion of 
globalisation 
processes. 
 Sustainable regional 
competitive 
advantages. 







 Increased competition. 
 Supply and demand forces. 
 Economies of scale. 
 Agglomeration. 
 Cumulative interconnection. 
 Increased competition. 
 Endogenous growth. 
 Monopolies may emerge. 
 New economic 
geography emerges. 








 Cost-benefit analysis.  Growth models. 
 New economic geography 
theory. 
 General computable 
equilibrium models. 
 Gain from trade. 
 Economic history 
analysis. 
Source: Meersman and Nazemzadeh (2017)  
2.5  SUMMARY 
This chapter sought to narrate an overview of the transport and logistics sector in Namibia 
with particular focus on the road sub-sector. Although the country has taken a giant step 
towards infrastructure development in an effort towards attaining its vision of becoming a 
logistics hub and a gateway of Southern African countries and to the international market, 
there is still potential to enrich the sector. The road sector is the main mode for importing 
goods into the country. Policy and strategies, aimed at ensuring that the scarce resource 
(road) is maintained, are in place. The policy advocates that the road users, as the consumers 
of the scarce resource, should be made to pay for their consumption at the or closer to the 
point of use.  
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To that effect, the road reform resulted in establishment of the three public enterprises with 
mandates that ensure that RUC are in place, that funds are deposited to a designated road 
funds, and that they are effectively allocated to the relevant authorities. Although there is an 
RF in place, the budget allocated towards maintenance and rehabilitation of the national road 
network is still not sufficient for the roads authorities to execute their planning and meeting the 
demand for the national road network. Generating sufficient revenue will not only ensure well-
maintained roads, but it will also reduce total transportation cost and facilitate trade flows.  
Transport is demand driven and on its own does not yield economic development. Transport 
infrastructure is a catalyst that complements other sectors and together contribute to economic 
development. Given its small domestic economy, Namibia must take advantage of its 
international corridors that link its ports to the SADC region and the rest of the world. 
Diversifying the country’s economy into more productive activities will not only position 
Namibia in becoming a logistics hub for the SADC region, but it will also eventually stimulate 
the economic growth needed to achieve the country’s Vision 2030, as emphasised by Diop, 
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CHAPTER 3:  
ROAD PRICING AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly explains the available literature on the subject of road pricing and funding, 
as well as policy instruments applied worldwide. The emphasis is on theoretical concepts, 
frameworks, and approaches to road pricing. While there is an assortment of literature on road 
pricing (Hau, 1992; Hau, 1995; Gomez-Ibanez & Small, 1994; Johansson & Mattsson, 2012; 
De Percy, 2018) and road funding (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2014; Dumortier, 
Zhang & Marron, 2017; Winder, 2018), this literature review focuses on prominent issues for 
the road sector on selected continents, including transport policies, economic principles for 
road pricing, and internalisation of external costs. A critical review of available studies on the 
road sector seeks to ensure a systematic analysis of relevant thematics for this research. 
Therefore, the chapter provides a conceptual framework that aims to guide the objectives of 
this study. Moreover, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 attempt a detailed discussion and broader literature 
review aimed to address the specific objective set for each chapter. 
3.2  INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH ON ROAD PRICING 
Road pricing implies direct charging of a price for the use of a road network (Australasian 
Railway Association, 2010) and it is often introduced as a method to internalise the 
externalities generated by road use (Johansson & Mattsson, 2012; Fridstorm, 2019). Road 
infrastructure investment is an expensive undertaking, in particular with the rising concern of 
the “user-pays” principle, which is justifiable on the notion that it is fair to hold accountable 
users of scarce resources (roads) for the full cost of road provision and use (Brid, 2001). The 
theoretical economic principle recommends road pricing to be set at the SRMC (Hau, 1992). 
It is worth noting that the concept of MSC has received substantial attention in the international 
research sphere. Innumerable transport policy documents have been produced with strategies 
for implementation and exploring various ways of charging users for road use. However, every 
geographic region (for example Asia and the Pacific, Europe, the United States of America 
[USA], and Africa) seems to follow a different approach with respect to the concept of road 
pricing and charging for road use. For instance, the European Commission (1998), in the 
policy paper titled “Fair payment for infrastructure use”, focused on a progressive 
harmonisation of charging principles in all major commercial modes of transport across the 
European Union (EU) community. In the USA, the report of the National Surface 





A new framework for transportation finance”, focused on the development and use of options 
and evaluation tools. In Asia and the Pacific, the Asian Development Bank (2012) aims to 
coordinate the systematic overhaul of the road-funding regime. To that effect, it proposed the 
establishment of institutional reform into an institution that manages road funding. In Africa, 
the focus is on the establishment of road funds and administration operating under the so-
called “second-generation road funds” (Heggie & Vickers, 1998; Heggie, 1995). The next 
section of this study unpacks main research areas from each geographic region. 
3.2.1  Road pricing studies in Europe 
The European Commission and countries on the continent have funded research aimed at 
relating road charges closely to the MSC principle associated with the use of road 
infrastructure. This implies charging road users for the use of infrastructure that not only 
reflects the costs of providing and maintaining the facilities but also reflects the externalities 
costs, including congestion, environment, and accident costs (European Commission, 1995). 
The EU places greater weight on economic instruments as a way of tackling the negative 
externalities that arise from road use (Nash & Matthews, 2005). The key focus of most 
European studies has been charging the price at SRMC. The MSC aims to internalise all the 
external costs, such that environmental costs, congestion costs, and other negative external 
costs that form part of the charges that road users pay for their consumption when using or 
closer to the point of using the road infrastructure. Other EU research studies’ focus has been 
on developing methodology on measuring the MSC of transport (see Table 3.1) and using the 
developed methods and tools to estimate the MSC when setting tariffs. Table 3.1 indicates 
sample research conducted in the subject area of measuring external costs in Europe.  
Table 3.1: Review of studies on estimation of transportation external costs 
Year Study Source 
2004 External cost of transport 
Developing harmonised European approaches for 
transport costing and project assessment (HEATCO) 
INFRAS and IWW (2004) 
Institut Fur Energiewirtschaft and Rationelle 
Energieanwendung (2004) 
2008 Handbook on estimation of external costs in the transport 
sector 
Internalisation measures and policies for all external 
costs of transport in Europe 
INFRAS, CE Delft, Fraunhofer 
Gesellschalft ISI and University Gdansk (2008) 
2011 External costs of transport in Europe CE Delft, INFRAS and Fraunhofer ISI (2011) 
2012 The true costs of automobility: External costs of cars. 
Overview of existing estimates in EU-27 
Technical University of Dresden (2012) 
2013 Internalisation of external costs of transport- A target 
driven approach with focus on climate change 
Musso and Rothengatter (2013) 
2014 Methods for estimation of external costs of transport Jokanovi and Kamel (2014) 
2014 Update of the handbook on external costs of transport DIW Econ, CAU and Ricardo-AEA (2014) 
2019 Handbook on external cost of transport, Version 2019 
(No.18.4K83.131) 
Ce Delft, INFRAS, TRT and Ricardo (2019) 





MSC pricing has been associated with various limitations. Critique of the approach 
(Rothengatter, 2003; Nash, 2003) asserts that the SRMC principle is limited to the verification 
of certain underlying assumptions. Quinet (2005) suggests that in overcoming the SRMC 
shortcoming, deviations must be considered to explore average cost, development cost, and 
Long-Run Marginal Cost (LRMC). However, the road-pricing concept has been in place across 
Europe, with Norway as a leading example of having established several urban pricing 
schemes since 1986. Some countries seem to favour marginal cost pricing by applying both 
SRMC and LRMC. For instance, SRMC can be related to the heavy vehicle fee introduced by 
Switzerland in 2001 (Nash & Matthews, 2005), whereas London implemented the urban road 
pricing scheme in 2003 based on SRMC.  
3.2.2  Road funding research in the United States of America  
In the USA, most roads were financed by the states and later by the federal government 
through gas tax (Levison, 2002). It was further recognised that the inter-state defence network 
(later renamed the inter-state highway network), as noted by Heggie (1999), could not 
continuously be funded by the federal budget. This thus resulted in the establishment of the 
Highway Trust Fund (HTF) in 1956. The snowballing of fuel-efficient vehicles is well 
acknowledged in the American market and as a result has contributed to the waning of the 
fuel levy’s purchasing power. According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA, 2017), 
the federal gas tax was charged at 18.4 US cents (about N$2.55 per litre5) since 1993 
(NSTIFC, 2009:2). It is recorded that the HTF-generated revenue has been inadequate to 
support the federal spending levels (NSTIFC, 2009). The funding gap was recorded at nearly 
US$400 billion during the period 2010 to 2015 and is projected to grow further to approximately 
US$2.3 trillion through to 2035 (see Figure 3.1). 
                                               






Figure 3.1: The widening gap between federal revenues and investment needs: 2010-2035 
Source: NSTIFC (2009) 
 
The NSTIFC (2009) final report argued that the challenge is not heavily based on insufficient 
investment, but that the gap results from the underpriced system. Basic economic principles 
narrate this case better, in that, when a good or service is provided for an amount less than 
its true costs, the demand for such a product tends to be higher, resulting in a shortage, which 
instantly manifests as congestion in the case of a road system. Road users often pay less for 
their consumption of the road system than the cost of providing the transportation facility.  
Underpayment contributes to less efficient use of the road system, and results in increased 
externalities associated with the use of roads infrastructure (NSTIFC, 2009). According to the 
NSTIFC (2009:4),  
“[i]f the federal government fails to act now, the future administration and next 
American generation will reap heavy repercussion. Additionally, America will face 
increased deteriorating roadways, bridges, and transit systems. Likely to result in 
increased accidents and facilities as well as increase in environmental and congestion 
(longer journey time, robbing businesses of vital economic activity and productivity) 
costs”. 
Various researchers have explored the road instrument charges per vehicle characteristics 
and kilometres travelled using the latest satellite technologies (Greaves & Figliozzi, 2008; 
Zupan, Barone & Whitmore, 2012). With respect to road pricing, the United States (US) 
Department of Transportation has sponsored various road-pricing experiments, including San 
Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge, Interstate 95 near Miami, SR520 near Seattle, and Interstate 





3.2.3  Road funding studies in the Asia-Pacific region 
In Asia, the Asian Development Bank advocates for restructuring the road fund and 
administrative arrangements for scoping for a fuel tax reform. According to Gwilliam (2003), 
countries that lack well-coordinated road revenues have led to uncertainty in revenue 
allocation for road investment. The Asian Development Bank (2012) therefore deemed it 
necessary to establish road trust funds for improved administration and to navigate new 
funding mechanisms.     
Japan seems to have set a trend in Asia by establishing a road fund (the Road Improvement 
Special Account) early in the 1950s. Such a development was of necessity after the end of 
the war, thereby developing a road network capable of supporting Japan’s rapid economic 
growth (Heggie, 1999). With respect to road pricing, Singapore seems to be the founder of 
road pricing with notable developments since 1975.   
New Zealand pursued the agenda of a technology-based RUC towards minimising evasion of 
the system within the road transport industry. Approximately 30 000 vehicles in New Zealand 
in 2008 were fitted with a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) fleet tracking system 
(McBride & Parker, 2008), and they have projected a monthly increase of approximately 500 
vehicles. Experience suggests that a technology-based RUC has the potential to reduce 
evasion by as much as US$80 million per annum, or some 2% below evasion (McBride & 
Parker, 2008). These facts seem to have placed New Zealand on the global map as the 
leading country in the Asia-Pacific region with direct application of the RUC.   
Australia, with its intelligent access programme, uses GNSS for fleet tracking and monitoring. 
It is a voluntary programme that permits qualifying operators to have higher mass and 
dimension limits in exchange for safety requirements to ensure compliance (McBride & Parker, 
2008). The automated systems generate non-compliance reports for the enforcement agency 
whenever the operator is outside the set parameters.  
On road pricing and its reforming agendas, the Australian government advocates adopting a 
user-pays system towards full market reform of road pricing. The Australian Department of 
Infrastructure, Transport, Cities and Regional Development upholds the National Heavy 
Vehicle Charging Pilot (Australian Department of Infrastructure, 2019). The pilot is likely to be 
a success with advocacy for reform reinforced by diverse stakeholders, including private 
transport companies, peak industry bodies, and policymakers (Mrdak, 2019; O’Keeffe, 2019). 
According to the Australian Department of Infrastructure (2019), the pilot envisages “to design 
and test options for replacing heavy vehicle registration fees and fuel-based charges with a 





businesses on how the envisaged new charging system ought to work, and participation was 
on a voluntary basis. The collaboration of the Australian and New Zealand School of 
Government promotes road pricing reform by connecting the government with academia, 
which is a notable effort in delivering the required research to identify the possible solution 
that could usher the Pacific into future economic prosperity (Mrdak, 2019).  
3.2.4  Road funding research in sub-Saharan African countries 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) was launched in 1987 in 
order to promote the concept of road commercialisation. This led to the creation of second-
generation road funds and roads agencies in many countries (Runji, 2015). Road research in 
many African countries focuses on establishing a noteworthy road fund and administration, to 
be in a position to identify potential sustainable sources of revenue generation. African 
countries are faced with multiple socioeconomic challenges; from small vehicle populations 
with expansive road networks (Petrus & Krygsman, 2018) to road users with fewer abilities to 
pay the prominent user charges. This is a situation that has resulted in road funds generating 
revenues that are not sufficient for the road maintenance required. The World Bank has 
conducted several studies advocating for the implementation of “second-generation funds”, of 
which fuel levies are the main source of income in many countries (for instance, Namibia, 
South Africa, and Tanzania) (see Chapter 5 for a thorough discussion of second-generation 
road funds).  
Most governments in Africa are responsible for setting the general state tax revenues and 
nominating road board members, which determines the road-user instruments to be charged 
and how generated revenues should be managed (Heggie, 1995). Moreover, independent 
agencies are in place and are mandated to maintain the road network. The second-generation 
road funds are recommended to manage and allocate resources in the most efficient manner 
in order to bring about a balance between the quality of roads and what road users should pay 
for consuming the roads. On transport externalities-related issues, a report conducted by 
Schwela and Hag (2012) of the Transport and Environment Science Technology network 
deliberated on transportation-related issues, including air pollution, road safety, traffic flow 
management, equity, and climate change. It further drew best practice and made several 
recommendations. 
3.3  NAMIBIAN ROAD FUNDING AND POLICY 
At the regional level, in an effort to contribute toward harmony, balance, equity, and 





(2006) in Articles 4.5 and 4.6 proposed some guidelines on funding for road infrastructure. 
Namibia is well known for its established and noteworthy RFA, that to a certain extent seems 
to have set a model for other developing countries to follow. Although the public enterprises 
were established, the MWT remained the custodian of policy and regulations. According to 
the Public Enterprises Governance Act (Act 1 of 2019), the Ministry of Public Enterprise acts 
as the overseer of the public enterprises, but is not directly involved in the day-to-day business 
(see Chapter 2, Figure 2.5). Table 3.2 presents some studies conducted in Namibia within the 
area of transportation externalities.  
Table 3.2: Studies on transportation external costs of road use in Namibia 
Components Study area Source 
Accident Accidents  
Cost of accidents to the Namibian economy 
National Road Safety Council 
(NRSC) (Ernst & Young, 2016) 
 
Environment  Namibia National Inventory Report  GRN (2016) 
RUC Accompanying measure for the sector-wide approach to 
the road sector for the Republic of Namibia. 
MWT (Aurecon) (2013) 
Source: Author 
3.4  GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR A TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING 
AND FINANCING FRAMEWORK 
The NSTIFC’s (2009) report discusses the following six key guiding principles when designing 
a funding and financing framework: 
 The funding and financing framework should support the overarching transportation 
goals of enhancing the mobility of all users; 
 Generating sufficient revenue that would meet the network needs on a sustainable 
basis; 
 Ensuring road users bear the full costs of using the road network to the greatest extent 
possible. Kelly (2016) suggested that whenever this is not the case, cross-subsidies 
could be applied in a transparent manner and should be applied in an equitable 
manner; 
 Revenue generated should be reinvested in the transportation system, aiming at 
closing the significant funding gap; 
 Equity considerations (horizontal and vertically) should form part and parcel of the 
framework; and 






These principles are crucial when determining which charging instruments to employ for a 
selected road network. The ideal framework should take the form of an RUCS. This implies a 
system to guide policymakers by ensuring that those driving on road networks contribute their 
fair share towards infrastructure costs (Atkinson, 2019). The principal motive driving the RUCS 
in many countries include gauging against the growing fuel-efficient and electrified motor 
vehicles that could bring about unsustainability in road funding as the fuel levy loses its 
prowess as the main revenue contributor (van Rensburg & Krygsman, 2015; Krygsman, 2018). 
Therefore, a charging system could be the answer to such a challenge by exploring technology 
to charge per vehicle per kilometre travelled. Atkinson (2019) posited that this could collect 
adequate revenues from hybrid and electric vehicles, as well as assisting the roads agencies 
to charge actual costs imposed on the road infrastructure.  
On the contrary, issues of privacy associated with the latest technology used to charge users 
based on location and time of the day have been a concern surrounding the concept of RUC. 
Atkinson (2019) stated, however, that previous studies revealed that such concerns have been 
taken out of context or they do not hold water. Recommendations by various studies 
established that roads agencies, when introducing a new instrument, should include a 
transition period for road users to adjust to the new technology.  
A study by Atkins, Houghton and Johnstone-Burt (2012) on the road pricing scheme in 
Australia discussed the three main types of technology as follows: 
 GNSS such as the GPS. The roads authorities mostly use satellite location systems 
such as GPS to determine vehicle position and to measure location and distance 
travelled mainly for charging and access control (FHWA, 2008).  
 Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRDC) systems using tags and beacons 
and wireless communication systems (e.g. electronic tolling technology). The system 
is commonly used on free-flow toll facilities. It utilises on-board units, also known as 
tags or transponders. These technologies communicate with gantry-mounted 
equipment at checkpoints, and roadside equipment identifies and verifies the vehicles’ 
on-board unit by either processing charges from its linked account or affording rights 
of access, mainly depending on the system in place (FHWA, 2008).  
 Closed-circuit television (CCTV) and Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) as 
applied by the London Congestion Scheme. The scheme entirely relies on ALPR as 
an enforcement system (FHWA, 2008). Other cities, including Toronto’s 407 toll 
facilities and Tampa’s Selmon Expressway use ALPR to record toll transactions, and 






According to the report and practical experience, DSRDC technology is recommended for 
cordon or specific roads (geographical constrained schemes with high volumes of traffic), 
whereas GPS-based systems best suit distance-based schemes. CCTV and ALPR 
technology are considered inferior to GNSS and DSRDC technology (Atkins et al., 2012). 
There is no one-size-fits-all technology, however; they differ depending on the network. Each 
scheme is therefore associated with its own limitations and a combination of technology might 
apply for a single scheme. The funding framework should encourage efficient investment in 
the transportation system (NSTIFC, 2009), taking cognisance of the inherent differences 
between and within transportation modes. The NSTIFC (2009) report also proposed a shift 
from road funding based on indirect user fees in the form of federal motor taxes, towards more 
direct user charges in the form of a vehicle-miles-travelled charging system.  
3.5  TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE COST AND THE CONCEPT OF 
MARGINAL COST 
Basic economic theory explains that marginal cost involves the expected future costs that 
could arise from additional utility consumed or future cost reduction (for investment yet to be 
undertaken) and rarely deal with fixed costs (those that do not vary with facility use) or 
historically sunk costs (Kahn, 1988). The NSTIFC (2009) report suggested that the funding 
framework in place should cause users and direct beneficiaries to bear the full cost of using 
the transportation system, including externalities costs, in order to promote the efficient use of 
the system. While the argument for the user to bear the full cost seems to be valid, there must 
be a distinction as to whom and in what scenario users should be held accountable for the full 
cost of transportation facilities. The assumption on infrastructure costs follows an argument 
by Gomez-Ibanez (1999) that, in the short run, marginal cost pricing is prescribed to optimise 
the efficient use of the existing infrastructure. Moreover, SRMC pricing compromises the 
efficient allocation of resources in the long run in a situation where such a facility generates 
insufficient revenue to cover both maintenance and new infrastructure investment or a case 
where the government is not able or unwilling to supplement the road budget out of the 
consolidated budget (Gomez-Ibanez, 1999).  
The principal rule for efficient pricing advocates that users of transportation must pay the 
marginal cost of each journey made (Petrus & Krygsman, 2019). The principle is quite complex 
and there is ambiguity about its requirements (Boyer, 1997). When the price is set below 
marginal costs, then the demand for transportation increases. In contrast, when the price is 
set above the marginal cost, demand for transportation will decrease, leading to wasting 
resources (under-consumption of transportation) as users tend to opt for the next best 





The issues that continue to receive more attention among transport economic researchers 
involve an attempt to clarify unresolved issues on road pricing, such as (i) whether the capital 
cost of road pricing should form part of RUC and (ii) whether the users should be responsible 
for projected investments or only for the maintenance of the current facilities (Newbery & 
Santos, 1999; Dutzik & Weissman, 2015; Bird & Slack, 2017).   
Transportation facilities exhibit economies of scale and scope (Haritos, 1974); in other words, 
facilities that are too small or too large for existing traffic. The principle of marginal costs poses 
many challenges to roads that are used sporadically. This implies that marginal costs to the 
roads authorities on rarely used roads might be close to zero (Kahn, 1988). In this case, few 
users utilising the road facilities are expected to pay RUC that are equal to their marginal 
benefit of road use. There is thus no equality between marginal cost and marginal benefit in 
this case. The revenues raised from RUC for rarely used roads cannot cover the cost of the 
provision of the roads (capital cost).  
Nash (2008) postulates that the application of marginal cost pricing in many countries would 
lead to higher charges for road users, which might have an impact on countries ’ 
competitiveness. The characteristics often exhibited by transportation facilities render 
marginal costs relatively low in comparison to the average cost of road use. Therefore, capital 
or sunk costs are too large to be covered by the marginal costing principle and thus should 
not form part of road pricing (Kahn, 1988). If at all applied, this implies that RUC should be so 
immensely high that the users opt to drop out and kill their own demand (Kahn, 1988).  
In the short run, traffic levels on a given facility can increase (resulting in a shortfall) or 
decrease (resulting in excess capacity). Planning for the facilities’ expansion or building 
requires a long-term plan. Gomez-Ibanez (1999) explains that capacity turns out to be “lumpy” 
in that it may appear to be economically beneficial to invest in a four-lane as opposed to a 
two-lane road. Gomez-Ibanez (1999) further argues that although it is cheaper to invest in a 
four-lane road, such a facility might end up underutilised in the short run. However, from the 
investment point of view, such an investment is worth undertaking, given that traffic is 
projected to grow. In addition, infrastructure managers can take advantage of low discount 
rates at the point of investment.  
3.6  APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLE TO ROAD PRICING 
Economists argue that if the economic principle ought to be of relevance to road facilities’ 
utilisation, then the RUC of their use ought to be set equal to the SRMC (Kahn, 1988). Marginal 
cost implies additional costs of allowing an additional vehicle to the existing traffic volume or 





The concept deals with cases in which the supply of a service or community need should be 
assured beyond a minimal capacity in order to meet the demand (Bird & Slack, 2017), with 
the exception when demand is too low to yield a revenue that covers the cost of that facility ’s 
minimum capacity supply. For instance, a sporadically used road meets the description of the 
latter.  
The concept of SRMC is not unique to the transportation sector. The principle is also applied 
to other public service utilities, including electricity, information and communications 
technology (Bird & Slack, 2017). The principle implies that it is worth doing business or 
supplying a service (good) as long as an additional revenue earned from selling such a service 
covers the additional cost of supplying such a service. In a purely competitive industry, the 
infrastructure manager would increase road charges up to the equilibrium point where 
marginal cost equals price. As it applies in other industries, the competition behaviour implies 
that road users (consumers) are free of choices and it should result in optimal resource 
allocation. There are several assumptions that marginal cost pricing must conform to. For 
instance, market distortion is likely to be minimised if prices for road and rail use are both set 
at SRMC (Kahn, 1988).  
3.6.1  Economic resource allocation  
Infrastructure managers often make decisions on economic resource allocation based on the 
short-run or long-run period. There are two basic criteria associated with the principle of 
marginal cost pricing (Kahn, 1988). The chief criterion is that the RUC of the highway should 
be set equal to the SRMC. The other consideration is that road users should bear the 
additional costs of road use imposed on the infrastructure, to other users, and to the rest of 
society (Kahn, 1988). It is therefore necessary to identify the components of marginal costs 
and indicate which of the costs should feature in marginal cost pricing.  
The long run is the period within which all inputs are variable for any investment decision made 
(Vilton, 1980). For instance, in the long run, infrastructure managers make decisions on the 
number of lanes to be built or expansion required for current facilities. In the short-run period, 
some inputs are variable and some are fixed. Variable costs entail any sacrifice of future value 
or future realisation of higher costs that are causally attributed to the present value (Kahn, 
1988). In the short run, capital structures are assumed to be in place and infrastructure 
managers should ensure that there is a pricing mechanism in order to control the use of  the 
facility. For example, a toll facility on the road network must be decided on. The two decision 
periods are not made in isolation. At both levels, the optimal investment is found at the 





1988). The difference appears at the optimal investment level between Average Variable Cost 
(AVC) and the SRMC imposed on the road by an additional user (Keeler & Small, 1977).  
The ideal price should cover fixed costs such as depreciation, cost of capital, and other 
overhead expenses (Kahn, 1988). However, fixed cost does not belong in marginal cost 
computation. Average Fixed Costs (AFV) is found by dividing total fixed costs by output. It 
implies that for a given network will continuously fall as output increases. It does not consider 
the variable costs associated with use and does not reflect external costs. Kahn (1988) states 
that additional repair and rehabilitation costs only form part of marginal cost if there is a relative 
chance that they will be incurred and that demand is sufficient to justify such additional 
expenses. Kahn (1988) further argues that as long as road users are willing to pay a price 
covering the SRMC and the variable cost of the facilities’ operation (including the current 
equivalent of whatever salvage value of the equipment), it suffices to say that the roads agency 
and society should charge road users a price set at SRMC and continue their operation. The 
operation of such a facility should continue until the time when the higher operating costs of a 
deteriorated network reach a peak point and it is no longer possible to postpone the required 
maintenance or replacement of such a facility, which could drive the SRMC above the RUC 




LRAC = Long-Run Average Cost 
Figure 3.2: The unit costs of the road infrastructure investment under long-run constant 
returns 













Given the fact that a road network is already in place, when price (RUC) appears to be greater 
than SRMC, there is a need for the government to subsidise the roads agency to ensure the 
continuation of business. Kahn (1988) posits that at such a point an efficient price is forgone. 
Moreover, for expansion purposes, no business should be undertaken, unless it is projected 
that associated costs both in the short and long run will be covered. On the other hand, when 
price (RUC) is less than SRMC, the marginal cost will generate revenue only sufficient to cover 
the variable cost and not sufficient to cover fixed costs (Kahn, 1988).  
Figure 3.2 demonstrates that short-run AVC per unit of output can never be greater than 
Average Total Cost (ATC). However, depending on the market demand or the facility capacity, 
SRMC can be lower, equal to (P=Q), or higher than ATC. In a competitive market, the 
equilibrium is presented in Figure 3.2 at point P where SRMC intersects with the ATC. In the 
long-run, LRMC is equal to LRAC. The LRMC (the total additional costs per unit of additional 
blocks of output, when capacity is altered so as to produce the larger output at a minimum 
cost), is illustrated at point P where LRMC=LRAC. Kahn (1988) explains that the transport 
industry operates under conditions of long-run constant cost, implying that if infrastructure 
managers plan to generate more or less Q, such can be achieved when charges are at the 
lowest P. In support, Keeler and Small (1977) state that under constant return to scale, some 
roads will generate sufficient revenue and some will generate insufficient revenue. At the 
decreasing return to scale, the facility will earn a surplus. In competitive industries, this point 
is represented in Figure 3.2 at point P=Q, where SRMC, LRMC, and ATC intersect. At the 
increasing return to scale, the road will have to be subsidised for efficient operation. The ideal 
position to demonstrate this point is where both SRMC=LRMC intersect and at that point ATC 
would not be covered by the revenue generated.  
To summarise, as demonstrated in Figure 3.2, at any point (between Q and P), infrastructure 
managers could raise the RUC as long as there is an increase in variable costs (unit Q). 
Therefore, marginal cost pricing is never formulated to cover long-run or fixed costs, yet at a 
certain time, when demand is sufficient, it will cover the fixed cost or even generate excess 
funds. Economically, it makes sense to set all RUC at the SRMC and it should cover all present 
or future as well as associated private costs. Taking the second-best pricing into consideration, 
efficient price is worth emphasising and where circumstances permit, such costs should be 
embodied in the rates. However, this idea is argued not to be feasible or even desirable in the 
real world (Kahn, 1988) for many reasons and challenges associated with the concept of 





3.7  TRANSPORT POLICY AND EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS 
The funding and financing framework should incorporate equity considerations (NSTIFC, 
2009). Levison (2010) suggests that equity issues surrounding road pricing should have the 
ability to raise revenue, as well as offering the ability to manage demand on the road network 
at a given location and time of the day. Equity refers to the fairness with which benefits and 
cost impacts are distributed (Litman, 2019). This implies equity considerations with respect to 
general equity across income groups, across modes, and geographic equity. Road pricing 
affects mobility, and the pricing decision could affect equity through the distribution of 
externalities, charges, and the way in which revenue is spent. There are various ways to define 
equity, including horizontal equity and vertical equity, with regard to income and social class, 
as well as ability and mobility needs (Pereira, Schwanen & Banister, 2016; Litman, 2019).  
3.7.1  Horizontal equity 
Horizontal equity is concerned with the distribution of impacts between individuals and groups 
in terms of their needs and abilities. It is often referred to as egalitarianism6 (Litman, 2019). 
This implies that public policies should treat equal individuals or groups the same when 
distributing resources or in terms of benefits and costs. Jones and Nix (1995) calculated 
roadway cost allocation (share of roadway imposed by different types of vehicles) by applying 
the horizontal equity principle. They then compared the cost imposed by different vehicle 
classes by revenue generated from RUC collected from the various classes. Litman (2019) 
summarised the cost allocation study conducted by the FHWA (1997). Table 3.3 summarises 
the results of a major cost allocation study, which concluded that user fees fund approximately 
two-thirds of the roadway facilities in the USA. 






















Automobiles 1,818,461 0.007 0.020 0.009 0.035 0.026 0.009 
Pickups and vans 669,198 0.007 0.020 0.009 0.035 0.026 0.003 
Single-unit trucks 83,100 0.038 0.067 0.041 0.146 0.112 0.034 
Combination trucks 115,688 0.071 0.095 0.035 0.202 0.157 0.044 
Buses 7,397 0.030 0.052 0.036 0.118 0.046 0.072 
All vehicles 2,693,844 0.011 0.025 0.011 0.047 0.036 0.010 
Source: FHWA (1997) 
 
                                               
6  Egalitarianism implies levelling the playing ground and treating everyone equally regardless of their race, 
gender, or income (Litman, 2019). 





Cost studies that consider total transportation costs, including externalities (accident risks, air 
pollution, congestion, etc.), found out that the greater the cost consideration, the greater the 
inequity (Litman, 1999). Litman (2019) illustrated this by arguing that motor vehicles are often 
subsidised by approximately one cent per mile just for roadway costs not borne by the RUC. 
It thus requires a greater subsidy to account for externalities (for example accidents, pollution, 
and environmental impacts) not accounted by the road users. Bandegani and Akbarzadeh 
(2016) employed a field survey to assess the horizontal equity of a distance-based public 
transit fee structure. Their study considered fee elasticity of demand and trip length passenger 
transit distributional probability. The Gini coefficient index and the revenue-to-cost ratio for 
each transit passenger was employed. The study findings indicated that the Gini coefficient 
decreased from 0.38 to 0.17 when switching from a flat to a distance-based structure. The 
ratio shows that the revenue or cost per mile/kilometre curve tended to be significantly flat 
after switching to a distance-based fee structure. This indicates similarity of wealth levels 
among passengers.  
Horizontal equity and economic efficiency can be differentiated in the sense that horizontal 
equity focuses on group-level average costs, whereas economic efficiency focuses on 
marginal costs per drivers’ individual trips and ignores sunk costs and fixed costs; however, 
the two tend to merge over the long run, where most cost turns out to be variable (Litman, 
2019).    
3.7.2  Vertical equity 
Vertical equity is involved in the distribution of resources between individuals and groups that 
differ in terms of income or social class (Litman, 2019). Vertical equity is mainly categorised 
in terms of income and social class, as well as individuals’ or groups’ mobility needs and 
abilities. It caters for social justice and environmental and social inclusion. Transport policies 
tend to be equitable when they favour disadvantaged groups socially and economically by 
compensating for any inequity (Rawls, 1971). Transport policies are either progressive (if pro-
poor) or regressive (if not favouring disadvantaged groups). Such policies advocate for special 
services or subsidies for lower-income groups and ensure that transport facilities and services 
meet the needs of all users, including those with special needs. Litman (2019) argues that in 
most instances, the two policies overlap or conflict with each other. For instance, the horizontal 
policy advocates for users to be held responsible for their usage of transport facilities or 
service, whereas vertical policies promote subsidies for disadvantaged groups. Transport 





Vertical equity is applied in many studies. For instance, Brown et al. (2008) assessed the time 
and money costs across jobs within several demographic groups and recommended various 
transit-oriented planning strategies that would potentially improve opportunity and fairness. In 
a recent study, Creger, Espino and Sanchez (2018) identified ways in which planning could 
better respond to disadvantaged groups. In investigating the equity impact on the fuel price, 
Leung et al. (2018) argue that although fuel taxes tend to be regressive, the revenue 
generated is often less than other funding options. Fuel taxes regressively tend to decline with 
improved accessibility routes for lower-income travellers (Leung et al., 2018). Ramjerdi (2006) 
conducted an evaluation of mobility management transport policies, including road pricing, 
parking pricing, and public service improvements in Oslo, Norway. The vertical equity analysis 
used various measures to reflect several assumptions and perspectives such as the Gini 
coefficient and the Lorenz curve in order to measure wealth inequality.   
The overall equity in transportation pricing depends on who pays the price, how prices are set 
or structured, and the transport alternatives available (Schweitzer, 2009; Golub, 2010; 
Manville, 2017; Cortright 2017, 2018). In addition, equity in transportation also has an impact 
on how revenue is allocated and used and the motive for undertaking a journey (necessity or 
leisure). When good alternatives are available (Litman, 2019), the revenue generated from the 
facilities is used to benefit (subsidise) disadvantaged groups.  
3.7.3  Efficiency 
Efficiency requires pricing at the marginal cost of road use (Litman, 2017). Andreson and 
Thompson (2014), however, argued that in an economic setting of economies of scale, 
efficient pricing might not cover the full cost of providing and maintaining the transportation 
infrastructure, especially for sporadically used roads. Andreson and Thompson (2014) further 
proposed a two-part tariff approach for low-volume traffic roads aimed at incorporating a flat 
fee with variable charges in order to possibly attain a sustainable financial mechanism. Their 
research addressed two pressing issues as advocated by the strategic goal of the US 
Department of Transportation, mainly aimed at improving highway maintenance and 
improving economic competitiveness.  
3.7.4  Accessibility and mobility 
Accessibility refers to people’s abilities to obtain desired service and activities. Litman (2003) 
discusses various factors that could influence transport accessibility, including mobility, 
connectivity and affordability, geographical sphere, and mobility service substitution (such as 





plays in an efficient and equitable transport system (Litman, 2019). In order to address bias in 
transportation modelling and economic evaluation, Litman (2019) recommends that transport 
improvements should be primarily guided by accessibility as opposed to mobility. This implies 
that improvement should take into consideration people’s accessibility of public services 
(transport) to places of work, health facilities, and education, while also considering other 
options such as travel time, financial budget, and ability to walk or drive, and not only saving 
travelling time. Litman (2019) also argues that travel-time saving for lower-income mobility 
should receive higher monetary value than high-income people’s mobility. Such an action is 
likely to increase consumer welfare and efficiency by allowing disadvantaged users access to 
education and employment opportunities.  
Mobility refers to a transportation system designed to increase access to high-quality mobility 
options, reduce transport externalities, and enhance economic opportunities for low-income 
groups (Creger et al., 2018). In recent research, Creger et al. (2018) conducted a robust policy 
investigation aimed at prioritising the mobility needs of low-income people in California and to 
attend to unaddressed historical experiences. They developed a framework envisaged to 
assess and maximise transportation planning and decision making that better address 
community-identified mobility needs.  
3.8  POLICY GOALS FOR A ROAD USER CHARGE SYSTEM AND ROAD PRICING 
Generally, the motives for an RUCS can be divided into three broad categories, namely: 
 raising revenue; 
 allocating road-use costs among different user groups; and 
 internalising externalities. 
Interestingly, the demarcations between the three categories are not entirely independent. For 
instance, charging users for emissions resulting from their activities associated with the road 
use certainly boosts revenue and may be helpful in allocating costs according to different 
vehicle classes of user groups. Table 3.4 shares some international experience on policy 
objectives that guide direct pricing schemes.  
Table 3.4: Policy objectives of international Road User Charge Systems 
Scheme Key policy objectives 
Germany: Heavy vehicle RUC Raise revenue based on user-pays system 
Singapore: Area network charging Demand management 
Stockhölm: Cordon pricing scheme Reduce congestion, increase accessibility, and improve the 
environment 
London: Area-wide scheme Traffic and congestion reduction in central London, and provide 





Trondheim: Multi-zonal charging Raising private sector revenue to support needed urban transport 
infrastructure investment 
Manchester: Rejected multi-cordon 
pricing 
Raise revenue for public transport investment and control 
congestion 
Gauteng Demand management, raise revenue based on user-pays system 
Sydney Harbour bridge: Harbour bridge Address congestion on Sydney Harbour Bridge 
Northern Gateway toll road: Interurban Raise revenue and demand management 
Source: Author (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2014:39) 
3.8.1  Raising revenue     
The current discussion on a potential policy for raising revenue has been the argument on 
road-use revenue with a particular concern with the projected decline in the fuel levy as the 
major contributor to the RGR (MWT, 2017). It is argued in the literature that the fuel levy has 
not been kept on par with inflation for several decades and has led to growing shortfalls in 
RGR (Transportation Research Board [TRB], 2005; MWT, 2017). Another point of concern 
with the fuel levy has been the entrance of electric-powered motor and hybrid vehicles that 
use less or no fuel (Krygsman, 2018; Van Rensburg & krygsman, 2019). These, in coming 
years, if no alternative measures are put in place, will likely exacerbate the road-funding 
dilemma facing many countries. Therefore, policy goals should aim at preventing foreseen 
erosion in road-use revenue and where possible should strive towards closing the funding 
gap. The literature recommends that a good policy is one that establishes a balance between 
managing demand and raising revenue (Atkins et al., 2012). The literature offers some 
international experience on road pricing aimed at revenue generation, including Scandinavian 
(Norwegian and Sweden) toll rings (Small & Gomez-Ibanez, 1998; Schuitema, 2007) and 
demand management as applied in Singapore, London, New York, and California (Schuitema, 
2007; Levison, 2010). Chapter 5 of this dissertation presents a detailed literature review on 
revenue and several instruments utilised to charge users. 
3.8.2  Allocation of road-use costs among different user groups 
The argument in the literature around cost allocations calls for proper description of the 
damage imposed on the road network by various vehicle groups. The amount of damage on 
the road network heavily depends on the axle weight of the vehicle, as well as the engineering 
design standards of the road8 (Sorensen et al., 2009). A light vehicle traveling on a trunk road 
network imposes relatively little road wear as compared to the damage a heavy vehicle with 
axles travelling on urban street road could inflict. It is notable that cross-subsidies among 
different users are likely to happen between light vehicles and heavy vehicles; for instance, 
                                               
8  Generally, national road networks, particularly national corridors and inter-urban roads, are designed to 





lighter trucks with more axles and heavier trucks with fewer axles (Small, Winston & Evans, 
1989). The policy on cost allocation aims to estimate the cost of each vehicle class per 
distance travelled towards accounting for more accurate damage that particular vehicles 
impose on the network and then structuring the per-km RUC accordingly (Sorensen et al., 
2009).  
3.8.3  Internalising externalities 
When a vehicle utilises the road network, it imposes costs on the road surface (wear and 
damage), on other users (in terms of congestion and accidents), and society (environment). A 
policy towards internalising externalities is engineered towards decreasing congestion delays 
and reducing emissions and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Monsalve, 2013). Several 
commentators have made efforts to measure the externalities of road use. To that effect, 
several studies used the contingent valuation method, mostly using a survey or open-ended 
questionnaires to determine respondents’ willingness to pay for non-market goods’ quality, 
including the desired change in air (environmental) quality (Ligus, 2018; Wang et al., 2015), 
noise reduction, minimising travel time, and reducing accident risks. Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation presents a detailed literature review of the internalisation of external costs.  
3.9  THE ROAD PRICING THEORY 
For decades, in particular in developing countries, the most popular road policy response to 
increases in revenue was the annual increment in levies and charges. However, for many 
reasons, including social and political interventions, road-user levies and charges, especially 
the fuel levy, the highest contributor to the revenue generated from the RUC, could not be 
raised on an annual basis (MWT, 2017). This resulted in less revenue for road maintenance 
and rehabilitation, with further implications for road networks, which have rapidly deteriorated 
over the past decades (RA, 2018). In searching for new mechanisms and strategies to 
increase revenue while managing demand and reducing accident risk and environmental 
risks, policymakers, as well as infrastructure managers, have increasingly become interested 
in policies that aim to address negative road externalities (MWT, 2017). Although road 
infrastructure brings about both positive and negatives externalities, it is rare that negative 






3.9.1  The first-best pricing theory 
Road pricing has evolved since Pigou’s study in the 1920s, launching the “Pigouvian tax” 
(Pigou, 1920), which aimed to internalise negative road externalities by imposing levies and 
charges to the users. Imposing Pigouvian tax implies charging road users at the so-called 
economic efficient price (MSC) as it takes into consideration both the Marginal Private Costs 
(MPC) and the MEC (Santos, 2017). The fundamental concept of road pricing follows the 
pricing mechanisms as applied elsewhere in a market economy (Yang & Huang, 2005). In line 
with this fundamental concept, the theoretical framework guiding this study was the failure of 
implementing RUC set at an economically efficient price based on the principle of MSC.  
Setting RUC at the optimal level influences revenue generation and resource allocation 
(Heggie & Fon, 1999). In order to maximise net economic benefits, road pricing should be set 
equal to the SRMC of road use. Investigations have been conducted on how this first-best 
pricing theory would work in practice; for example charging for transportation externalities such 
as environmental costs (see Van der Bossche et al., 2001), accident costs (Lindberg, 2002), 
congestion costs, and infrastructure damage costs (see Newbery, 1988; Bruzelius, 2004). 
Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996) argue that first-best road pricing would improve the road 
sector’s status quo. However, setting the price equal to MSC does not guarantee an increase 
in revenue generated from RUC. RUC could lead to a revenue deficit or surplus (Proost & van 
Dender, 2003). As a matter of fact, the literature suggested the calculation of the optimal user 
charges to see whether they would yield a deficit or surplus and the results should serve as a 
point of departure (Walter, 1968). On the other hand, the process of introducing road pricing 
might be slow due to various reasons, including political interventions and social, practical, 
and technical barriers (Verhoef, 1998). Several shortcomings of the SRMC principle are 
outlined by Rothengatter (2003). Despite the difficulty in implementing the MSC principle, road 
pricing should aim to attain economic efficiency in order to reduce vehicle operation cost, 
increase safety, revenue generation, and significantly to bring about gains in economic 
development.  
3.9.2  The second-best pricing theory 
Despite the fact that the theoretical foundation of the first-best road pricing is established, 
optimal pricing schemes lack practical implementation. Economic theory postulates that the 
price of a product or service is likely to be affected by the price of its complements or 
substitutes (Richa, 2019). Since road transportation has substitutes or complements, market 
failure and distortion can be experienced in the transportation sector. Therefore, if other modes 





(Verhoef, 1998). Therefore marginal pricing might conflict with equity issues if not considered 
when setting the road pricing. Even within the road sector, the first-best pricing theorem is met 
when the entire road network is priced at the MSC. Rouwendal and Verhoef (2003) made an 
illustration of two road links from the same origin and heading to the same destination; where 
Road A is a private (tolled) road; whereas Road B is public (non-tolled) road. Road B is likely 
to attract more traffic (excess demand), leaving Road A with underutilised infrastructure.   
Second-best pricing theories are considered when it is not possible to implement the first-best 
pricing policies due to market failure or distortion elsewhere in the economy (Maffi, Parolin & 
Ponti, 2010). The second-best pricing theorem received attention for the past decade with 
researchers (Lindsey & Verhoef, 2000) investigating the optimal level and efficiency of the 
second-best pricing scheme. Given this theory, this study explored efficient RUC for Namibia 
based on the MSC principle. The literature review on the component of the MSC to consider 
when setting the price equal to MSC is presented in Chapter 6.  
3.10  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Road transport abounds with externalities. Externalities arise whenever one road user makes 
another user or society worse or better off (Cowen, 2019), yet not bearing the costs associated 
with the use of the road. The implication of not accounting for these externalities and 
internalising them into road pricing so that they influence the present and future price of road 
use, is generally less known. The literature presented price set equal to the SRMC to be the 
recommended point to charge road users (as discussed in Section 3.6). The challenge 
recorded in the literature is associated with the complexities in measuring and implementing 
such road pricing, more so in developing countries that have not invested in research 
associated with the MEC of road use. Fortunately, many of these developing countries, 
including Namibia, use the HDM-4 model as a way to determine budget allocation, to identify 
projects for implementation, and to undertake economic evaluation. The RA uses the HDM-4 
to strategise for maintenance expenditure and to motivate investment needs for the national 
road network (see Figure 3.3). The use of the HDM-4 to influence the present and future road 
pricing remained a grey area in the authorities’ domain despite road pricing presenting a more 
efficient way of allocating resources (including road space). The HDM-4 contains most of the 







Figure 3.3: The use of HDM-4 for road-user planning and strategies  
Source: Author  
As the case may be with road users not taking into consideration the costs they impose on 
others, the implication of not factoring externalities costs into road pricing also applies to the 
supply side. The current RUC do not cover externalities imposed by the road user that vary 
with space and locations. As a result, this sends price signals to the road users that do not 
include externalities, thus the users only pay according to the charges imposed on them.  
Although road users in Namibia pay charges in the form of a fuel levy, vehicle registration and 
licence fees, CBC, MDC, and abnormal load levies, most of these instruments do not follow 
the user-pays principle (see Figure 3.4). Namibian roads are characterised by a spacious 
network serving a small vehicle population, as discussed previously. This poses a challenge 
to charging pricing that is based on the SRMC of road use. Figure 3.4 raises the question that 
if Namibia implements the recommended efficient pricing of SRMC pricing for road use, would 
the approach yield sufficient revenue to cover all the costs and provide for an acceptable return 
on investment? The opposing view is whether is indeed the aim of the principle to deliver 
sufficient revenue to cover fixed costs and provide funding for road upgrading and expansion. 
It should be noted that while the objective of marginal social costs pricing is to reflect the 
(variable) costs imposed on society, the principle can, under some circumstances, deliver 
sufficient revenue to cover fixed costs (minimum gross rerun on invested capital and 
depreciation to invest in capital expansion).  
In line with this fundamental concept, the theoretical framework guiding this study was the 
failure of implementing RUC set at an economically efficient price based on the SRMC 





and capital funding has been overlooked for many years. Figure 3.4 presents the scenario of 
internalising external costs into road pricing. The RA conducted assessments of the road 
conditions utilising visual systems, including Geographic Information System (GIS) and Road 
Referencing System (RRS) and other mechanical surveillance measurers to collect data (RA, 
2018). Such data were deposited into the RMS. Transport planners use analytical tools such 
as the HDM-4 model to describe road conditions, identify maintenance and rehabilitation 
needs, and analyse investment needs.  
The rarely explored components of these tools are associated with exploring rich data 
embedded in the HDM-4 that contain the conditions of the road network and the characteristics 
of vehicle fleets to estimate the external costs of road use. The HDM-4 has the potential to 
estimate the negative external costs of road use that are rarely internalised into road pricing. 
This study attempted to address the said gap by exploring the HDM-4 to estimate the MSC of 
road use in monetary value (per vehicle kilometre). 
The study made the presupposition that the user-pays principle, recommended by the 
Namibian Transport Policy (MWT, 2017), ought to be implemented and that the SRMC is 
perceived relevant for road pricing to internalise the MEC into the road price for a true reflection 










The estimated MEC are compared to the average costing in order to determine which of the 
two costing principles yields positive results. Furthermore, in determining what road users are 
currently paying for road use, the fuel levy was utilised as a proxy of the current instruments 
and compared to the estimated external costs to assess the impact that the efficiency pricing 
would have on revenue generation for road use. Would pricing at MSC yield a surplus or 
deficit? Thus, what is the second-best alternative Namibia could employ in order to bridge or 
supplement the road sector’s financial deficit should the MSC yield a deficit?  
3.11  SUMMARY  
The contemporary literature on road pricing revealed that RUC set equal to the SRMC could 
serve as a foundation for charging for road use both on the demand side (sending accurate 
price signals) and supply side (internalisation of external costs). Road activities abound with 
externalities that are rarely taken into consideration by road consumers when making 
decisions for undertaking a journey. The issues of MEC are well documented in the literature, 
predominately in studies in developed countries. However, research studies on the MEC of 
road use in developing countries are still in the infancy stage. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, estimating the MSC of road use that covers all four components and assigns 
monetary value that could possibly be used to inform road pricing and influence policymaking 
decisions has not been conducted thus far in Namibia.  
Overall, the lessons learned from road pricing and funding literature are that every continent 
seems to have a unique focus on the subject matter. However, transport policies in both 
developed and developing countries seem to have a common consensus, namely to 
implement the user-pays system that would foresee consumers of scarce resources paying 
their fair share of the infrastructure costs and for their use of roads. The literature, however, 
revealed that charging for road use at efficient pricing is very complex and difficult to 
implement in practice. This is likely due to the complexity of measuring all components varying 
in space and time, the resources required to conduct thorough studies, as well as data 
limitations. The literature, however, recommended that when data permit, the exercise is worth 
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CHAPTER 4:  
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY AREA AND ANALYSIS METHOD 
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides a trajectory of the methodology applied in this study. This dissertation 
is structured to address three objectives. Therefore, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 outline a deeper 
analysis of the methodology as per the objective to be attained. 
4.2  METHODOLOGY AND STUDY AREA 
The HDM-4 Workspace 2015 version obtained from the RA was used as the basis for the 
selection of the study area (RA, 2018a). The RMS division of the Namibian RA is responsible 
for the development and operating of coordinated and integrated support tools or system in 
order to facilitate the efficient management of the national road network and providing 
information pertaining to the network (RA, 2019). The RMS comprises several sub-systems, 
including the Pavement Management System (PMS), the RRS, the Traffic Surveillance 
System (TSS), the Unsealed Road Management System (URMS), Accident Management 
System (AMS), and Bridge Management System (BMS). The interdependency and data 
information associated with each of these sub-systems are presented in Figure 4.1. 
The HDM-4 Workspace presented in this study applies all the RMS sub-systems data-
collection principles, as well as associated systems such as GIS. Data on all proclaimed road 
networks were collected through regular visual assessments and mechanical surveillance 
measurements and deposited in the RMS (RA, 2018b). A well-developed and well-managed 
RMS often assists management in making accurate decisions when determining the level of 
funding and to identify and prioritise road projects (Bennett et al., 2007). The RMS division 
utilises such data to continuously monitor the condition of the road network, analyse the impact 
of funding scenarios, identify periodic maintenance and rehabilitation needs, and minimise 
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Figure 4.1: Road systems interdependency  






Kerali, Robinson and Paterson (1998) explained the HDM-4’s operations and its dependency 
on core data managers, including: 
 the road network manager, who defines the road network or sub-network that forms 
the basis of the analysis; 
 the vehicle fleet manager, who defines the characteristics of the vehicle fleet using the 
road network to be analysed; and  
 HDM-4 configuration, which defines all the default data to be used with the input data, 













Figure 4.2: HDM-4 system architecture 
Source: Henry and Kerali (2000) 
 
The HDM-4 model illustrated in Figure 4.2 has four indispensable components, namely 
RDWE, RUE, SEE, and the PMS. This model is utilised to predict future pavement conditions 
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RDWE: Road deterioration and work effects  
RUE: Road user effects 
SEE: Social and environmental effects 
PMS: Pavement Management System 
 
Model libraries 
can be used in 





costs as a function of road condition (Harvery, 2012), to estimate the social and environment 
effects associated with the use of roads, and to forecast the maintenance strategies and 
investment needs of the road network respectively. This study focuses on the application of 





















Figure 4.3: HDM-4 lifecycle analysis  
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Figure 4.3 simulates the underlying operation of the HDM-4. Interacting sets of costs incurred 
by the roads agency and those incurred by the road users are added over time in discounted 
present values (Kerali et al., 1998). These costs are determined by predicting the physical 
quantities of resources consumed and multiplying such quantities by unit costs (Kerali et al., 
1998).  
4.2.1  Pavement data 
The RMS division of the RA in collaboration with several consultants collected the required 
data using surveys. For instance, a survey can be conducted towards evaluating pavement 
condition and structure. Pavement evaluations aim to record pavement characteristics that 
influence pavement performance such as roughness, texture, skid resistance, mechanical or 
structural properties, surface distress, and geometry (Bennett, De Solminihac & Chamorro, 
2006). For instance, pavement condition data collected via visual inspection and classified 
according to the road condition (very good, good, fair, and poor) can be converted into the 
HMD-4 model’s requirements (Henry & Kerali, 2000). 
Pavement evaluation can be functional or structural in nature, depending on which of these 
characteristics are being surveyed. Function evaluations aim to collect data that provide 
information about surface conditions that have a direct effect on users’ safety and comfort, 
namely skid resistance, surface texture, and roughness (Bennett et al., 2006). Structural 
evaluation provides information on the performance of the pavement structure under certain 
traffic loading and environmental conditions. Pavement evaluations are often performed 
through manual surveys or by means of specialised equipment and quantified by means of 
indicators or condition indices (Bennett et al., 2006).  
Table 4.1: Pavement data-collection equipment 
Pavement characteristic  Equipment class 
Group 1: Precision profiles (Laser or manual) 
Group 2: Other profilometer methods 
Group 3: International Roughness Index (IRI) estimates from correlations 






Falling weight deflectormeter 
Deflection beams 
Dynamic cone penetrometer 




Inertial navigation units 





4.2.2  Traffic data 
The collection of traffic data aims to monitor the use and performance of a road network. The 
principal traffic data categories includes traffic volume, vehicle classification, and truck weight. 
Furthermore, other traffic characteristics of relevance to this study include vehicle speeds and 
occupancies. The RMS division operates a traffic counting system. The traffic counts are 
recorded at a specific point (count station or site) assigned to a certain segment of the national 
road network. There are approximately 150 base and 200 ad hoc electronic traffic-monitoring 
stations on selected inks of the national road network (RA, 2018c:43). Since it is not feasible 
to collect traffic data at every point along the road network, the data collected from the sampled 
segment of the road network are often extrapolated to represent the entire road (FHWA, 2016). 
Therefore, information on the AADT growth rate is estimated from the traffic count data. The 
RMS division can instruct its consultant to conduct traffic count surveys should the RMS data 
be found to be insufficient (RA, 2014). The software has been designed to work with several 
data types and quality.  
Furthermore, for any missing data, HDM-4 has default data that can be calibrated to the local 
environment. The data imported into HDM-4 and exported from of the software are organised 
according to the data objects categorised as road networks, vehicle fleets, maintenance and 
improvement standards, and HDM-4 configuration (Henry & Kerali, 2000). A workspace 
obtained from the Namibian RA (see Figure 4.4) was used as the population from which the 






Figure 4.4: HDM-4 Workspace 
 
4.3  DATASET 
The full HDM-4 Workspace is available at the Namibian RA (RA, 2018a). This analysis used 
version 2015 of the workspace, which consists of a full description of the Namibian vehicle 
fleet and road network data for the national road network. The data provide information on 
Namibia’s vehicle fleet and six representative vehicle characteristics, including basic 
characteristics and the economic unit costs of each vehicle. Road network data consist of 
information such as surface classes, pavement type, length, carriage width, speed flow, 
accident class, climate zone, road classes, and motor vehicles’ AADT (RA, 2018a). The  
HDM-4 Workspace has already been calibrated to the Namibian environment, therefore, in 
this study, no calibration was carried out. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, the 
following data were gathered: 
 The HDM-4 Workspace (RA, 2018a) and the GIS shapefiles (RA, 2018d) were sourced 
from the RA division of RMS. The motor vehicle annual growth statistics for the 
2012/2013 to 2016/2017 fiscal year were obtained from the RA division of Transport 
Information and Regulatory Services (RA, 2017). 
 Anonymised data on Namibian trade statistics on Chapter 87 and Chapter 27 
commodities consisting of income generated from various indirect taxes were obtained 





The dataset for the period 2012/2013 to 2015/2016 included customs and excise data 
(fuel levy), ad valorem taxes, and VAT on vehicle sales and vehicle import duties. 
 The RFA provided information on revenue generated from the RUC for the period 
2012/2013 to 2016/2017.  
 A dataset on revenue generated from the MVA Fund indicates a fuel levy of N$0.503 
on a litre of petrol and diesel sold for the period 2012/2013 to 2016/2017 (MVA Fund, 
2017).  
 The MME provided updated data on fuel composition consisting of the pump prices 
and wholesale selling of diesel (N$14.08 @ 50 or N$14.13 @ 5009) and petrol price 
less custom and excise duty, NEF fuel levy, RUC, fuel tax, and MVA levy.  
4.3.1  Why HDM-4 was the best software for this study 
The HDM-4 model of the World Bank is commonly used in developing countries, including 
Namibia. The model is mainly used for the economic appraisal of road investment needs and 
maintenance strategies (Henry & Kerali, 2000). The HDM-4 model simulates the behaviour of 
the roads within the lifecycle by considering the effect on traffic, pavement structure, 
maintenance operations, and environmental impact over time (Martinez et al., 2018). The 
software has the ability to estimate savings in road-user costs, as well as to predict the benefit 
associated with road management, including lower travel times, reduction in accident risk, and 
fewer environmental effects. The HDM-4 software has the ability to stimulate future change to 
the road system from present conditions (Bagui & Ghosh, 2015). 
HDM-4 consists of a robust framework for road management analysis options to determine 
the investment needs of paved and unpaved road networks. In order to achieve quality and 
correct interpretations of the data, as well as the desired reliable results, HDM-4 requires 
configuration of inputs such as vehicle fleet unit costs, pavement structure, traffic levels and 
characteristics (type and load), road geometry, road conditions, climate conditions, 
maintenance operations, accident rates, traffic flow patterns, speed-flow types, etc. Therefore, 
the model only performs analysis as per the data provided by the user (Martinez et al., 2018). 
It is therefore crucial for the users of these systems to provide accurate data input as far as 
possible. Road network performance could be predicted as a function of traffic (volume, 
loading, and speed), road pavement (type and strength), maintenance and improvement 
standards, as well as environmental conditions. The researcher believed that HDM-4 was the 
best software to use as this study intended to explore and build on existing road pricing and 
funding from multiple perspectives, as well as contributing to the understanding of the RUCS 
                                               





in Namibia. The study sought to explore contemporary phenomena within roads agencies by 
exploring available tools and data that could be used to inform road pricing planning and 
strategy at the transport policy level. This study can benefit several stakeholders in the road 
sector, including roads agencies, line ministries, and policymakers.  
4.4  DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Documentary evidence relevant to the study, including financial reports, business plans, 
strategic plans, policies, newspaper articles, and published and unpublished articles, were 
obtained from roads agencies, line ministries, and relevant stakeholders. The documentary 
analysis approach relies heavily on the RUCS to explore the RUC accrued to the RF managed 
by the RFA. Figure 4.5 illustrates the RUC instruments and the percentage each instrument 
contributes to the funds generated from the road users. The researcher assessed to what 
extent these RUC conform to the user-pays principle. Therefore, the criteria for choosing the 
RUC included those applicable to the Namibian national road network (see Figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Percentage of Road User Charges of revenue 







4.5  SAMPLE METHOD AND SECTION SELECTION 
The idea behind using available tools such as HDM-4 is to sensibly analyse the road sections 
or other documents that best help the researcher to understand the problem and address the 
research objectives. One way of sampling is the road network matrix. The matrix is used to 
assist the researcher in ensuring that the most important factors that affect transportation costs 
in Namibia form part of the study. According to Henry and Kerali (2000), a typical road network 
matrix should include the traffic volume or loading, pavement types and conditions, as well as 
environmental or climatic zones. The following criteria were included in choosing road sections 
within the Namibian national road network: 
 The three main road types (trunk, main, and district roads), the location, and road type 
(paved and unpaved) are crucial to congestion and accident costs. 
 Six representative vehicle classes’ (pickups, articulated trucks, buses, heavy trucks, 
medium cars, and mini-buses) cost per kilometre and revenue heavily depend on 
vehicle type.  
 Traffic volumes influence time period, flow speeds, and congestion and environmental 





4.5.1  Case studies 
 
Figure 4.6: Namibian national road network 
Source: Author (Based on shapefiles from RA, 2018d) 
 
The Namibian road network parameters consist of three road classes (trunk, main, and district 
roads) (see Figure 4.6), two surface types (paved and unpaved), three traffic classes (high, 
medium, and low), three strength classes (strong, medium, and weak), three condition classes 
(good, fair, and poor), and four climate zones (humid/subtropical-hot, peri-humid/subtropical-
hot, semi-arid/subtropical-hot, and sub-humid/subtropical-hot). The road matrix network 
comprises 274 cells10 (RA, 2018a). 
                                               











Based on the workspace and the data available on the characteristics of the national road 
network, the sampled sections were categorised as followed: Paved road network into three 
AADT classes (high, medium, and low); and pavement conditions into three classes (good, 
fair, and poor). Information on the sampled road section is summarised in Table 4.2. 









Good condition 117.76 km (T0108)  
Fair condition 22.75 km (M0052) 
Poor condition  61.05 km (D0872) 
Source: RA (2018a) data adapted from Henry and Kerali (2000)  
 
In order to demonstrate the use of the HDM-4 model and its possibilities to inform the setting 
of road pricing, this chapter uses three case study scenarios. Three road sections D0872, 
M0052 and T0108 roads were randomly sampled from the paved roads of the national road 
network and represent all three road classes, including trunk, main, and district roads (see 
Table 4.3). To better reflect the candidate road work programme in terms of location and the 
maintenance strategies applied to a particular section of the case, the study employed tactical 
analysis. This type of analysis conforms to the SRMC of road use. A description of the road 
sections sample is provided in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Paved road network matrix: A sample of three sections 
ID Section Summary Length (km) AADT 
T0108 (TBB2HGGZ3)  Trunk: Paved: AMGB: High: Strong: Good: Zone 3 117.76 3114 
M0052 (MBB6MPFZ3) Main: Paved: STGB: Medium: Warning: Fair: Zone 3 22.75 1226 
D0872 (DBB5HPPZ1) District: Paved: STGB: Medium: Warning: Poor: Zone 1 61.05 224 
Source: HDM-4 Workspace (RA, 2018a) 
 
Table 4.3 presents the road network matrix outlining the parameters covered by the three 
hypothetical roads; that is, the three road classes (trunk, main, and district), the paved surface, 
three traffic classes (high, medium, and low), three condition classes, and two climatic zones. 
To that effect, the maintenance strategies applied to each candidate road were defined. Table 
4.4 outlines the standard maintenance strategy for the three roads and condition classes.  
Box 4.1: Road network matrix 
 
A road network matrix can be modelled using three traffic categories (high, medium, and low), two 
road categories (paved and unpaved), and three pavement condition levels (good, fair, and poor). It 
is the researcher’s assumption that the environment throughout the study area is similar and a roads 
agency is responsible for the national road network. The matrix for one road class (for instance, trunk 
roads) would therefore comprise (3 x 2 x 3 = 18) representative pavement sections.   





Table 4.4: Maintenance standards for paved roads 
Maintenance strategy 
Trunk roads Main roads District roads 
Good Fair Poor Good Fair Poor Good Fair Poor 
Minimum maintenance √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Rejuvenator √ √   √ √   √ √   
Single bitumen surface treatment (SBST) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Double bitumen surface treatment (DBST) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SBST with shape correction √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
DBST with shape correction √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Overlay 40 √ √ √             
Light rehabilitation   √ √   √ √   √ √ 
Medium rehabilitation   √ √   √ √   √ √ 
Heavy rehabilitation   √ √   √ √   √ √ 
Source: Author (Ourad, 2016)  
 
Details of the sampled sections and the maintenance strategies applied to each case study 
are outlined in Table 4.5. Table 4.5 presents descriptions of the three case studies in terms of 
length (km), carriageway width (m) and the location, number and types of vehicles in the traffic 
(AADT). The maintenance strategies applied on each sampled case study are also discussed. 
Table 4.5: Paved road sections sampled from the national road network 
Case study Description 
A: District paved road 
 
Case study A presents a sampled section of a district paved road of the national road 
network. The road is 61.05 km in length, 6.78 m in width11, and carries average daily 
traffic of 224 motor vehicles, including 69 pick-ups, 20 articulated trucks, one bus, 12 
heavy trucks, 105 medium cars, and 17 mini-buses. An analysis period of 20 years was 
used and a discount rate of 12% was applied. The road was assumed to have been 
newly constructed at the beginning of the period. The maintenance strategy is that the 
road is subjected to overlay when roughness (IRI) exceeds 5.23, a partial resurfacing 
if more than 10.61% of the road area suffers structural cracking, or a partial overlay if 
rutting exceeds 13 mm. The outlined maintenance strategies could apply to a paved 
road in the Hardap region.  
B: Main paved road 
 
Case study B presents a sampled section of a main paved road of the national road 
network. The road is 22.75 km in length, 13.6 m in width, and carries average daily 
traffic of 1 226 motor vehicles, including 375 pick-ups, 108 articulated trucks, six buses, 
68 heavy trucks, 575 medium cars, and 94 mini-buses. An analysis period of 20 years 
was used and a discount rate of 12% was applied. The road was assumed to have 
been newly constructed at the beginning of the period. The maintenance strategy is 
that the road is subjected to overlay when roughness (IRI) exceeds 4.16 or a partial 
overlay if rutting exceeds 9.47 mm. The outlined maintenance strategies could apply 
to a paved road in the Erongo region. 
C: Trunk paved road 
 
Case study C presents a sampled section of a trunk paved road of the road network. 
The road is 117.76 km in length, 7.6 m in width, and carries average daily traffic of 3 
114 motor vehicles, including 953 pick-ups, 275 articulated trucks, 15 buses, 172 heavy 
trucks, 1 461 medium cars and, 238 mini-buses. An analysis period of 20 years was 
used and a discount rate of 12% was applied. The road was assumed to have been 
newly constructed at the beginning of the period. The maintenance strategy is that the 
road is subjected to overlay when roughness (IRI) exceeds 2.22, a partial resurfacing 
if more than 12.46% of the road area suffers structural cracking, or a partial overlay if 
rutting exceeds 4.23 mm. The outlined maintenance strategies could apply to a paved 
road in the Otjozondjupa region.  
                                               







Calculating the marginal and average costs for vehicles using a specific road involves 
consideration of several influencing factors for each external cost component. Table 4.6 
summarises the factors considered for calculating the infrastructure costs, congestion costs, 
environmental costs, and accident costs.  
Table 4.6: Summary of the factors considered for each cost component in calculating the 
marginal cost and average costs 
Influencing factors on cost 
components 
 Marginal costs Average social costs 
Infrastructure costs 






























Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) 









Key: √ SRMC analysis consists of the additional cost increases per vehicle kilometre. Average cost analysis 
consists of the average costs the group of users imposes on other users, infrastructure, and the rest of society 
and the environment. 
Source: Author 
4.6  RESEARCH PROCEDURES 
A formal letter from the Stellenbosch University requesting data was presented to the roads 
agencies. Although RFA data are mostly available on the organisation’s website, the 
researcher submitted an official letter for permission to use the data, as well as to create 
awareness of the study. At the Namibian RA, the researcher received an official letter from 
the office of the chief executive officer (see Appendix B.1). The researcher then used the 
approval to interact with several departments for the data required. Recent data not available 
on websites were obtained from the agencies. A disclaimer form was signed for the workspace 
obtained from the RMS division of the RA (see Appendix B.2). The data obtained from the 
Roads Authority were kept in an electronic format and only the research and the supervisor 





4.7  DATA-ANALYSIS PROCESS 
The overarching research aim was to establish the relationship between road network 
preservation, investment needs, and the RUC imposed on the user in accordance with the 
user-pays principle. This relationship serves as a motivation to explore the HDM-4 model 
currently used by the RA to plan for the national road network’s investment needs and to 
extend it further by using the same tools to estimate the external costs of road use that are 
rarely considered in road pricing determination. Data needed for the type of analysis are 
project specific and require detailed inventory, condition, and performance data (Flintsch & 
Bryant, 2009). The HDM-4 has been a support system for transport planners and engineers 
to project the economic, social, and environmental impact that might occur when making 
investment decisions (Jain, Aggarwal & Parida, 2005). To achieve the research aim, the 
research addressed three objectives, which are divided into the following two main categories:  
A) Road-user spending, revenue generation, and allocations: 
(i) To determine road-user spending on road use;  
(ii) To establish the allocation of RUCS funds towards infrastructure preservation and 
development; and 
(iii) To compare the revenue generation and allocation to international standards. 
B) MEC of road use: 
(iv) Estimate the MEC of road use; 
(v) Establish the financial implications of implementing the RUC-based on MSC; and 
(vi) Explore possible second-best RUC.  
The analysis of each data approach to address each objective is further elaborated on in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
4.7.1  Road-user spending, revenue generation, and allocations 
The information gathered from the RFA (total revenue generated through the RUCS) and RA 
(vehicle kilometre travelled) was used to determine what road users are currently spending 
per kilometre driven on the road infrastructure. Several descriptive statistical analyses were 
performed to establish the empirical relationship between road revenue generation, road 





4.7.2  Marginal External Costs of road use 
This section explores the usage of the HDM-4 model for estimating the MEC of road use for 
Namibia. Costs relevant for road use for the calculation of marginal costs and average costs 
include: 
 infrastructure costs; 
 congestion costs; 
 accidents costs; and 
 environmental costs. 
The analysis approach involved estimating the marginal costs and average costs. Where 
marginal costs analysis studies the impacts of an additional vehicle per kilometre assuming 
that the infrastructure capacity is held constant, average costs analysis examines the social 
costs associated with the road use and assigns the total social costs to the various vehicle 
types. Both marginal costs and average costs were compared to the revenue, which varies 
with road use12. 
Table 4.7: Marginal costs versus average costs  
Cost components Marginal costs Average costs 
Infrastructure costs Mostly wear-and-tear costs associated with 
increased costs per vehicle per kilometre. 
Include all costs related to the upkeep of 
existing infrastructure. 
Congestion costs Costs imposed by an additional vehicle on 
other users using the same network. 
Not relevant (costs within the group may 
result in double counting). Costs across 
different groups are excluded from this 
calculation. 
Accidents costs Social costs of an additional vehicle per 
kilometre; mainly the increase/decrease of 
accident risks associated with an increase 
in traffic.  
Total external costs associated with 
different groups of vehicle classes. 
Environmental 
costs 
Costs of an additional vehicle per kilometre 
imposed on society. 
Total costs for all vehicle classes per 
kilometre. 
Fuel levies Revenue generated by an extra vehicle per 
kilometre. 




In order to establish a link between road investment, maintenance, and pricing, the study 
employed the direct approach to estimating the costs of road use. The direct approach 
involves the use of the HDM-4 mostly used by the roads agencies to analyse the economic 
effects on various maintenance strategies and investment needs of the road network.  
A workspace was obtained from the Namibian RA. Estimations were based on case studies 
representing a paved road sampled from the trunk, main, and districts roads of the national 
                                               





road network. The road sections were assumed to be homogeneous in order to aggregate 
network capacity into one speed-flow relationship. Each section, mainly inter-urban roads with 
two lanes (both wide and standard), road width, and aggregate calibration included climate 
zones, length (km), and AADT. The vehicle fleet comprises six representative vehicle 
categories: 4x4 sport utility vehicle, articulated truck, bus, heavy truck, medium car, and mini-
bus. The output from the HDM-4 include the NPV, fuel consumption per 1 000 vehicle 
kilometres, emission per vehicle categories, and speed flow, which formed the basis of the 
calculation. The estimates were based on three case studies representing a section of an 
individual paved road. The NPV of a certain action formed the foundation of cost inputs into 
the calculations. Two alternatives were compared, by calculating the difference between two 
alternative NPV of certain actions. According to Bruzelius (2004), the marginal costs could be 
determined as thea difference between two alternatives, mainly NPV with an increase in the 
AADT (AADT plus one) compared to another NPV (AADT).   
Table 4.8: Steps and factors that influence the estimation of Marginal External Costs 




The MIC was were calculated from an output of an HDM-4 run, mainly an estimate of the 
NPV of an action. Considering the outlined maintenance strategy, two cases (do nothing 
with AADT and do minimum with AADT increased by one additional unit) were compared, 
and the difference between the NPV of the two cases are were calculated. Therefore, the 
cost of the marginal user may be determined. The major factor for consideration for 
estimating the MIC is the ESAL factor (see Table 4.6). In order to obtain the marginal cost 
of one vehicle, corrections were made to account for the fact that the analysis was based 




The estimate of the MCC relies on the speed-flow relationship. An output of an analysis 
using the HDM-4 model is an estimation of the net time loss of a certain action. Typically, 
two alternatives are compared in terms of the hourly flows of a given period as a proportion 
of the AADT. The marginal time loss may be determined as the difference between two 
actions; one having an increase in the AADT by one additional vehicle in comparison to 
another. For the purpose of calculation, it was assumed that time loss is valued at N$5 per 
minute. A correction was made to account for the homogeneous stream in terms of PCSE 
for all vehicles. Another factor considered was that the analysis was based on an increase 
of one unit per minutes, thus a need to cater for all minutes in a given year and not just 




An output of an analysis using the HDM-4 model provides input data into for calculating 
the total accident cost per causality, including fatal, injury, and damage- only costs. The 
major factors considered ion the estimation of the MAC are mainly the accident rate per 






MENVC, as defined in Chapter 6, includes three components; however, the calculation 
considered only those associated with global warming. In order to allow comparison 
between the different GHGs, there is a need to make these gasses comparable to each 
other. Schroten et al. (2019) posit that the way to compare CO2 emissions with non-CO2 
emissions is to use the global warming potential (GWP). Global warming costs are 
calculated by multiplying the GHGs emitted by the GWP, to obtain a CO2e. The main factor 
of necessity to global warming costs is fuel consumption per 1 000 km. The Namibian 
environmental levy rate value of N$40 of CO2 emissions exceeding 120 g/km was used to 






4.8  STUDY LIMITATIONS 
Certain limitations are associated with a series of tools or mechanisms that allow transport 
planners to make better use of the available resources for maintenance and rehabilitating the 
road network. Limitations associated with the HDM-4 as outlined by Henry and Kerali (2000) 
include the following: 
 HDM-4 is a powerful decision support tool used in road asset management worldwide 
to estimate the external costs of road use, e.g. emission. However, HDM-4 requires 
calibrations to the local environment, which were done by the RA. It is unclear for how 
long a calibrated version of the HDM-4 remains valid and allows external costs 
estimation reliability.  
 Input of unit costs: HDM-4 uses data for new vehicles as input costs. However, 
Teravaninthorn and Raballad (2009) observed that in most African countries, transport 
companies mostly purchase second-hand trucks at a price lower than a brand-new 
truck. They argue that low-priced vehicles would benefit less from the road 
improvements of the model, which are meant to reduce vehicle maintenance benefits. 
Thus, it is concluded that the reliability of the model could be subjective to a certain 
error margin of large fleets of second-hand vehicles that dominate the African road 
network. Martinez et al. (2018) posit that such a situation could be minimised by means 
of local surveys to estimate the average price of a second-hand vehicle fleet.  
 Low-volume roads: The HDM-4 considers roads with traffic volume of fewer 50 
vehicles per day as inappropriate for analysis (Teravaninthorn & Raballad, 2009); the 
cost-effectiveness approach could therefore be employed.   
 Collection of the required data is expensive and time consuming (Bennett et al., 2006; 
2007). Feeding data into the software requires conducting several surveys on traffic 
counts, pavement conditions, etc., which could be time consuming and requires an 
extensive budget. Therefore, given the time and budget constraints for this study, the 
researcher acquired a workspace from the Namibian RA.   
 The estimated calculations are complex and based on assumptions of certain 
scenarios. It is therefore crucial for the user of the results to assess the reliability of the 
results and how the assumptions may influence the outcome. The way to validate the 
results is to compare them with similar methodology estimates conducted using a 
similar model. No effort is made in this study to compare HDM-4 results to other 
methodologies on estimating external costs as outlined in the literature (Bruzelius, 
2004; Schroten et al., 2019) (see Chapter 6). However, the adjustments that are 
compatible with available data were adopted to estimate the external costs of road use 





The limitations pointed out above apply to this study. The Namibian road network is expansive 
and consists of both paved and unpaved roads; however, this research only covered paved 
road sections sampled from each road category. The research covered paved road sections 
sampled from all road categories of the national road network, including trunk, main, and 
district paved roads. This therefore mitigated the limitations by ensuring that the sampled 
sections represented all road categories and were sampled from different regions, mainly the 
Haradap, Erongo, and Otjozondjupa regions. Furthermore, the road matrix utilised included 
the sample road sections used in this study. The RFA allocates funds to both the national road 
network and local authorities for urban street maintenance. However, the length of urban roads 
is unknown, thus the study was limited to assessing RUC-generated funds allocated to the 
RA. 
4.9  SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the overarching methodology used in this study. An analytical tool 
approach (using multiple sources of secondary data) was employed in order to understand 
the relationship between planning for network investments and determining the level of RUC 
imposed on road users by drawing recommended practice from the policy level. The 
researcher utilised available HDM-4 in order to understand to what extent available databases 
are useful or necessary for decision making, in particular in determining the level of RUC. The 
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CHAPTER 5:  
EVALUATION OF NATIONAL ROAD NETWORK FUNDING IN NAMIBIA: THE 
CURSE OF EFFICIENT ROAD USER CHARGES13 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
Road infrastructure is critical for economic development, reducing poverty and inequality, 
creating jobs, and ensuring environmental sustainability (Carter et al., 2017). Investing in new 
roads and maintaining the existing road network is therefore an important policy for national 
development. Road infrastructure requires large capital investments coupled with proper 
financial administration to ensure sufficient financing and funding in order to meet 
developmental objectives, specifically of developing countries. In most developing countries, 
infrastructure investment is under-funded, making it difficult for countries to meet strategic 
developmental goals such as universal access and poverty eradication. Chapter 2 discussed 
the importance of road infrastructure and the role it plays in economic development.  
The search for more sustainable funds therefore prompted many developing countries to 
establish second-generation road funds in the 1990s (Heggie, 1995a). These second-
generation road funds serve as a departure from using the general tax revenue. The main 
underlying principle that guides the second-generation road funds emphasises that road users 
(consumers of scarce resources) should pay for their consumption (Freeman, 1982) through 
RUC (levies or surcharges), separate from general taxation. Revenue generated from the 
RUC are designated to the RF, managed by the Road Board, with a specific member chosen 
to represent road users. The establishment of a second-generation road fund is justifiable 
based on the argument that it could improve the allocation of resources through the 
implementation of the RUCS (Gwilliam & Shalizi, 1999). Gwilliam and Shalizi (1999) posit that 
the introduction of RUC directed to a road fund, instead of relying on the consolidation budget, 
would increase efficient allocations. 
The Namibian RF is a second-generation road fund and is supported by earmarked revenue 
generated from the implemented RUCS. The RFA was established according to the principles 
of second-generation road funds. Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.2) of this dissertation provided a 
detailed discussion of the principles that guide second-generation road funds.  
The common problem with second-generation road funds is that they create the impression 
that all the revenue generated from the RUC should be sufficient to cover the road network 
                                               
13  A short version of this chapter was presented at the 2018 Southern African Transport Conference (SATC); see 





expenditure. The Namibian RF approach differs from those found in other countries in that the 
legislation states that RUC should fully recover costs to also include or to cover the 
expenditure incurred when undertaking justified new investments in the road sector (Bruzelius, 
2000). The current RUCS, based on the stated principle of economic efficiency, appears to 
have run into some problems and has proven to generate insufficient revenue to meet the 
investment needs of the current national road network (Sherbourne, 2017).  
The overall contribution of this chapter lies in using administrative statistics and data in order 
to evaluate the performance of the current RUCS by focusing on how road revenue is 
generated, allocated, and spent on the national road network. These are compared to 
international standards. Previous studies conducted in Namibia focused on reforming the road 
sector (MWTC, 2000; Bruzelius et al., 2000; Runji, 2003; Bruzelius, 2010) and management 
of funds (Heggie, 1995a). Taking cognisance of the importance of the roads for economic 
development, research into road funding has received a great deal of attention internationally. 
Freeman (1982) and Kocaks, Jones and Whibley (2005) are correct in their observation that 
conclusions reached in RUC studies should be treated with caution. It is important, therefore, 
that RUC studies and the user-pays principle in particular be complemented with case studies 
of developing and diverse countries with small vehicle populations such as Namibia. This 
study focuses on road national policies’ performance and funding approaches for Namib ia 
compared to six selected countries to determine the impacts these have on the levels of road 
expenditure. This chapter contributes to existing knowledge in terms of how much road users 
in Namibia are currently spending on utilising the national road network.   
This chapter sought to bridge the gap between road reform and the implemented RUCS. It 
serves as a stepping-stone towards efficient pricing by providing information on the 
performance of the RUCS in terms of revenue generation, allocation, and road expenses for 
the national road network. The evaluation conducted in this chapter placed Namibia in the 
larger knowledge on RUCSs, particularly after establishing the RF.  
The aim of this chapter is to offer an overview of the Namibian road funding trajectory after 
the sector reform. The chapter evaluates the revenue generated from RUC, the allocation 
thereof towards road expenditure by the RFA, and the funding shortfalls experienced by the 
RA. The chapter also discusses the ignored dilemma facing many developing countries with 
road funds, namely the inability of RUC to meet expenditure needs. In addition, this chapter 
sought to determine what Namibian road users are currently spending on road use per 
kilometre (on average) and to ascertain how much of these funds are allocated back to road 
infrastructure maintenance, rehabilitation, and new construction. It also sought to analyse the 





international standards. Towards these goals, Section 5.2 provides a conceptualisation of 
funding for the road infrastructure. A review of the literature on road funding is presented in 
Section 5.3, followed by the methodology in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the results, 
followed by the summary and discussion of the chapter.    
5.2  CONCEPTUALISING FUNDING FOR ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
There is still a grey area that remains unaddressed in making a distinction between road 
funding and financing. Current studies offer little help in obtaining a definition or distinction 
between the two. Transport economists sometimes use the two terms interchangeably to 
cover road investment, which can be related to the road sector. In essence, quality definitions 
aim to send a clear message for the purpose of analysis and policy. The definitions postulated 
here are those of economic perspectives. However, before discussing road funding, it is 
essential to define and clearly distinguish between public infrastructure funding, financing, and 
charging instruments.  
5.2.1  Definitions of road funding and financing 
Funding denotes money provided by the government or a road fund to roads authorities 
based on set agreements and with no expectation of being paid back (Waqar, 2015). Funding 
can be sourced directly from the road users or indirectly through general rates and taxes that 
the government imposes on individuals and companies. However, funding for road 
infrastructure should not be left to the public sector alone, which should look for opportunities 
to involve both road users and the private sector in order to fund road projects together. In this 
context, Davies (2016) recommends that the public sector should undertake a radical 
approach to looking for private sector funding opportunities.  
In contrast, financing refers to the capital obligations required for infrastructure investment. 
For example, road infrastructure can be financed by the public sector through surplus recurrent 
revenues or the private sector through public-private partnerships (PPPs). It is worth noting 
that when the private sector provides finance for road infrastructure, it ultimately requires a 
return on investment. Davies (2016) established that finance comes at a price, which is 
normally above the government cost of finance. Historically, private financing entails 
transferring project cost risk and expertise and introducing efficiencies. Moreover, it is worth 
engaging the private sector if risk transfer, expertise, and efficiencies introduced compensate 
for the higher finance cost. Otherwise, while it is more affordable for the public sector to source 





Therefore, the government should take careful consideration before involving the private 
sector for infrastructure financing.   
Funding for road infrastructure is often generated from the charging instruments in place. 
Charging is therefore a subset of funding, as it refers to the mechanism, type of instruments, 
levies, and taxes that should be paid. It is critical that sources of funding are in place to support 
financing. Funding and financing go hand in hand; however, they are fundamentally different. 
Davies (2016) posits that funding opportunities normally arise where the private sector is 
already financing an asset.  
5.2.2  The Namibian road funding policy framework 
Namibia has adopted various initiatives and national policy documents, including plans with 
direct implications for road funding; namely the NDPs (NPC, 2012; 2017), the White Paper on 
Transport Policy (MWTC, 1995), the Namibian Transport Master Plan and Master Plan of an 
International Logistics Hub for SADC Countries (NPC, 2015b), the Windhoek Urban Master 
Plan (City of Windhoek, 2014), the Road Transport Sustainability Plan (RA, 2015c), and the 
Namibian Transport Policy (MWT, 2017). All initiatives towards road infrastructure and road 
safety require funding and place a heavy demand on the current funding sources14.  
Literature on road funding and financial initiatives from different parts of the world illustrates 
that fuel levies tend to be the main source of road revenue (Kumar, 2002; TRB, 2006). Due to 
several trends, fuel levies may lose their effectiveness as the main source of income. There 
is thus a need to implement the recommended user-pays principle for charging road users. 
The following section discusses various RUC implemented in Namibia and other countries 
5.2.3  Road User Charges 
These charging instruments are commonly divided into two categories. The first category 
comprises those that are charged on the road use and that are related to vehicle acquisition, 
vehicle ownership, and vehicle usage. The second category entails those that are levied on 
the road beneficiaries and are mainly used in municipal areas for urban access roads and in 
rural areas for road access (Heggie, 1995b). This study focused on the first category of RUC. 
Road users are interested in a well-maintained road network that could reduce their vehicles’ 
operating costs. Therefore, the first step in sourcing road maintenance funding is to ensure 
that road users pay for the cost of road maintenance (Queiroz, 2009). Experience in various 
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countries indicates that road users are willing to pay for road maintenance and even for further 
road network expansion provided that the generated revenue is allocated back to improving 
road networks (Queiroz, 2003). According to Yenny (2002, cited in Queiroz, 2009:2), RUC 
must be economically efficient, equitable15, easy to collect, and not easily evaded. Moreover, 
RUC should be adjusted for inflation. Preferably, RUC instruments should be closely linked to 
the use of the road network. To that effect, appropriate charges are those charged for road 
space and the damage that HGVs impose on the roads. Funding for roads should take into 
consideration the conditions and characteristics of the country under review. It suffices to 
analyse the current RUC instruments in the Namibian context.  
Table 5.1: Revenue streams over the past seven years 
RUC (in millions) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Fuel levy  852 937 975 1 035 1 105 1 299 1 341 
AVLRF and ALF 330 392 410 408 458 586 634 
CBC 67 78 86 97 106 122 125 
MDC 38 51 63 71 85 85 98 
Total revenue 1 288 1 459 1 535 1 613 1 756 2 094 2 199 
Source: Author (Data from RFA, 2018) 
 
In Namibia, the White Paper on Transport Policy recommends that the full cost for providing 
the roads be recovered from the road users (MWTC, 1995). To that effect, five charging 
instruments as per the RFA Act of 1999 were introduced: 
(i) Fuel levy is one of the common RUC that is widely applied and to some extent varies 
(proportionately) to the use of the road network. Fuel levies are relatively inexpensive 
to collect and easy to administer. However, the major shortcoming with a fuel levy is 
that it does not reflect much of the increased damage imposed on the roads by 
HGVs. Although HGVs consume more fuel per kilometre than light vehicles, the 
impact imposed on the road is not proportional with the fuel levy (Queiroz, 2009). A 
fuel levy should therefore be supplemented by an additional charge that better 
reflects the cost HGVs impose on the roads. In Namibia, the fuel levy is charged on 
every litre of diesel and petrol sold and collected by commercial undertakings (Puma, 
Total, Engen, and Vivo Energy) on behalf of the RFA and deposited directly into the 
RF’s account.  
(ii) MDC or Vehicle Travelling Distance Charges (VTDC) have been successfully 
implemented in developed countries, including New Zealand, Sweden, and Norway. 
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It represents the marginal cost of road use. These charges are imposed through 
sealed hub odometers, on-board devices, GPS, smartphone applications, and in-
vehicle telematics. Implementing MDC/VTDC can be costly and requires 
sophisticated administration. Another shortcoming is that MDC are prone to evasion. 
For instance, in New Zealand, evasion was recorded as ranging between 10% to 
20% (Queiroz, 2009). In 2007, the RFA introduced MDC to ensure that HGV16 
operators pay their fair share towards the maintenance of road infrastructure. MDC 
are imposed on HGVs (domestic and foreign) with a carrying capacity over 3 500 kg 
travelling on Namibian roads (see Section 2.3.3.4 of Chapter 2 for fees per vehicle 
category). The MDC are based on distance travelled within the country, HVG owners 
are therefore obliged to declare their vehicle odometer readings at the RFA office 
situated at the border post or nearby town when entering and leaving Namibia. The 
MDC in Namibia has been faced with implementation challenges, which is the 
measure’s ability to allocate charges to HGVs whose use of the road infrastructure 
imposes the greatest costs on the road network (Diop et al., 2012). Despite the 
implementation of MDC, during the financial year 2015/2016, the RFA managed to 
collected approximately N$59 465 000 and N$25 938 000 from local and foreign 
HGVs respectively. Prepaid payments can be done directly to the RFA bank account 
and a permit is issued upon furnishing proof of payment. Evasion is high as the 
measures are based on self-declaration of distance travelled by the owner17. 
Compliance concerning MDC permits are checked by means of law enforcement in 
place through the traffic police, roadblocks by the Namibian Police, and through the 
RA weigh bridge stations across the country. Non-compliance is charged with an 
amount not exceeding N$4 000 at any of the law enforcement points.  
(iii) CBC are imposed on foreign-registered motor vehicles (including motor cycles) that 
utilise the Namibian road network. During 2015/2016, the RFA collected 
approximately N$122 817 000. The amount was collected by RFA offices located at 
various Namibian border posts or towns (RFA, 2016). 
(iv) AVLRF are commonly charged on an annual basis. The fees vary across the 
different types of vehicles and are easy to administer. The disadvantages of this 
method are that they are not related to the use of the road. In Namibia, licensing fees 
are collected by e-NATIS on behalf of the RFA. e-NATIS has approximately 35 
offices across the 14 regions of Namibia, 21 testing centres, and three registering 
                                               
16  MDC apply to all foreign and domestic vehicle in excess of 3 500 kg that utilise the road infrastructure, as 
consumption is perceived to increase with vehicle mass.  





offices that are directly managed by the RA, while 11 e-NATIS centres are managed 
by local authorities on a memorandum of agreement with the RA (RA, 2017).  
(v) ALF are charged on HGVs carrying abnormal loads. Due to their dimensions, 
abnormal loads cannot be transported without exceeding the mass limitations. 
Therefore, charges should be imposed on oversized or overloaded vehicles to 
compensate for the extra damage such vehicles impose on the roads. These fees 
represent the fixed cost associated with providing the roads (Runji, 2003). 
Drawbacks associated with abnormal load vehicles involve the increase of the 
financial burden on road maintenance and that it requires advance payment 
(charges) for future capital investment for new facilities (Newbery et al., 1988). 
Another drawback is that such charges can be easily avoided through bribes. In 
Namibia, the RA issues abnormal load permits and collects payments on behalf of 
the RFA. During the 2015/2016 financial year, abnormal load charges amounted to 
N$12 986 000 (RFA, 2016).  
Other notable sources of funds include grants and loans offered by development partners, 
commercial bank loans, and bonds issued by the Infrastructure Finance Corporation. The 
government acquires grants and loans at favourable interest rates from the development 
partners (e.g. the RFA16 Loan Stock and the KfW Grant). Given the RFA’s revenue flow 
ability, the RF must keep its eye on the lending market.   
“The RFA through government grantee reached a loan agreement with KfW 
Development Bank in November 2015 for N$447 million, as per the Road Fund 
mandate … ‘to secure and allocate sufficient funding’ (the RFA Act, 18 of 1999 
section 3). The loan was made possible through a financial cooperation agreement 
between the GRN and the Federal Republic of Germany under the Programme Sector 
Wide Approach Road Transport 2 and 3. This loan was specifically earmarked towards 
bridging the gap occurred in road rehabilitation particularly for upgrading of Trunk Road 
1/6 to a dual carriage freeway (Windhoek to Okahandja)” (RFA, 2018:33).    
The earnings accumulated from the fund invested in the diversified local money market 
instruments redeemed the RFA16 Loan Stock.  
(vi) Road pricing that exists elsewhere in the world but which has not yet been applied 
in Namibia, such as: 
(i) In most countries, tolls are strategically positioned on specific roads, bridges, and 
tunnels. Tolls are set at a level that is equitable and proportional with road usage. 





toll plazas, tollbooths, controlled access points, and operating costs. In order to 
establish tolls, they must comply with the rule of thumb in such a way that traffic 
volumes on the targeted tolled road should not be less than 10 000 vehicles per 
day (Bousquet & Queiroz, 1996). When this condition is met, it is likely that 
administrative costs are kept at a low percentage of the toll revenues.  
(ii) Vignettes are usually sold for a period of one year or less and can be used during 
the valid time irrespective of the distance driven and therefore do not address the 
issue of charging for the use of the road. The drawback of this method is that 
evasion is likely to be high as verification of vehicles that display vignettes are only 
done through random checks.   
5.3  EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW ON ROAD FUNDING 
Funding for road transport networks has been the subject of ongoing research in recent 
decades (Freeman, 1982; Jones & Hervik, 1992; Grieco & Jones, 1994; Fon & Heggie, 1999; 
Gomez & Vassallo, 2014). Studies that investigated the efficient utilisation of resources often 
focused on economic appraisal of user charges and other taxes levied by the government (see 
Walter, 1968; Freeman, 1982). Some studies attempted a thorough investigation of road 
financing systems by focusing on the instruments in place (Queiroz, 2009). Others conducted 
comparison analyses of road revenue generation, allocation, and expenditure-related ratios 
(Gomezo & Vassallo, 2014).  
In comparison, few studies have focused on sub-Saharan African countries and in particular 
on Namibia. There are a few traceable papers on the Namibian road sector reform, including 
Mwase (1987), Bruzelius (2000), Bruzelius et al. (2000), Runji (2003), and Tekie (2005). 
Mwase (1987) researched funding transport and communication with emphasis on the 
transformation of the road sector from pre-independent to independent Namibia. In contrast, 
Bruzelius (2000) and Tekie (2005) explored road management. Runji (2003) discussed in 
detail the road sector reform process as one moving from dependence on the SRF to one 
managed and partially funded by the RF. Several studies focused on road funding and 
financing (Freeman, 1982; Bousquet & Queiroz, 1996; Gomez & Vassallo, 2014); however, 
the treatment of the road financial system in Namibia is yet to be explored.  
The literature on road financing systems has mostly been developed around important yet 
controversial issues such as earmarking, revenue generation, and expenditure levels with the 
major focus on maintenance and rehabilitation of the existing roads as a priority versus the 





5.3.1  First-generation funds, second-generation funds, earmarking, and 
commercialisation 
Government objectives are multifaceted and state budgets cater for various sectors. For 
example, due to the growing population, governments may prioritise the social sector over the 
road sector. Insufficient budget allocation towards the road sector has severe implications for 
the sector, as it creates a maintenance backlog, which leads to increased transport costs in 
the long run. On the other hand, road rehabilitation and maintenance seem not to receive 
priority and promote political agendas as opposed to the development of new roads (Zietlow 
& Bull, 2002). Interestingly, international agencies support many developing countries with 
road construction (Orondje et al., 2014). Addressing road maintenance expenses therefore 
remains a challenge in many developing countries. The search for sustainable funds prompted 
many developing countries to establish road funds mainly in the 1990s (Heggie, 1995b). The 
so-called second-generation road funds are funded through RUC instruments. The 
establishment of a road fund is justifiable based on the argument that it could improve the 
allocation of resources through the implementation of an RUCS (Gwilliam & Shalizi, 1999). 
Although second-generation road funds are recommended for sustainable funding of the road 
sector, they are not necessary or effective in all countries. Experience reveals that countries 
with good governance manage to maintain their road networks through state budget 
arrangements. Gwillian and Shalizi (1999) argue that other factors such as poor governance 
have the potential to make it difficult for a country to maintain the road system even with the 
establishment of a road fund.  
Economists and public finance specialists have criticised the establishment of road funds on 
the grounds that they constitute earmarking (see Creightney, 1993; De Richercour & Heggie, 
1995; Bousquet & Queiroz, 1996; Potter, 1997; Heggie & Vickers, 1998; Calvo, 1998; Gwilliam 
& Shalizi, 1999; Heggie, 2003; Orondje et al., 2014). Some argue that road funds introduce 
fiscal inflexibility and fail to address challenges with respect to the internalisation of 
externalities and do not address the principle of unified budget management. Surprisingly, 
Gwilliam and Kumar (2003) state that second-generation road funds do not undermine fiscal 
flexibility, but rather have been an instrument that improves the administration process and 
output of a road fund in terms of execution capability and the condition of the road network.  
Another argument is that the government is best positioned to make decisions on distribution 
and allocation of revenue and that earmarking taxes for specific sectors is inappropriate. The 
Asian Development Bank (2015) indicates that first-generation road funds have led to 
deficiencies in the road sector system with significantly low road maintenance, resource 





Earmarking of funds is stipulated by the World Bank (1996) as appropriate in a case where 
there is a high need to protect a certain budget item or in a situation where maintenance 
planning and implementation have been affected by funding insecurity. Therefore, such cases 
justify the need for second-generation road funds or better options for the RFA to argue for 
RUC increments with the aim of strengthening road network maintenance (Queiroz, 2003).   
Earmarking of funds should therefore be treated with caution, as each country needs to 
determine the proportion of taxes and levies to be earmarked for road maintenance and 
rehabilitation. For instance, Bousquet and Queiroz (1996) used France and the USA as case 
studies to argue that it is possible for a country to a have good road system with or without the 
implementation of a second-generation road fund. They demonstrated how both France and 
the USA managed to have adequate road infrastructure while operating different road funding 
systems. The USA practises earmarking of the road sector with funds designated to its HTF, 
whereas in France, with the exception of the motorway tolls, road-related taxes and levies are 
directed to the general budget.  
Therefore, road funds should prevail at all levels concerning resource gathering and 
expenditure. In addition, users should pay their fair share and administration should see to it 
that appropriate proportions are allocated towards road expenditure. Finally, sufficient funds 
should be allocated to roads agencies for the preservation of road networks.  
Commercialised road funding implies that revenues should be raised from the RUC and not 
from general taxes or levies. It also implies that revenues are designated to a road fund and 
are kept apart from the general funds. This justifies the adjustment of road tariffs on a regular 
basis with the aim to meet the expected required expenditure. Finally, the revenue generated 
should finance the maintenance and rehabilitation of the road network and a road fund should 
not extract further revenue from other sectors.  
5.3.2  Maintenance of existing roads versus development of new roads 
Inadequate maintenance results in high transport costs and subsequently raises the net costs 
to the whole economy. Metschies and Rausch (1991) state that the latter has proven (in many 
African countries) to be a major obstacle to national economic development. Bousquet and 
Queiroz (1996) agree that insufficient budget allocation to the road sector has implications and 
constrains economic development. They argue that deteriorated roads have high implications 
for high vehicle operation, loss of time for road users due to low speed, and high prices.  
Vehicle-operating costs increase more than double or triple for each dollar saved on road 





developing countries spend on road maintenance, road users save approximately three US 
dollars (Asian Development Bank, 2003). Insufficient allocation towards road maintenance is 
often demonstrated by high return to maintenance and rehabilitation (Harral & Faiz, 1988). 
The backlog of deferred maintenance remains a great concern in many developing countries. 
Heggie (2003) asserts that in many developing countries, only about a third of the funds 
required for road maintenance was allocated, which is a main reason for the shortage of funds 
for maintenance. A properly maintained road benefits not only the users but also contributes 
to economic development. 
Potter (1997) raises the question whether there is a difference between road funds covering 
road maintenance and rehabilitation only and those that cover capital spending. Potter’s 
(1997) rationale is, for as long as the road funds or roads authorities receive funds from the 
general budget, they tend to compete with other sectors for budget provision. Countries where 
road funds pursue a genuine commercial agency approach are likely to achieve efficient 
means of delivering road maintenance and even cover their capital expenditure. Most 
developed countries with efficient budgetary systems have proven to satisfy the latter 
condition. For example, road revenue is significantly higher than road expenditure in most 
European countries (Bousquet & Queiroz, 1996). However, in many developing countries, 
recommendations were to reform the road sector and road funds’ and agencies’ procedures 
and practices in order to attain efficient road funds financial system.  
5.3.3  Road sector funding systems: Cross-country comparison 
When reviewing a country’s public expenditure, it is helpful to analyse the road financing plan 
associated with its GDP. This is mainly because other indicators such as comparing one 
country to another can be very helpful; however, the limitation of this approach lies in the 
availability of data for both countries (Heggie, 2004). In his cross-comparison between 
countries with road funds and those without road funds, Heggie (2004) found that countries 
with road funds spend on average 1.6% of their GDP on their roads. Across the countries 
under review, the percentage of GDP on road spending ranged from 1.2% in the USA to 2.5%, 
making Japan the top country among the analysed spending patterns. Figures for 
maintenance spending have been a challenge, especially in Africa. Heggie (2004) indicates 
that figures on maintenance spending were below the requirements, with an average of 0.8%. 
To summarise, maintenance spending figures should be used as a guideline as it is anticipated 
that some figures might have included rehabilitation costs. When associating maintenance 
spending to the country’s GDP, the rule of thumb implies that the preferred GDP percentage 
should range between 0.5% and 1.0%, while a range between 1.0% and 2.0% is preferred for 





5.4  METHODOLOGY 
Research is based on underlying philosophical assumptions of what constitutes validity and 
reliability. In this chapter, document analysis was employed to empirically investigate the 
Namibian road funding system and compare it to selected developed countries. Towards this 
goal, a thorough analysis of national road networks was conducted. This chapter presents the 
Namibian road funding system and outlines the sources of RGR systems, how the revenue is 
distributed to the approval authorities, and how such revenue is spent on road expenditure. In 
so doing, the chapter used administrative statistics. According to the African Development 
Bank, administrative statistics is one of the principal sources of data (Africa Development 
Bank, World Bank & The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2011:5). Given that the chapter 
focuses on road funding from the supply side, the institution responsible for road services 
furnish the administrative records. In contrast, from the demand side (users), national sources 
such as censuses and surveys provide variable data. In addition, many public and private 
global databases also provide variable complementary information on road infrastructure. 
5.4.1  Data sources 
The primary analysis of the Namibian road funding system utilised secondary data for the 
period 2011 to 2016 in an annual time series. The roads agencies, line ministries, and affiliated 
public enterprises in the road sub-sector were pragmatically identified. For international 
comparison, ratio data for the developed countries (the USA, selected countries in the EU, the 
United Kingdom (UK), Switzerland, Germany, Spain, and France) for the period 2004 to 2009 
were extracted from Gomez and Vassallo (2014). 
Table 5.2: Selected institutions for data collection  
Institution Data collected Category 
Road Fund Administration 
(RFA) 
Annual reports, policies, newspaper articles, Acts, plans, 
and strategy documents 
Roads agency 
Roads Authority (RA) Annual reports, budgets, plans, policies, research reports, 
newspaper articles, and statistics on vehicle population 
Roads agency 
Ministry of Works and 
Transport (MWT) 
Policies and research reports Line ministry 
National Planning 
Commission (NPC) 
Plans and research reports Affiliated ministry 
Ministry of Mines and Energy 
(MME) 
Fuel composition Affiliated ministry 
Ministry of Finance (MoF)  Statistics on revenue generated outside the RUCS Affiliated ministry 
National Statistic Agency 
(NSA) 
Data on national account Public enterprise 
Motor Vehicle Accident 
(MVA) Fund 






5.4.2  Documentary analysis 
Documents related to the topic, including annual reports, budgets, plans, policies, research 
reports, newspaper articles, and published and unpublished articles, were collected from the 
institutions listed in Table 5.2. This method was adopted from Heggie and Quick (1990).   
Road revenue generated through RUC was utilised to estimate how much road users spent 
(on average) on the road network and how much of these funds were allocated back to road 
infrastructure investment. To that effect, three ratios were calculated, namely the (i) RGR ratio, 
(ii) road expenditure ratio, and (iii) road allocated ratio for Namibia and comparing them to 
international standards.   
Table 5.3: Items covered in the ratio calculation for the Namibia national road network 
Concept Road Expenditure RGR Road Allocation  
Items 
covered 
National road network operation 
expenditure: 
 Maintenance 
 Construction and rehabilitation 
 Network planning and 
consultation 
 RMS 
 Road inspection services 
 Transport information and 
agents 
Road taxes, levies and 
charges inside and outside 
RUCS: 
 Fuel levies 
 MDC 
 CBC 
 Vehicle registration and 
licences 
 Abnormal load levies 
 Vehicle excise duties, vehicle 
import duties, ad valorem 
taxes, and VAT on vehicle 
purchases 
Source of funds: 
 SRF 
 RF 
Source: Author (Gomez & Vassallo, 2014) 
 
 
Table 5.3 presents the Namibian data used for ratio calculation. The data seek to illustrate the 
percentage of both road revenue generated from the road users. The analysis of the three 
ratios was conducted on the Namibia national road network as follows: 
 Road expenditure illustrates the operational expenditure spent on the Namibian 
national road network managed by the RA.  
 RGR represents all revenue generated through the RUC, taxes, and levies the road 
users are charged, both directly and indirectly for utilising the Namibian national road 
network.  
 Road allocation denotes the budget allocated to the RA from various sources 
including the GRN (including loans and grants) and the RF (RUC) towards national 






5.4.3  International comparison 
The comparison aimed to quantify the annual revenues generated through RUC (fuel levy, 
MDC, vehicle registration and licences, CBC, and abnormal load charges) in Namibia and 
compare them to the annual national roads level of expenditure. In comparing the Namibian 
road funding system to selected developed countries, three ratios used by Gomez and 








                                           (2) 
 Road Allocation_ratio = 
𝐴𝑅
𝑅𝐺𝑅
                                                           (3) 
5.5  RESULTS 
Road funding sources in Namibia can be divided into two categories, namely (1) allocation 
from the RF (revenue generated from RUC) and (2) allocation from the SRF (revenue 
generated from general government taxes). Revenue from the RUC relates to the actual use 
of the road network by different vehicle types and varies with road use. All revenue generated 
from RUC accrues to the RF. Revenue allocation from the SRF comprises the national 
government funds mainly generated from general taxes, which are not associated with the 
vehicle use of roads and are thus not earmarked for a specific sector.  
5.5.1  Namibian road funding and its sources 
Namibia generates revenue from various sources such as personal income tax, VAT, 
company tax, property tax, and trade tax (on goods imported into Namibia), as well as income 
from the SACU, of which Namibia is a member state. During the 2016 fiscal year, government 
revenue amounted to N$55 440 billion (MoF, 2016). Income from international trade and 
transactions, individual tax income, domestic taxes on goods and services, company taxes, 
and fuel levies contributed 31%, 23%, 19%, 14%, and 5% (see Figure 5.1) respectively to total 
government revenue (MoF, 2016). The government also collects revenue from other sources 
such as royalties from minerals (like diamonds and copper), as well as dividends from public 
enterprises and various administrative fees, fines, permits, and charges. In addition, the 
government also raises funds by selling T-Bills and bonds to the domestic market and 
borrowing money from international financial markets.  
Filling large voids with external financing entailing account deficits, however, make the 





(Okondjo-Iweala, Pinto & Birdsall, 2018). These challenges drive the government to explore 
and recognise the importance of the domestic saving rate.  
 
Figure 5.1: Percentage contribution to total revenue per source 
Source: Author (Data from MoF, 2016) 
 
All income collected by the national government accrues to the SRF within the MoF. The state 
budget is allocated to various implementing agencies, including government offices, 
ministries, or agencies18. In addition to the funds allocated from the state budget, municipalities 
and councils can mobilise funding through various charges such as tariffs and property rates 
and taxes19.  
Road revenue generation in Namibia can be divided into two categories, namely (1) revenue 
generated from RUC and (2) revenue generated through the general government taxes. 
Revenue generated from RUC relates to the actual use of the road network by different vehicle 
types utilising the roads and varies with the road use. Revenue from general taxes includes 
national government taxes and tariffs on road-related commodities, which are not associated 
with the vehicle use of roads, thus they are not earmarked for a specific sector.   
                                               
18  Various agencies submit their developmental programmes and projects through the NPC for funding. The NPC 
analyses and assesses Development Budget submissions from various offices, ministries, or agencies and 
forwards recommendations for funding to the MoF. The Development Programme’s Estimates of Expenditure 
are then presented in the form of an MTEF, which is a three-year rolling budget. The first year provides accurate 
figures, followed by estimates for the two consecutive years.  










Percentage Contribution to the total revenue per source 
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Income taxes on individual
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Following the establishment of the RF in Namibia in 2000, funding for roads in Namibia has 
been provided though a combined funding mechanism. Funds generated from the RUC accrue 
to the RF and is allocated to the approved authorities mandated to manage various road 
networks. In addition, authorities also receive an annual budget from the national government 
towards road development projects. Figure 5.2 presented the three stages of the current road 
funding approaches in Namibia. 
The first stage illustrates the receipts of funds for both revenue generated from the RUC and 
government taxes and tariffs. The roads agencies are responsible for collecting road charges 
and depositing them to the RF. In contrast, the government through the MoF receives general 
taxes and levies that accumulate to the SRF. Another agency at this level is the MAV Fund 
that receives a designated fuel levy charged from the road users.  
The second link presents the distribution of funds to various roads agencies and related 
expenses. The last link focuses on the national road network expenditure. It shows how the 
funds received from the two sources and allocated to the RA for the fiscal year 2015/2016 






Figure 5.2: Namibia road funding and allocation flowchart approaches20 
Source: Author (Based on various sources, including RFA, RA, MoF & MVA Fund)
                                               





5.5.2  Aggregated road-generated revenue for the period 2011 to 2016 
The RFA depends mainly on revenue streams generated through the current RUCS to fulfil its 
mandate. Table 5.4 depicts the aggregated revenue collected from the road users in Namibia. 
In total, Namibia collected N$4.765 million from road users.  
During the 2015/2016 financial year, the RF generated a total revenue of N$2.094 million from 
the RUC (see Table 5.4). The road funds generated are allocated to the “approved authorities” 
towards national road network-related maintenance and rehabilitation. In addition, allocation 
to other expenses includes (i) maintenance of major urban and arterial roads, (ii) traffic-related 
maintenance of urban roads and streets, (iii) traffic law enforcement and traffic information 
systems, (iv) the RA, and (v) RFA administrative costs, among others. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that RGR is made up of revenue generated inside and outside the 
RUC.  
Table 5.4: Aggregated road-generated revenue for the period 2011 to 2016 (in million) 
Income stream 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Coordinated 
by 
Fuel levy N$1.22/l 852 938 975 1,035 1,106 1,299 RFA 
AVLRF 323 383 404 390 475 574 RFA 
CBC 67 78 87 97 106 123 RFA 
MDC local 30 42 48 52 63 59 RFA 
MDC foreign 7 9 16 19 22 26 RFA 
ALF  7 8 6 18 13 13  RFA 
Total revenue  1,287  1,458 1,536 1,611 1,785 2,081 RFA 
MVA Fund: Fuel levy N$50.3/l  286 344 390 448 505 541 MVA 
Total revenue from RUC 1,573 1,802 1,926 2,059 2,291 2,622  
VAT on vehicle sales 922 1,067 1,294 1,769 1701 1,458 GRN 
Import duties: Vehicles 24 54 80 92 120 56 GRN 
Fuel levy 104 110 87 52 174 262 GRN 
Ad valorem 5 6 37 30 49 9 GRN 
Excise duties: Fuel 4  10 15 12  31  50  GRN 
VAT on fuel 114 184 198 221 444 292 GRN 
Import duties: Fuel  25 576 837 723 2 2 GRN 
Revenue from general taxes 1,194  2,007  2,548 2,887 2,521 2,079  
*Total Revenue 2,767 3,809 4,474  4,946  4,812 4,701  










Table 5.5: Percentage of aggregated road-generated revenue for the period 2011 to 2016 
Percentage of income stream 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Coordinated 
by 
Fuel levy 31% 25% 22% 21% 23% 28% RFA 
AVLRF 12% 10% 9% 8% 10% 12% RFA 
CBC 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% RFA 
MDC local 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% RFA 
MDC foreign 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% RFA 
ALF 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% RFA 
MVA Fund: Fuel levy* 10% 9% 9% 9% 11% 12% MVA 
VAT on vehicle sales 33% 28% 29% 36% 35% 31% GRN 
Import duties: Vehicles 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 1% GRN 
Fuel levy 4% 3% 2% 1% 4% 6% GRN 
Ad valorem 0.2% 0.2% 1% 1% 1% 0.2% GRN 
Excise: Fuel  0.1% 0.3 0.3% 0.2% 1% 1% GRN 
VAT on fuel 4% 5% 4% 4% 9% 6% GRN 
Import duties: Fuel 1% 15% 19% 15% 0.04% 0.04% GRN 
Total revenue 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Direct income  57% 47% 43% 42% 48% 56% RUC 
Indirect income 43% 53% 57% 58% 52% 44% Taxes/tariffs 
Source: Author (various sources RFA; MoF; MVA Fund; and RA, 2011-2016) 
 
 
The revenue depicted a positive increase between the period 2010/2011 to 2015/2016. 
However, the RUC were not increased annually, in particular the main contributor, the fuel 
levy, has not been kept on par with inflation. This significantly contributed to the effect on the 
economic slowdown on road revenue collected in 2012/2013 and 2014/2015.   
In 2015/2016, N$2.081 billion was collected through the RUCS and approximately 
N$2.079 billion was collected through government taxes and tariffs. The fuel levy formed the 
highest contributor both to the RF and to the MVA Fund, comprising N$1.299 million (28%) 
and N$541 million (12%) respectively.  
In Namibia, fuel levies are collected by commercial fuel stations, namely Engen Namibia (Pty) 
Ltd, Total Namibia (Pty) Ltd, Puma Namibia Ltd, and Vivo Energy Namibia (Pty) Ltd on behalf 
of the RFA and paid directly to the RF. Petrol and diesel in August 2017 were sold at N$10.50 
and N$10.33 per litre respectively (MME, 2017). Of the N$10.50 per litre and N$10.33 per 
litre, the fuel levy charged for road use towards the RFA and MVA Fund are inclusive.  
By March 2011, the fuel levy was charged at N$0.99 per litre on petrol and N$1.04 per litre on 
diesel by April 2011. An increase in the fuel levy of 10% was further recorded by April 2015, 
thus both petrol and diesel were charged at N$1.14 per litre. In June 2017, an increase of 8% 
was granted on both petrol and diesel. The fuel levies accruing to the RFA are set at N$1.22 





In contrast, the MVA Fund is able to fulfil its mandate as per the MVA Fund Act (No. 10 of 
2007)21, through which the fuel levy provided by the MME is set at 50.3 Namibian cents per 
litre petrol and diesel sold (MME, 2017). The fuel levy is the highest contributor toward the 
revenue stream generated inside the RUCS and contributed approximately N$1 105 591 000 
and N$1 299 616 000 during the 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 financial years respectively (RFA, 
2016).  
 
5.5.2.1  Revenue streams generated from the Road User Charge System 
Road users pay charges and fees for owning and operating a vehicle on the national road 
network and other roads. The RUC instruments in place include the fuel levy, AVLRF, MDC, 
CBC, and ALF. The fuel levy dominated the revenue generated from the RUC for the period 
2007 to 2017. During the 2016/2017 fiscal year, the fuel levy (N$1.22 per litre for both diesel 
and petrol) contributed N$1.341 million (61%) to the total RUC revenue, AVLRF and ALF 
N$634 million (29%), CBC N$125 million (6%), and MDC N$98 million (4%). Figure 5.3 
illustrates the trend of revenue generated from the RUC from 2006/2007 to 2016/2017.  
 
Figure 5.3: Total revenue collected through the Road User Charge System 
Source: Author (Data from RFA, 2016) 
 
For the 2007 fiscal year, the RFA generated an amount of N$897 million, which gradually 
increased to N$2.199 million by 2017. Revenue generated from the RUCS recorded steady 
                                               
21  The MVA Fund is mandated to design, promote, and implement crash and injury prevention measures, provide 
assistance and benefits to persons injured in motor vehicles accidents and to the dependants of those killed in 
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nominal growth of 5% in the 2016/2017 fiscal year. From 2016/2017, the Namibian economy 
registered a contraction of 0.8% in real value with average inflation recorded at 6.1% (NSA, 
2017a). The real RUC revenue generated from charges and fees registered a moderate 
growth of 5.4% (RA, 2017).  
The growth in revenue is deflated to real revenue, using the Namibia Consumer Price Index 
in order to understand the real revenue growth. Although Figure 5.3 contains information on 
the revenue growth between the 2006/2007 to 2016/2017 fiscal years, the real growth 
comparison was only compiled for the 2011/2012 to 2015/2016 financial years (see Figure 
5.4). During the 2011 year, the fuel levy (largest contributor to the RUC revenue) was charged 
at N$0.99 (petrol) and N$1.04 (diesel) and only increased to N$1.14 for both petrol and diesel 
during the 2015 year. It appears that both the VKT and the vehicle population growth are 
above the real RUC revenue growth. The RFA stated that RUC, in particular the fuel levy 
(main contributor), have not been kept on par with inflation. 
Figure 5.4: Real Road User Charges revenue growth compared to vehicle population and 
vehicle kilometres travelled 
Source: Author’s calculation (Using various RA & RFA publications) 
 
The RFA (2015) argues that compensation for inflation since the 2001 to 2015 financial years 
would have been above N$1.65 per litre as opposed to the N$1.14 per-litre rate charged during 





















5.5.2.2  Revenue allocation to the approved authorities 
Approximately 80% of the income collected from the RUC is allocated to the RA towards the 
national road network maintenance and rehabilitation. In addition, an allocation is also made 
towards the maintenance of major urban and arterial roads, traffic-related maintenance of 
urban roads and streets, traffic law enforcement, traffic information systems, and the 
administration costs associated with the RA and RFA. Figure 5.5 shows the total revenue 
collected through the RUCS and the allocation thereof to the relevant authorities. During the 
2016 fiscal year, the RA received N$1 467 102 000 or 80% from the RFA of the total revenue 
generated by the RUC. The fuel levy refund constituted the second largest portion of 
N$209 084 000 (11.4%), local authorities received N$68 470 000 (3.7%), the RFA allocated 
N$65 945 000 (3.6%) for administration, and the regulatory authorities received N$28 990 000 
(1.6%) towards traffic law enforcement (see Figure 5.5). 
 
Figure 5.5: Road User Charges revenue allocation for the financial years 2011/2012 to 
2016/2017 
Source: Author (Based on data from RFA financial reports 2011-2017) 
 
The next section turns to an assessment of the funds allocated to the RA towards the 
preservation of the national road network.  
5.5.2.3  Allocation of funds to the Roads Authority 
The RA prepares a five-year budget, guided by key planning documents such as MLTRMP, 


















and long-term (2016-2030) programmes based on justifiable, economically optimal operation 
levels for road preservation and development. The RA budget for maintenance and 
rehabilitation is submitted to the RFA for funding. After a further optimal budget rationale, the 
RFA accepts and provides the necessary funds. In addition, the RA, through the MWT, 
submits a budget for new road development to the MoF through the NPC. The government 
revenue is allocated through a structured budgetary process, which is subject to parliamentary 
debate and approval. The availability of funds determines the proportion each department 
receives and the amount the RA receives from the SRF. Figure 5.6 depicts the total 
contribution from the two funding sources for the period 2012/2013 to 2017/2018. 
During the 2012/2013 and 2015/2016 financial years, the government allocated 
N$1 315 704 000 (52%) and N$1 960 472 000 (55%) respectively of the revenue generated 
from general taxes. In contrast, the RFA in the same period allocated N$1 239 042 930 (48%) 
and N$1 629 488 000 (44%) towards national road expenditure from the revenue generated 
by the RUCS. The budget allocated from both sources to the RA shows that there is a shortfall 
of the funds required by the RA to meet the demand of national road network expenses and 
the allocation from the two sources, namely the SRF and the RF. 
 
Figure 5.6: Total contribution from the RFA and the SRF towards the national road network 























During the 2015/2016 fiscal year, the road sector absorbed approximately 3% of the 
government’s operational budget and approximately 18% of its development budget (NPC, 
2015a). The results are in agreement with Heggie and Vickers (1998), who state that the road 
sector could absorb as much as 10% to 20% of the government’s development budget. The 
percentage share of funding provided by the government towards the development of the 
national road network is reasonable (18%) compared to international standards (ranging 
between 10% to 20% of the government development budget). Figure 5.7 presents the RA’s 
budgetary allocation towards national road development (construction) and preservation 
(maintenance and rehabilitation) projects in real terms, for the period 2011/2012 to 2016/2017. 
 
Figure 5.7: National road network expenditure in 2010 prices (N$000)   
Source: Author (Data from RA, 2016) 
 
Resources in real amounts made available for construction (development) of new roads and 
maintenance of existing roads show a flat trend that is proportional to the total budget allocated 
to the RA towards the national road network. In terms of administration versus the operation 
budget, the overall RA administration expenses decreased to 48% from 2011/2012 to 
2015/2016, corresponding to 15% of the RA’s total expenditure (operation and administration) 
for the national road network budget.  
The evaluation demonstrates a fiscal squeeze in the revenue generated from the RUC that 
resulted in limited resources being available for the preservation of the national road network. 
The road budget for preservation and development shows a total increase in allocation, 
although uneven (see Figure 5.7). On average, 80% of the revenue generated from the RUC 





















funding to meet the required demand cannot be explained as a result of insufficient allocation 
towards the national road expenses. The RFA can only allocate funds to the road sector, which 
are generated by RUC or funds acquired through loan arrangements. The road users’ base, 
their travel behaviours, and the level of RUC therefore determine the income generated from 
the roads, whereas the size of the road network and the standards determine the demand for 
road funding. Getting the price right is therefore an important policy objective and can have a 
significant impact on the available resources for road maintenance, rehabilitation, and 
construction. Although the RFA legislation is clear on the user-pays principle, the theory is yet 
to be modelled into practice.  
5.5.2.4  Namibian aggregated national road expenditure 
The budget allocated to the RA aims to fulfil its mandate of managing the national road 
network. Apart from receiving funds from the RFA, the RA also receives funds from the GRN 
through its line ministry, the MWT. Figure 5.8 presents the RA budgetary allocation to its 
various departments and projects. 
 
Figure 5.8: National road network expenditure (N$000) during the period 2014/2015 to 
2015/2016 
Source: Author (Based on data from RA, 2016) 
 
Due to road expenditure demands for road construction and maintenance, the conclusion can 
be drawn that the RA is faced with a great financial demand for national road preservation. 
During the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 financial years, road maintenance received the highest 
proportion of the revenue of N$739 million and N$897 million respectively (see Figure 5.8). 
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5.5.3  Existing funding gap 
The RA submits a five-year budget proposal to the funding sources, as per the national road 
expenditure demand for possible funding. The preparation of the budget is guided by planning 
documents such as the MLTRMP, the NDPs, and the RA’s Strategic Plan. The MLTRMP 
outlines the medium-term (2012-2016) and long-term (2016-2030) identified programmes for 
road preservation and development. Although the RA received funding from two sources 
during the period 2012-2016, the results show that the demand for road expenditure required 
for road preservation exceeded the budget allocated. Figure 5.9 illustrates the funding gap 
between the budget required by the RA and the budget allocated from the two sources. 
 
Figure 5.9: Budget allocated towards national road network expenditure from both the State 
Revenue Fund and the Road Fund Administration for the period 2012/13 to 2016/17 
Source: Author (Based on data from RA, 2017) 
 
This gap is in accordance with those observed by the RFA in its annual report, as follows: 
 During the 2011/2012 financial year, the RA observed a growing gap between the 
funds allocated towards development of new roads versus the funds allocated towards 
maintenance of existing roads (RFA, 2012). In addition, the RFA’s business plan for 
2011/2012-2015/2016 projected an annual sum of N$1.5 billion; however, 
approximately 38% of the existing national road network requires rehabilitation and 
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for the business plan period in order to address backlogs in road maintenance and to 
avoid further deterioration (RFA, 2013).  
 During the 2012/2013 financial year, the gap between the revenue generated from the 
RUC and the actual expenditure resulted in a deficit of N$28 million (RFA, 2013). A 
further deficit was recorded in the amount allocated to the preservation of the road 
network. The RA requested N$1.100 million and ended up with an allocation of 
N$1.030 million (RFA, 2013:5) a deficit of approximately N$70 million is needed in 
order to fully recover the routine and periodic maintenance.  
 During the 2013/2014 fiscal year, N$1.470 billion was allocated to the RA for the 
preservation of the national road network, of which it was reported that the RA required 
approximately N$2.844 billion in order to bridge the funding gap (RFA, 2014:3). An 
overall deficit of N$1.37 billion was recorded in the revenue generated from the RUC.   
 The RFA business plan for the 2014/15 financial year projected N$1.780 billion; 
however, the RUCS only generated approximately N$1.757 billion, which is a shortfall 
of 1% of its business plan target (RFA, 2015:3). According to the MLTRMP (RA, 2012), 
the optimal funding was projected at N$2.87 billion. However, the RFA could only 
allocate N$1.676 billion towards the national road network. This resulted in a funding 
gap of approximately N$1.194 billion (42%) (RFA, 2015:4).  
 During the 2015/2016 financial year, the RUCS generated approximately N$2.1 billion 
(RFA, 2016:24). The optimal funding requested from the RFA by the RA for the 
preservation of the national road network and to cover the existing backlog was 
N$1.756 billion; however, the RFA could only allocate N$1.629 billion, which resulted 
in an approximate deficit of N$127 million. 
 During the 2016/2017 fiscal year, the RFA generated N$2.21 billion through the RUCS 
and RFA expenditure for the same year stood at N$2.3 billion, of which 81% was spent 
on road projects (RFA, 2017:7). In contrast, the RA required N$2.115 billion from the 
RFA, but the RFA could only allocate N$1.781 billion, which resulted in a shortfall of 
N$334 million (RFA, 2017:7). 
In order to close the existing gap observed in the funds generated from the RUCS, there is a 
need to coordinate efforts in prioritising between the maintenance of existing roads and the 
development of new roads. In addition, there is room to boost revenue streams generated 
from the RUC, which currently does not meet the road expenditure demand. Given that the 
RA’s budget did not receive required funds from the two sources, it created a gap between 
revenue allocated and funds required by the RA to meet the expenditure demand for the 
national road network. Potential technology leverage, especially for the MDC instrument to 





5.5.4  Road user spending and infrastructure investment 
The RA’s RMS division, through its traffic surveillance system, collects information on traffic 
using the Namibian road network (RA, 2015a). Statistics reveal that the total VKT per annum 
in Namibia was 3.847 million in 2016 (see Table 5.6). In considering the total revenue 
generated from the RUC of N$2.095 million in 2015/2016, on average, a Namibian vehicle, 
irrespective of vehicle type, ceteris paribus, equals N$0.54 per kilometre of the RUC. At the 
broader level, the road user spends approximately N$1.24 per kilometre, when considering 
revenue generated from general taxes (See Appendix C). Although road users have spent 
approximately N$1.24 per kilometre, only N$0.54 per kilometre could be counted for road 
preservation. Approximately N$0.70 per kilometre contributed forms part of the consolidated 
budget.  
In contrast, the RA-allocated budget from both sources accrued to N$3.589 billion in 
2015/2016, which was invested in the national road network at N$0.93 per kilometre. From 
the revenue generated inside the RUCS and allocated to the RA, on average N$1.629 billion, 
N$0.4 per kilometre was invested in the national road network during the financial year 
2015/2016. The RA received a fair share of the budget from the SRF through its line ministry 
towards managing the national road networks. Therefore, more effort should be directed 
towards exploring available technology to charge road users per kilometre, in order to improve 
the revenue collected from the RUC.  
Table 5.6: Vehicle kilometres travelled for the period 2012-2016, per road category and surface 
 
Source: RA (2017) 
 
To summarise, the RFA allocated a total grant of N$1.629 billion of the revenue generated 
from the RUC to the RA. In the 2015/2016 financial year, the total expenditure for the national 
roads network from both the SRF and RF amounted to N$3.589 billion. This amount was 
invested in national road network infrastructure and operations. A total of N$3.589 billion was 
invested in preserving the national road network, which includes maintenance, rehabilitation, 
and development. The amount was spent on 7 284.74 km of road network managed by the 
RA, used by 371 281 registered vehicles, travelling a distance of 3 847 million km, which 
resulted in an investment of approximately N$0.93 per kilometre. 
Length (km) VKT (mill) Length (km) VKT (mill) Length (km) VKT (mill) Length (km) VKT (mill) Length (km) VKT (mill)
Sealed 6,664.31 2,376.22 6,664.31 2,552.16 7,165.18 2,703.85 75,681.10 2,995.58 7,568.10 3,168.89
Gravel 27,709.48 469.59 25,709.48 503.61 25,921.05 485.18 25,675.43 485.49 25,675.43 491.92
Earth 11,459.81 93.82 11,459.81 100.60 11,541.17 91.73 13,022.11 101.91 13,022.11 102.18
Procalaimed only 1,523.63 45.38 1,523.63 58.56 1,445.86 25.25 1,829.16 46.48 1,829.19 46.61
Salt 287.52 42.54 287.52 40.51 304.29 37.56 304.29 37.53 304.29 37.63
Total 45,644.75 3,027.55 45,644.75 3,255.44 46,377.55 3,343.57 48,399.12 3,666.99 48,399.12 3,847.23
2016
Roads Categories





Table 5.7 is a summary of what road users contributed to the national road network as per the 
RUC imposed during the financial year 2015/2016 versus the amount of RGR invested back 
towards the preservation of the national road network in Namibia.  
Table 5.7: Revenue generated from road users for the year 2015/2016 
Source: Author 
 
On average, road users spent N$0.54 per kilometre on Namibia’s national road network as 
per the RUC imposed on users (see Table 5.7). In comparison to that is the road investment 
per kilometre on the amount generated through RUC and invested back towards the road 
preservation, including maintenance, rehabilitation, and construction, which amounted to 
N$0.93 per kilometre. The following section explores the Namibian road funding strategies in 
comparison to the rest of the world. 
5.5.5  Namibian road funding compared to the rest of the world 
Namibia’s road funding framework has been compared to international standards by 
illustrating the similarities and differences in the national policies and identifying the impact 
different funding approaches has on different countries’ levels of roads expenditure.  
5.5.5.1  Road expenditure to revenue ratio 
The results of the Namibian national road network for the period 2011 to 2016 compared to 
the selected developed countries for the period 2004 to 2009 are illustrated in Figure 5.10. 
The results can be categorised into three different groups. The first group consists of countries 
with high, followed by the second group consisting of countries with medium, and the third 
group consisting of countries with low dedication of RGR towards roads expenditure. 
 
 
Revenue generated inside the RUCS for the 
2015/2016 financial year  
Revenue invested back in the national road network 
during the 2015/2016 financial year  
Amount collected from 
RUC 
N$2 094 537 000 Amount invested in national road 
network preservation 
N$1 629 488 000 
Total national road network 48 327.53 km Total national road network 48 327.53 km 






Utilised by the registered motor 
vehicles  




Travelled distance  3 847 230 000 km Travelled distance  3 847 230 000 km 






Figure 5.10: Selected countries’ road expenditure to revenue ratio 
Source: Author’s calculations (Based on Gomez & Vassallo, 2014) 
 
Namibia is among the first group of countries with higher dedication revenues of 80% and 
above towards roads expenditure, together with the USA and Switzerland. The second group 
comprises France and Spain, which dedicate 40% to 50% towards road expenditure 
respectively, and the third group includes Germany and the UK, which dedicate 30% or below 
towards road expenditure. Apart from Namibia, the USA, and Spain, other countries 
experienced a constant ratio for the period under evaluation (see Figure 5.10).  
In their analysis, Gomez and Vassallo (2014) observed features common to the USA and 
European road funding models. The authors concluded that European road systems subsidise 
other government objectives and policies, whereas in the USA the roads are subsidised by 
the public sector. These American trends were observed in Namibia, where the government 
subsidises the national road network by allocating the annual budget to the RA towards the 
preservation of the national road network. For the period under evaluation, the RA needed 
additional funds from the SRF generated through general taxation to fund the national road 
system. For example, after the 2014/2015 financial year, the expenditure/revenue ratio 
increased from 0.61 to 0.68 in 2016 (see Figure 5.10). In summary, an observation was made 
that, regardless of the difference in the road funding models and the countries’ characteristics, 
similar trends were observed between the American and Namibian road funding systems. 
Both the United State and Namibia has a ring-faced road (highway) fund into which all road-





Highway Trust Fund has been frequently under severe fiscal pressures that frequently 
required the bailout from the government.  
5.5.5.2  Road expenditure to gross domestic product ratio 
The results show that Namibia has the lowest ratio, with expenditure of approximately 0.25% 
of its GDP (see Figure 5.11). This is likely attributed to the fact that only the national road 
network expenditure was considered in the analysis. Namibia recorded an increase in national 
road expenditure to GDP ratio after 2014. The result is explained by the gap that existed 
between the road expenditure and the road allocation, which will be further explained under 
Equation 3 of the RA ratio.  
 
Figure 5.11: Selected countries’ road expenditure/gross domestic product ratio 
Source: Author’s calculations (Based on Gomez & Vassallo, 2014) 
 
Although the countries under evaluation showed different characteristics in terms of size and 
population densities, different trends were observed in the developed countries. Due to the 
highest road charges, Switzerland has the highest ratio of approximately 1.4% of its GDP 
(Gomez & Vassallo, 2014). In addition, the authors assert that other countries exhibited road 





5.5.5.3  Road allocation ratio 
The comparison showed that Namibia had the highest road allocation ratio of 0.96 (see Figure 
5.12). The RA receives allocation from both the RFA (revenue stream generated through the 
RUCS), and from the SRF (revenue generated from general taxes and levies). The Namibian 
road allocation ratio must be considered as the least valuable as urban roads under local 
authority jurisdictions were not included in the analysis.  
 
Figure 5.12: Selected countries’ road allocation ratio 
Source: Author’s calculations (Based on Gomez & Vassallo, 2014) 
 
For developed countries, the USA showed a similar trend to Namibia where road systems 
receive budget allocation at federal and state level. According to Gomez and Vassallo (2014), 
the USA has the highest ratio of 0.5, followed by Switzerland with an approximate ratio of 0.44, 
where large amounts of revenue generated from the RUC are allocated back for road 
purposes. The authors also shed light on countries such as France and Spain, whose 
dedicated road revenues are generated from private tolls, thus their ratios range between 0.2 
and 0.1 respectively. In addition, lower road allocation ratios were experienced in countries 
such as Germany and the UK. In conclusion, Figure 5.12 shows the proportional relationship 
between the road allocation ratio and the revenue expenditure to GDP ratio. 
5.6  SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
The primary aim of this chapter was to evaluate Namibian road sector funding approaches 





revenue generation and allocation towards national road expenditure. In addition, the chapter 
provided an analysis of the relationship between the RGR and the national road network 
expenditure with emphasis on determining the RGR, road allocation, and road expenditure for 
Namibia (developing country) compared to the USA and five selected European (developed) 
countries. Figure 5.13 summarises the Namibian funding approaches to the road sector in 
terms of revenue generation and allocation towards national road expenditure. The results in 
this chapter confirmed that given the fact that Namibia established an RF that operates under 
the so-called second-generation road fund, the road subsector experiences uncertainty in 
budget allocation towards the preservation of the national road network. 
 
Figure 5.13: Namibian road funding approach 
Source: Author’s construct 
 
The study confirmed that there are two sources of funds and identified three main stages 
involved in the current road funding approach in Namibia. The RFA generates revenue from 
the RUC, which accumulates to the RF and is distributed to appropriate road authorities (Stage 
1). Approximately 80% of revenue generated from the RUC (Stage 2) is allocated towards the 
national road network. Revenue generate from the RUC is allocated towards the preservation 
of the national road network (Stage 3). The Namibian government subsidises the road sector 
with annual allocations from the SRF generated though general levies and taxes.    
An important finding from the evaluation affirms that funds allocated from both sources 
between the 2011/2012 and 2016/2017 financial years were not sufficient to meet the demand 
for required road preservation. Therefore, these results are in agreement with those recorded 
by Gwilliam and Shalizi (1999), who state that uncertain budget allocation undermines roads 
Stage 1: Receipt of funds
Stage 2: Fund allocation






authorities’ planning and execution of road maintenance. The performance capacity of a roads 
agency is limited to available resources. During the 2012/2013 and 2015/2016 financial years, 
the government allocated N$1.315 billion (52%) and N$1.960 billion (55%) respectively of 
revenue generated from general taxes. In contrast, the RFA in the same period allocated 
N$1.239 billion (48%) and N$1.629 billion (44%) towards national road expenditure from 
revenue generated from the RUC. This finding further supports the argument by Zietlow and 
Bull (2002) that government funds are directed towards financing new developments. This 
therefore results in a growing gap between optimal allocation towards maintenance of the 
existing roads and the development of new roads. The need for balance between road 
construction and road maintenance is essential for sustaining the quality of the existing road 
network in Namibia. 
In addition, during the 2011/2012 to 2016/2017 financial years, the RA received an average 
allocation of 54% from revenue generated through the RUC, which was subsidised by the 
government with an allocation of 46% on average for the past six years. The percentage share 
of funding provided by the government towards the national road network through the general 
budget is reasonable, given the fact that the country has an RF and that government objectives 
are multifaceted.  
Several issues require special attention with the goal of improving the Namibian funding 
approach. The RFA funding model has depicted a limited capacity in meeting the increased 
demand for road expenditure. This study shows that fuel levies were the highest contributor 
towards the revenue generated through the RUC and contributed approximately 
N$1 105 591 000 and N$1 299 616 000 during the 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 financial years 
respectively (RFA, 2016). The finding further supports the argument by the RFA (2013) that 
the highest contributor is not kept on par with inflation. There is a growing need for more 
sustainable means of raising funds since the fuel levy as the current highest contributor is not 
sustainable in the long run. The MDC have the potential to improve revenue growth through 
the RUC; however, this charging instrument is prone to evasion, as argued by Queiroz (2009). 
Therefore, an annual increase of the current RUC should be considered as a short-term 
solution. In the long run, Namibia should also consider introducing toll roads at the PPP level. 
In addition, automation and new technology to optimise the revenue raised through MDC 
should be explored.  
In this chapter, comparative analysis revealed a growing gap in funds allocated towards road 
maintenance in Namibia. The Namibian government subsidises the road sector by allocating 
annual budget to the RA through its line ministry, the MWT, towards the development of new 





the HTF for road infrastructure development. In contrast, in Europe, the road sector subsidises 
the government towards funding other policies.  
In addition, regardless of Namibia having a high road allocation ratio, the RGR ratio has not 
been able to cover the country’s road expenditure needs for the past few years. On average, 
road users, through revenue generated from the RUC, spent approximately N$0.54 per 
kilometre. Moreover, investment of the revenue generated from the RUC was N$0.98 per 
kilometre on average. These results affirmed the fact that Namibia forms parts of the countries 
with lower levels of RUC, and generates revenue that is not sufficient for the required road 
expenditure.  
An important limitation of this chapter was the use of documentary and administrative data. 
Therefore, the study’s results are only subjected to documentary analysis. While urban and 
other roads under the local authorities were considered, urban roads were excluded from the 
analysis due to the limited and unavailability of data and therefore did not form part of the 
discussion. Thorough analysis was conducted on the national road network with emphasis on 
allocation and expenditure levels. Revenue allocated towards the preservation of the urban 
roads under the management of local authorities was not included in the ratio calculations.  
This study was further limited by high heterogeneities and characteristics among the countries 
under evaluation, including population, GDP, road network, developed versus developing, 
road funding instruments in place, and location on the continent, as noted by Gomez and 
Vassallo (2014). In contrast, countries within sub-Saharan Africa were considered; however, 
they were excluded due to the limited data. Therefore, the Namibian national road network 
was compared to developed countries because of the availability of data. Although there is no 
correspondence between the analysed data periods for the developed countries and Namibia, 
general trends were worth observing.  
The strength of this research lies in the methodology adopted and the calculation of three 
ratios, namely RGR, road allocation, and road expenditure for Namibia as a developing 
country in comparison to the USA and five selected European (developed) countries. This 
study is necessary for Namibia in that it establishes a balance between charging for road use 
and national road network expenditure. Thus, the ratio calculated should be considered as a 
benchmark and serve as a minimum reference value as it is expected that the Namibian 
figures would have been different if the calculation accounted for the entire road sector. 
Future studies should seek to evaluate the best way to raise and improve revenue generated 
through the RUC in Namibia. While the user-pays principle approach is recommended and 





sources of funding. In addition, it is worth investigating whether implementing RUC based on 
the MSC results in a surplus or deficit. To that effect, implementing RUC for Namibia that are 
based on the MSC principle is worth attempting.  
In conclusion, the evaluation provided novel evidence on the Namibian road sector in 
comparison to international levels. The evaluation affirmed the fact that Namibia forms parts 
of the countries with lower levels of RUC, therefore generating revenue that is not sufficient 
for the required road expenditure. This finding may indicate the dilemma facing many 
developing countries where revenue from the road users does not cover total road costs due 
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CHAPTER 6:  
THE USE OF THE HDM-4 TO DETERMINE THE MARGINAL EXTERNAL COSTS 
OF ROAD USE22 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 was concerned with unpacking the Namibian road funding and financing system. 
National policies, legal frameworks, and funding schemes to address the demand for road 
maintenance, rehabilitation, and construction have been drafted. It is quite clear that Namibia 
has implemented a seemingly sound institutional framework and has a sound policy on how 
to secure funding through the road user charges system (RUCS). The RFA Act is clear on 
maintaining economic efficient pricing. An economic efficient price is one that is set at the 
short run marginal cost (SRMC) associated with road use. The Namibian White Paper on 
Transport Policy (MWTC, 1995) and the recent Namibian Transport Policy (MWT, 2017) 
recommended that road users should pay for the full costs associated with road use. It is not 
clear, however, whether the current road user charges (RUC) are set to include the external 
costs generated by road use and impinge on other road users and society. From everyday 
experience, it is quite clear that there are other costs associated with road use, which are not 
directly borne by the road users. The price road users pay for a journey may not reflects the 
true costs of a journey. These are the costs related to infrastructure damage costs, congestion 
costs, as well as environmental and accidents costs.  
An increased interest in transport policies to tackle negative externalities by means of charging 
instruments have attracted notable studies on estimating the marginal social costs (MSC) of 
road users over the past two decades. Research conducted on how to measure the MSC and 
assign monetary value towards efforts of road pricing has predominantly been conducted in 
developed countries. Remarkable EU studies, which seem to form the fundamental 
methodology on estimating MSC of transport, include those by Nash (2003b), Nash et al. 
(2008), and Doll and Essen (2008). In contrast, the concept of estimating the MSC of road use 
in most developing countries and sub-Saharan Africa in particular is still in the infancy stage. 
Studies conducted within Southern Africa often focus on estimating the cost of externalities to 
countries’ economies. For instance, the NRSC’s (2016) study worked solely on determining 
the cost of road accidents to the Namibian economy. In South Africa, Olukoga (2004) and 
Labushagne, De Beer, Roux and Venter (2016) estimated the cost of road/traffic accidents. 
With regard to environmental costs, Namibia has several reports and strategies that make 
reference to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) guidelines for national 
                                               





GHG inventory (GRN, 2002; 2011; 2016). The IPCC recommended a reduction of CO2 
emissions by 50% by 2040, given the 1990 level as the base. In South Africa, Lotz and Brentz 
(2017) conducted a study on carbon footprints, which seem to be one of the leading guidelines 
for practitioners and companies in calculating carbon footprints. Congestion studies focus 
more on improving urban mobility and reducing the commuting times between cities and 
suburbs. They seldom calculate a cost for congestion and if they do, it is often on an aggregate 
national or city level.  
The Namibian Transport Policy (MWT, 2017) called for the refinement of the current RUCS in 
order to assess the feasibility of implementing the user-pays principle, and to ensure full-cost 
recovery from those who consume the road network for economic justification of road projects 
and programmes. The user-pays principle aims to hold road users accountable for the costs 
they impose on the infrastructure, on other drivers using the same facility (in terms of 
congestion and accidents risks), and on society. The user-pays principle theoretically forms 
part of the policy documents without further knowledge of the value of such negative 
externalities to be paid by the users.   
This chapter attempts to address the gap between the recommended user-pays principle as 
a road pricing policy and as a strategy towards its implementation. The fundamental aim of 
road pricing is mainly based on three pillars, namely (i) the need for demand management, (ii) 
reducing emissions and accident risks, and (iii) revenue generation. In Namibia, as far as 
revenue generation from the RUC is concerned, there is evidence that the current RUCS 
seems to have run into a serious problem and has proven not to generate sufficient revenue 
to meet the demand for the road network (see Chapter 5).  
In terms of revenue generation, the fuel levy is Namibia’s largest contributor to the revenue 
generated among other RUC but is projected to lose it prowess and seems to be under intense 
pressure across the globe with emerging new-generation, fuel-efficient vehicles. When it 
comes to the fuel levy, there is a high chance of less productivity, especially with the new 
powertrain technologies and fuel-efficient vehicles, for example the introduction of hybrid and 
electric vehicles that use less or no fuel at all (Van Rensburg & Krygsman, 2015; Krygsman, 
2018; Van Rensburg & Krygsman, 2019). Although there are other RUC instruments in place, 
their revenue reliance cannot be compared to that of the fuel levy, especially in the Namibian 
context. In this chapter, the researcher also follows the argument by Nash and Matthews 
(2005) that consumers of the road infrastructure should be held liable for their consumption of 
road use, and thus be made to pay in proportion to the costs they impose on the road 
infrastructure, other users, and society. Despite the progress made in estimating the MEC of 





studies incorporating all-important components of MEC are rare.  This holds true for the 
Namibian case as well with regard to evidence of any of the important four components of the 
MEC of road use. In light of these views, the case studies presented in this study provide such 
evidence and evaluate results by comparing the marginal costs and average costs.   
This chapter seeks to examine efficient RUC for Namibia based on the principle of MSC. The 
importance of studying efficient RUC for Namibia cannot be overemphasised as roads 
contribute to the nation’s economic development, job creation, and reducing poverty and 
inequality in Namibia (NPC, 2017). Efficient road pricing is therefore crucial to generating 
revenue for road infrastructure development and financing. The formal contribution lies in 
demonstrating that the HDM-4 model of the World Bank can be used to estimate the marginal 
costs of road use for a specific road section or network. Bruzelius (2004) posits that HDM-4 
can be utilised to determine the marginal costs of a specific road or “as an average level of 
aggregation”. Apart from demonstrating the ability of the HDM-4 to estimate the MEC of road 
use, it is hoped that this chapter’s findings will provide important information and guidance that 
could be valuable to researchers, planners, and governments in road infrastructure 
development and financing, as well as policymakers and roads agencies who seek to 
internalise the MEC of road use in road-use tariffs.  
This chapter focuses on the estimation of the MEC of road use with particular emphasis on 
marginal infrastructure damage, marginal accident, marginal congestion, and marginal 
environmental costs using the available secondary data. Although previous literature provides 
methodology and estimates of MEC, these estimates do not reflect the Namibian context 
(Proost et al., 2002; Bruzelius, 2004; Preiss & Klotz, 2008; CE Delft, INFRAS & Fraunhofer 
ISI, 2011; Technical University of Dresden, 2012; Korzhenevych et al., 2014) and cannot serve 
as input for decision makers and planners to make relevant decisions at the tactical or strategic 
level in Namibia. The main objective of this chapter is to demystify MEC estimations and help 
roads agencies to grasp the concept, as well as to internalise externalities into road pricing. 
This chapter therefore aims to explore the following objectives: 
 To explore the possibility of estimating the MEC of road use in Namibia; and 
 To compare MEC (efficient) to average cost (cost recovery) pricing. 
The chapter is organised as follows: The next section provides the theoretical framework, 
followed by the literature review. Section 6.4 discusses the methodology used to estimate 
MEC. Section 6.5 discusses the results of marginal externality estimates in comparison with 





6.2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on efficient RUC and road pricing with a particular focus on the Namibian road sector 
is lacking, and this study intends to fill this gap. Dierks (1992) conducted a study focusing on 
the technical aspects of appropriate low-volume roads in Namibia. Although Dierks’ (1992) 
study conducted investigations that led to cost- and quantity-optimised systems based on 
VOC, the study excluded the MEC associated with road use. Both the Namibian White Paper 
on Transport Policy (MWTC, 1995) and the Namibian Transport Policy (MWT, 2017) 
discussed the user-pays principle as a point of departure, with no further implementation 
strategies on the MSC of road use.  
6.2.1  Marginal External Costs theory 
In order to maximise net economic benefits, road pricing should be set equal to the SRMC of 
road use (Nash & Matthews, 2005; Litman, 2019). The road price is reflected as short run 
because charges only consider the use of existing roads without any consideration of how the 
expansion or new road investment should be funded. The economic theory of MSC indicates 
that the use of roads comprises two cost components, namely MPC and MEC (see Figure 
6.1). The former comprises VOC, insurance, other ownership costs, and travel time costs. 
MEC consist of the costs that road users do not necessarily consider when undertaking a 
journey. These entail damage imposed on the road infrastructure, accident risks, congestion, 
and environmental costs imposed on society (Van Essen et al., 2019). Setting the price equal 
to MSC ensures that, in addition to MPC, users also cover their external costs of road use. 
Although the MSC concept entails the two components, the researcher’s focus in this study is 
on estimating the MEC.  
 
Figure 6.1: Economic theory of the Marginal Social Cost of road use 





6.2.2  An illustration of Short-Run Marginal Costs charging  
Economic realities and the use of roads demonstrate several unpaid actions; in particular the 
negative externalities associated with road use. What is not yet known is to what extent these 
externalities are relevant for the Namibian policy framework. Rothengatter (2000) explains 
how these interactions work. Externalities occur through an unplanned interaction among 
agents, who mostly work outside the market (thus no market price), and they negatively affect 
the efficiency of the market economy. This is illustrated in the model modified by Glaister and 
Graham (2003). They estimated the cost of a specific vehicle class, at a particular time of the 
day, measuring the total costs each user per vehicle kilometre using the following equation: 
𝐺 = 𝑃 + 𝑟𝑣 (
1
𝑆
) + 𝑟𝑤𝑊 + 𝐶 + ⋯……………………………………………………………………… 1 
P is cost, 𝑟𝑣 is value in vehicle time multiplied by per vehicle kilometres plus time value (waiting) 
x average waiting time + charges + (…) any other relevant costs.  
Figure 6.2 presents the general costs per vehicle kilometre. The horizontal axis illustrates the 
flow of vehicle class per hour and the vertical axis presents the costs per vehicle. For any road 
type and network section, MSC and MPC as presented in Figure 6.2 can be estimated. The 
MPC line represents the marginal cost the vehicle owner may incur for undertaking an extra 
trip and the MSC line includes external costs imposed on other users and society. On the 
vertical axis, the distance between point 𝑥𝑖0 and 𝑥𝑖 presents the cost difference between MPC 
and MSC (see Figure 6.2). If vehicle owners can plan their journey (route) and strive to 
minimise their private costs as much as possible, then, as illustrated in Figure 6.2, equilibrium 
is reached at 𝑥𝑖0 where MPC intersect with the demand curve; however, this equilibrium is 
referred to as suboptimal. For instance, the motorist could pay N$0.50 as MPC per additional 
kilometre travelled. However, when travelling the vehicle owner also imposes external costs 
of approximately N$0.05 on other users and society. This implies the marginal social cost of 
a journey costs N$0.55 per kilometre travelled.   
At equilibrium, 𝑥𝑖0, there is a welfare loss, mostly referred to as “deadweight loss
23” as 
illustrated by triangle area B. The deadweight loss can be improved or minimised by charging 
users at equilibrium 𝑥𝑖, where the SRMC intersects with the demand curve. However, in order 
to move road users from, 𝑥𝑖0 to  𝑥𝑖 , a charge needs to be introduced. The introduced charge 
                                               
23  Deadweight loss is a cost to society as a whole that is generated by an economically inefficient allocation of 
resources within the market (Agarwal, 2019). When supply and demand do not balance by market forces, 
consumers may opt not to acquire the good or services as they assess that the price charge is not worth the 
utility of goods or services offered. Thus, when the overall exchange of goods and services for money reduces, 





leads to a decrease in number of users from, 𝑥𝑖𝑜 to  𝑥𝑖 and it simultaneously increases cost 
from, 𝑝0 to  𝑝1. 
  
Figure 6.2: The principle of Short-Run Marginal Cost pricing 
Source: Author (Rothengatter, 2015:406) 
 
The optimum charge is therefore the difference between MSC and MPC at equilibrium 𝑥𝑖. 
Revenue generated by introducing the charge is illustrated by rectangle C in Figure 6.2. Given 
the two equilibriums, it is theoretically possible to integrate all other externalities, for instance 
accident costs and environmental costs, into the estimated MSC. The total MEC can be 
illustrated (adapted from Sansom et al., 2000:21) as follows: 
MEC = MIC + MENVC + MAC + MCC …………………………………………………………… 2 
MEC represent Marginal External Costs, MIC represent Marginal Infrastructure Costs, 
MENVC represent Marginal Environmental Costs, MAC represent Marginal Accident Costs, 
and MCC represent Marginal Congestion Costs. The danger of this equation is that double 
counting can easily occur, in particular with MCC (where perpetrators and victims happen to 






























belong to the same club24) if optimal adjustments are not properly conducted (Rothengatter, 
2015).  
Given the above illustration, it is theoretically easy to demonstrate the principle of SRMC; 
however, it is widely accepted that the textbook theoretical model is far from practical. 
Whenever impractical implementation of SRMC perseveres, Rothengatter (2003) proposes a 
deviation from the SRMC principle in order to implement the best alternative that suits a 
particular environment. For instance, the SRMC can be modified by adding a mark-up to the 
average costs or by constructing multi-part tariffs to capture different external costs 
(Rothengatter, 2015). Such charges or tariffs permit aberration from the first-best pricing to 
the second-best pricing principles. 
6.2.3  Challenges of implementing Short-Run Marginal Costs 
The criticisms of implementing MSC are well established in the literature, with Rothengatter 
(2003) as a chief critic. Implementing the principle of MSC for road use is quite a challenging 
exercise, it is time consuming, and it requires an extensive budget (Link et al., 2016). The 
MEC are situation based and location specific, which makes it difficult for practical use 
(Shepherd, 2003). Several shortcomings of the SRMC principle are outlined by Rothengatter 
(2003). He makes numerous arguments why the textbook approach might face challenges, 
including the following:  
 Measuring the SRMC of road use is very complex in practice; 
 The SRMC tend to ignore equity; 
 Efficient pricing at SRMC relies on present infrastructure and ignores the capital costs 
required for network expansion;  
 Financial and institutional matters are ignored. The concept is objected on the ground 
that it rarely covers total costs; and  
 The concept ignores price distortion elsewhere in the economy. 
Nash (2003a) made a counter-argument on financial issues that this depends on the 
aggregation level at which costs are compared to the revenue generated. For marginal costs 
to recover total costs typically implies a big increase in RUC or taxation coupled with a 
reduction in other modes such as rail and public transport charges. At the aggregate level, the 
reverse applies.  
                                               
24  Rothengatter (2015) explains that secondary effects from the road congestion externalities turn out to be 
external to the individual driver but internal to the group of road users utilising the same network. He therefore 
argues that as a group, road users are somewhat paying a sum of external congestion costs, although not at 





MEC are situation based and location specific. Thus, estimating MEC requires a thorough 
study that analyses a range of circumstances such as time of day, location of the road, as well 
as geographical region. There is often substantial variation in measuring the marginal costs of 
different types of vehicles using the road network and MEC differ per vehicle category. 
Creightney (1993) posits that an assumption for a single marginal cost curve can be made 
(ignoring the difference in vehicle category) or calculated using the MEC per vehicle category.  
This has led to many policymakers abandoning such exercises and type of road pricing policy 
(Creightney, 1993). Therefore, it may be realistic to make estimations based on the best 
available data to estimate the MEC of road use. In a more realistic approach, case studies on 
a specific section of the network could give a better understanding of the cost variations from 
one circumstance to another. Despite the difficulty in implementing the MSC principle, road 
pricing should aim to attain economic efficiency in road-use tariffs as only efficient pricing will 
bring about gains in terms of economic development.  
Setting the price equal to SRMC does not guarantee fiscal neutrality, or an increase in revenue 
generated from RUC. Road use charges set at SRMC could in fact lead to a revenue deficit 
or surplus (Proost & Van Dender, 2003; Heggie, 1995). The literature therefore suggests using 
SRMC as a point of departure in order to determine whether RUC set at SRMC could lead to 
a deficit or surplus (Walter, 1968). Kahn (1988) outlines the principal challenge of setting the 
price at SRMC, in that in networks defined by low demand and excess capacity, SRMC pricing 
is likely not to cover the fixed costs (return on capital investment) that the roads agency ought 
to recoup from road users. In the case of high demand, SRMC pricing is likely to generate 
revenue surpluses.  
6.3  LITERATURE ON ESTIMATING THE MARGINAL EXTERNAL COSTS OF ROAD 
USE 
The literature presents estimations of the MEC (accident cost, air pollution, congestion, and 
road damage) of road use at the country level or for a particular road network. This section 
provides an overview of some studies that have been conducted on MEC (Blauwens et al., 
2012; Ghadi et al., 2018; Gavanas et al., 2017; Pretro & Konecny, 2017).  
6.3.1  Accident costs 
Korzhenevych et al. (2014) define external accident costs as those social costs of traffic 
accidents that do not form part of risks covered by insurance premiums. The principal accident 
costs include medical costs, production losses, material damage, administrative costs, and 





(Korzhenevych et al., 2014). Traditionally, accident costs rely on two methodologies, namely 
the human cost approach, and the value of statistical life (willingness to pay) to determine the 
costs. The human capital approach involves observation of present and future expenditure 
(see Figure 6.3) as a result of accidents and includes medical and hospital costs, legal and 
administrative costs, and property damage (Ghadi et al., 2018). 
 
Figure 6.3: Classification of accident cost components by the human capital approach 
Source: Author 
Willingness to pay includes risk values such as loss of productivity to the economy due to 
premature death and thus the willingness to pay in order to reduce accident risks. Ghadi et al. 
(2018) used the human capital approach to estimate the total and unit costs of traffic accidents 
for Jordan for the period 2011-2013. The study findings estimated that the total costs of 
accidents amounted to US$543 917 509, US$532 458 743, and US$414 026 545 for the years 
2011, 2012, and 2013 respectively. These costs constituted approximately 2.5%, 2.3%, and 
2.25% respectively of the country’s total GDP (Ghadi et al., 2018:133). Mofadal and Kanitpong 
(2016) studied traffic accident costs in Sudan for 2010 and 2011 using the gross loss of output 
approach. The study evaluated and compared the significance and impacts of economic loss 
caused by road traffic accidents employing key parameters such as severity level, vehicle 
type, discount rates, and medical and insurance information in Sudan. The total cost of the 





of the GDP for the year 2010 and 2011 respectively. In Namibia, the cost of vehicle accidents 
to the Namibian economy was estimated at N$512.97 million. In 2015, the average cost of 
vehicle accidents in Namibia was estimated at N$19 047 and approximately N$1 604 per 
registered motor vehicle (NSRC, 2016). 
6.3.2  Congestion costs 
Road congestion implies the costs that motor vehicles impose on other vehicles using the 
same network, at the point where traffic flow approaches the highest network capacity 
(Goodwin, 2004). Congestion builds up when an additional vehicle joins the network and 
potentially reduces the speed of all the other vehicles, thereby causing journey delays and 
higher fuel consumption. It is therefore essential to calculate the time lost for all the vehicles 
on the road section due to the additional costs of an additional vehicle. Congestion costs are 
highly influenced by marginal time costs. Marginal external time costs are calculated by the 
difference in journey time caused by an additional vehicle on a specific network multiplied by 
the estimated value of the journey time (Blauwens et al., 2012). A methodological caveat is 
the need to estimate the marginal external congestion costs after the congestion charges have 
been determined (Link et al., 2016). These allow the roads agencies to internalise MCC into 
road tariffs.   
Another methodology used in the literature is the speed-flow relationship used to estimate 
changes in journey time. The speed-flow relationship is typically characterised as a 
relationship between travel speed, traffic volumes, and the number of vehicles (traffic density) 
occupying a given space of a road (FHWA, 2008). Figure 6.4 illustrates scenarios of speed-
flow relationships.  
At low-volume traffic, motor vehicles are likely to have an insignificant impact on one another; 
the speed limit per vehicle per kilometre is only limited by speed regulation and the road 
geometry. As the traffic volume increases, vehicles’ freedom to manoeuvre between lanes or 
overtake another vehicle becomes very restricted. This results in decreasing travel speed that 
is indirectly proportional to the traffic volume on the network (as traffic volume increases, they 
are likely to lower other vehicles’ travel speed). When traffic density reaches the maximum 
point, also called jam density, speed starts to decrease due to the additional vehicles in the 































































Figure 6.4: Fundamental traffic-flow relationship 





Gavanas et al. (2017) used the speed-flow function to assess congestion costs in 
Thessaloniki, Greece. Using floating car data, the study utilised the following equations to 
estimate marginal and total social costs for congestion along a specific street (Tsimiki Street): 
MCC congestion = 𝐹. 𝐶. +𝑉. 𝑂. 𝑇.
𝑆+395.791
395.791 𝑆
   , (𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆 = 25.72)……………   3 




F.C. represents fixed cost, V.O.T. represents the value of time, and S represents speed. The 
finding of their study is summarised in Table 6.1, which presents the difference in marginal 
and total social costs due to congestion between the values that correspond with the average 
hourly speed during a workday and the 85 percentile hourly speed of a workday. 
Table 6.1: Marginal and total social costs of congestion along Tsimiski Street 








Daily average hourly 29.6 1425 0.496 0.513 731.025 
85 percentile hourly 32.4     923 0.456 0.473 436.579 
Source: Gavanas et al. (2017) 
 
Blauwens et al. (2012) employed the speed-flow relationship approach to illustrate an 
estimated congestion tax on a (2 by 3) road carriage lane. The study employed the following 
equation: 
V = 105 − 0.005833 𝑥 , (𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≤ 1200) …………………………………5 
 𝑉 =  98 − 0.025(𝑥 − 1200), (𝑖𝑓 𝑥 > 1200 𝑎𝑛𝑑 < 2000) ………………..6 
V represents speed flow (km/h) and X represents vehicles per hour, per lane, PCU, and one 
minute has a value of €0.1. Their results indicate that the congestion levy increases with the 
traffic flow. For example, when traffic flow is 200 cars per hour, the optimal levy amounted to 
€0.0065 per kilometre. In the case of heavy traffic of 2 000 cars per hour per lane, the 
congestion levy rises to €0.04927 per kilometre. Gronau (1994) used a speed-flow function to 
estimate the MCC in Accra, Ghana, with an average count of 1.16 private cars equivalent. The 
results indicate MCC of ȼ0.13-0.29 per private-car equivalent per kilometre (Gronau, 1994).  
                                               





6.3.3  Environmental costs  
Environmental costs mostly consist of the three main components of air pollution, global 
warming, and noise.  
6.3.3.1  Air pollution 
Air pollution from vehicles consists of carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
hydrocarbons (HC), particulate matters (PM2.5), and sulphur dioxide (SO2), which are the 
main contributors to air pollution  (Link et al., 2016). CO causes a reduction of oxygen in the 
bloodstream, which results in difficulties in breathing and negative cardiovascular effects 
(Parry, Walls & Harrington, 2007).  
 
Figure 6.5: The steps of an impact pathway analysis on air pollution  
Source: Author (Based on European Commission, 1998, and Bickel et al., 2005) 
 
HC and NOx are the main components of smog. They react in sunlight and result in ozone 
layers. HC and NOx have greater effects on children and cause asthma-related diseases and 
affect visibility. PM2.5 have an effect on lung tissue, and particulate exposure has been related 
to mortality effects (Douglas et al., 1993). The costs category includes damage to materials 
and buildings, health costs, crop damage, and ecosystem damage. The common approach to 
air pollution is mainly the impact pathway (bottom-up) analysis, which models the emissions, 





pathway study conducts a detailed assessment of human health and the environment using 
five steps (see Figure 6.5).  
These steps involve determining the emission factors such as dispersion parameters that lead 
to exposure that influences human health and the environment. Such impacts were quantified 
into monetary values by way of willingness to pay. In the estimation processes, technology 
type per vehicles, the dose-responses functions used to quantify the physical impacts, and 
the value of statistical life are used to assess the value of death risk or illness caused by air 
pollution. 
6.3.3.2  Global warming 
Motor vehicles emit pollutants that can affect the global climate. GHGs such as carbon dioxide 
(CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), and methane (CH4) are the main causes of climate change. 
Estimating climate change costs is a complex task due to the global and long-term character 
and risk pattern involved (Link et al., 2016). Climate change impacts include sea level rise, 
health impacts, ecosystem and biodiversity impacts, extreme weather events, and 
catastrophic events or major climates discontinuities (Link et al., 2016).   
An environmental impact study conducted by Condurat, Nicuta and Andrei (2017) on road 
transport traffic, performed with COPERT 4 software, aimed to quantify the energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions produced by road traffic. Their results indicated passenger 
cars as the highest carbon monoxide (CO) contributors, with approximately 72.18% to the total 
emissions. CO is one of the contributors to high ozone concentration, which could lead to 
global warming. Condurat et al.’s (2017) study also indicated that vehicle engines produce 
approximately 47.43% of CO2. For the NOx emissions, the study findings indicated heavy 
vehicles as the main pollutant, producing 41.77% as compared to 18.91% produced by 
passenger cars (Condurat et al., 2017).   
The standard approach to estimating global warming costs involves three major steps: (i) 
convert individual gasses to CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalent); (ii) multiplying the amount of 
CO2e emitted by the cost factor, and (iii) multiplying it by the GWP26 of the associated gas. 
The Intended national determined contributions (INDC) report covers three direct gases, 
namely CO2, CH4, and N2O. The report uses the IPCC’s 2006 guidelines and software and 
adopted the GWP, mainly CO2 (1), CH4 (21), and N2O (310). Namibia contributes less than 
0.1% to global emissions (National Determined Contributions Partnership Support Unit, 2017), 
and the country’s CO2e emission outlook indicates a 63% contribution to CO2, 21% of CH4, 
                                               





and 16% of N2O. The Ministry of Environment conducted a study titled “the National 
Greenhouse Gases (GHG) Inventory Report”. The report indicated that there has been an 
increase in CO2e emissions over a 10-year period from road transportation. In 2000, the CO2e 
emitted amounted to 1 334 GHGs’ CO2e in comparison to 20 163 GHGs’ CO2e in 2012 (GRN, 
2016:36). 
6.3.3.3  Noise 
Noise costs involve disturbances, annoyance, and health impacts. Disturbance and 
annoyance are related to individual experiences associated with traffic noise. Health impacts 
are associated with long-term exposure to noise and could result in health effects such as 
hypertension and myocardial infraction (Link et al., 2016). The methodology explored in the 
literature to estimate marginal noise costs is similar to the impact pathway approach to 
estimating air pollution costs.  
Table 6.2: Impact pathway approach to noise 
Step Description 
Noise emissions The changed levels of noise are measured in terms of change in time, location, 
frequency, level, and source of noise. 
Noise dispersion The differences in exposure to noise are estimated according to geographical 
locations, and measured in decibel (dB) (A) and noise level indicators (𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑛 and𝐿𝑛𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡). 
The results are presented in noise maps. 
Exposure response 
functions 
These functions present a relationship between dB levels and the negative impacts of 
noise. Each impact has one or more endpoint. Using the information about the number 
of cases of each endpoint, the overall change in noise impact is calculated.  
Economic valuation An economic value for a unit of each endpoint of the exposure-response functions is 
calculated by transferring estimates either from existing valuation studies or by 
conducting a new original study using environmental valuation techniques. 
Overall assessments The economic value of each unit of endpoint is multiplied by the corresponding impact 
and aggregated over all endpoints from exposure-response functions. 
Source: Korzhenevych et al. (2014:49) 
6.3.4  Infrastructure damage 
The marginal infrastructure damage (MIC) of road use associated with an additional vehicle 
utilising a specific network comprise three components, namely road damage externality, road 
wear, and damage (Bruzelius, 2004). Road damage externality implies the increased costs 
imposed on other vehicles because of an additional vehicle that joins the network. Road wear 
and damage are conditions that cause roads authorities to take action (routine and periodic 
maintenance) to remedy the wear and damage at an earlier stage than the case would have 






Figure 6.6: The impact of additional unit of mass to the road network 
Source: National Transport Commission (NTC, 2009:33) 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the impact of additional mass loads on the road surface that call for earlier 
maintenance action in order to ensure that the network maintenance standard is kept at a 
certain level. The repercussion of a vehicle driving on a deteriorated road is felt because of 
increased vehicle operation costs, and lower speeds that subsequently result in longer 
journeys and less comfort. The structure and capacity of the road are directly linked to its 
foundation and pavement type, which is expressed as a number of Equivalent Single Axle 
Load (ESAL). South Africa uses 80 kN axle as the standard axle load (Department of 
Transport, 1991). The amount of damage caused by heavy vehicles is associated with axle 
load to the fourth power (Blauwens et al., 2012). The Department of Transport (1996) explains 
that the cumulative damage effect caused by different vehicles moving across roads is defined 
by the number equivalent 80 kN single axle loads (E80) The structure design of the road 
requires an estimate of the cumulative equivalent traffic expressed as the number of E80 axles 
over its design life. 
 
Box 6.1: An illustration of Equivalent Standard Axle Loads 
 
If one chooses 8.2 tonnes as a standard axle load, then an axle load of G tonnes may be expressed 
in ESAL by inscribing the load G in the expression of (𝐺/8.2)4. For instance, an axle load of 10 
tonnes is equivalent to (10/8.2)4 = 2.21 ESAL. A passenger car with an axle load of about 600 kg 
corresponds to no more that (0.6/8.2)4= 0.000029 ESAL.  





MIC have been estimated using four main approaches. First is the direct approach that mostly 
uses the HDM-4 and yield estimates in the form of a NPV (Bruzelius, 2004). The second is 
the indirect method that is based on David Newbery’s fundamental theorem, which focuses 
on the effect of road damage and periodic maintenance in the form of overlay (Newbery, 
1988). The club approach is the third, and it is often based on equity and is not compatible 
with the marginal cost principle (Bruzelius, 2004). The fourth is the econometric approach, 
which often estimates marginal costs after the cost function is built on the microeconomic 
production theory.  
Bruzelius’ (2004) study was based on the direct method to estimate the MIC of a sampled 
section of the Swedish national road network. The study utilised the HDM-4 to estimate the 
NPV of a defined action. Bruzelius (2004) made an illustration of a 9m wide road carrying 
average daily traffic of 6 000 vehicles, namely 4 860 cars, 300 pick-ups, 360 large trucks, 360 
small trucks, and 120 buses. A maintenance strategy applied included an overlay if IRI 
exceeds 5.0, a partial overlay if rutting exceeds 22 mm or a partial resurfacing if more than 
10% of the road area suffers structure cracking.  
The costs of the marginal user were determined by calculating the difference between two 
NPV alternatives; one with an increased AADT by one unit (with a case) compared to a do-
nothing case. A run was performed with HDM-4 for the identified road in South Sweden. The 
results indicated that the road damage externality was found more important than the wear 
and damage (see Table 6.3). Bruzelius (2004) concluded that marginal-based pricing presents 
a more promising chance to recover costs associated with road damage externality than with 
wear and damage for the period of 50 years in Sweden. His results of the estimated MIC of 
road use per vehicle class calculated with HDM-4 output are presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Marginal Infrastructure Costs (SEK per/km) 
Vehicle Wear and damage Road damage externality Total 
Bus 0.001635 0.516679 0.518314 
Truck 0.015533 0.741432 0.756965 
Light truck 0.000204 0.134756 0.134961 
Car 0.000177 0.026454 0.026630 
Pick-up 0.000000 0.064340 0.064340 
Source: Bruzelius (2004:25) 
Gronau (1991; 1992, cited in Gronau, 1994) studied the contribution of road damage to road-
use costs in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana (1991), and Zimbabwe (1992) in particular and how 
MSC should be recovered. He particularly focused on the interurban road deterioration in the 
least developed countries for the 1987 fiscal year and utilised Newberry’s theorem. Gronau 
(1991 & 1992, cited in Gronau, 1994) outlined that estimates for road damage externality 





loading services. He determined the impact that an additional vehicle has on road roughness 
over time. An alternative case was then to increase the level of roughness and determine the 
impact on VOC, ceteris paribus. His assumption of road damage externalities that are load 
related rather than traffic responsive for paved roads in Ghana was estimated at ȼ0.9  per 
ESAL kilometre (Gronau, 1991, cited in Gronau, 1994); in correspondence, in Zimbabwe it is 
estimated at ȼ7.1 per ESAL kilometre (Gronau, 1992, cited in Gronau, 1994). Assigning 
external costs to heavy vehicles’ road damage externalities yielded in the range of ȼ1.53 to 
ȼ3.87 per vehicle kilometre in Ghana and 5.33 US cents per vehicle kilometre for Zimbabwe.  
In Namibia, studies on the road management system (RMS) focus on the use of the HDM-4 
model, for planning, especially for budgeting purposes to motivate more funding for the 
network needs (Tekie, 2015).   
6.4  METHODOLOGY  
This study employed the direct method of estimating the external costs of road use. This 
method best allows researchers to make use of RMS data and the HDM-4 in order to estimate 
the external costs of road use. As discussed by Bruzelius (2004), the HDM-4 model is mostly 
used in developing countries in order to analyse the economic effect of several maintenance 
policies and network investment needs. The Namibian RA uses the HDM-4 for the same 
purpose. In this chapter, the use of HDM-4 is extended to estimating the external costs of road 
use, which could be further utilised by road planners and policymakers as an input to 
determine road pricing.  
6.4.1  Dataset 
The analysis in this chapter, as described in Chapter 4, is based on the dataset obtained from 
the Namibian RA (see Section 4.4). Using case studies, this chapter intends to make 
comparisons between two road pricing rules, namely average costs and marginal costs, in 
order to establish which of the two could yield the best results for Namibia. Marginal cost 
pricing presents the efficiency case, while average cost pricing implies a practical long-term 
alternative. The next section explains the difference between the two pricing approaches. 
6.4.2  Average costs  
Average costs imply the total costs of the external components divided by a measure of 
outputs such as vehicle kilometres (Commission of European Communities, 1998). The 
average external costs were calculated by taking the total external costs imposed by a certain 





For instance, the average infrastructure costs of road use were calculated by taking the NPV 
of maintenance costs divided by the AADT for all the vehicle types per road section. Cost 
allocation was done by using the apportionment formula that considers the size and weight of 
a vehicle. However, various factors could potentially influence the value calculated (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.7.2). In this study, average external costs per vehicle class are presented 
in N$ or Namibian cents per kilometre. While average costs deliver reasonable results, the 
pricing approach does not necessary produce results that accurately reflect the impact an 
additional vehicle has on road costs, and the results may underestimate the true impacts of 
different vehicle classes (NTC, 2009). From an equity point of view, average cost pricing 
presents results that indicate whether vehicle categories pay their way according to the costs 
they impose when using the road network.  
6.4.2.1  Average infrastructure external costs 
This study adopted the methodology from Bruzelius (2004), namely using the direct method 
in order to estimate the infrastructure external costs of road use. As described in Section 6.3.4, 
the output of the HDM-4 model analysis is the NPV of a certain action. At this point, the 
analysis was structured to exclude other external costs such as accident costs. The estimate 
of infrastructure external costs for three sampled paved roads to reflect the average 
infrastructure external costs of each vehicle category. The maintenance strategy applies as 
defined in Chapter 4 (see Tables 4.5 and 4.8 for a full description).  
6.4.2.2  Average accident external costs 
The main input in the HDM-427 includes the average accident category costs (in thousand 
Namibian dollars), including fatal (N$1 440 380), injury (N$224 230), and damage only 
(N$496 260). The RA’s accident costs as presented in the Economic evaluation manual 
(2014:8) were utilised as a base and projected to 2015 for the HDM-4 analysis (see Figure 
6.7).  
                                               






Figure 6.7: Average accident costs categories 
Source: Author 
 
To calculate the average external costs per road section, the road-user accident costs were 
obtained from the HDM-4 run. To determine the average external accident costs, road-user 
accident cost per road section is divided by the traffic volume on each sampled section. To 
determine the average accident external costs per kilometre, the determined average accident 
cost is divided by section length (kilometre) and per day. Then the average costs per vehicle 
per kilometre are determined.  
6.4.2.3  Average environmental external costs 
For environmental externalities (mainly climate change), average external costs and MEC are 
equal. Schroten et al. (2019:67) argue that “an additional kg of CO2 emitted results in the same 
external costs as the average kg CO2 emitted, since the quantity of CO2 emitted occupy the 
whole atmosphere”. Their argument applies to this study. The estimation of average global 
warming/climate change in this study adopted Schroten et al.’s (2019) methodology. The GHG 
emissions per vehicle category were obtained from HDM-4 run and the steps as outlined under 





6.4.3  Marginal External Costs 
MEC refer to the additional costs arising due to an additional vehicle on the road network and 
which are not directly borne by the user in question (Sansom et al., 2001). The estimation of 
MEC therefore needs to be established using a case study representing different inter-urban 
road categories (trunk road, main road, and district road) of the national road network. 
Road pricing at the price equal to SRMC of road use has, however, been criticised in the 
literature to be a more theoretical construct with difficulty in implementation, with special 
reference made concerning the state of technologies and legislation (Milne, Niskanen & 
Verhoef, 2000). Marginal pricing set at SRMC, although yielding efficient pricing, is difficult to 
achieve in practice, therefore average costs pricing is often applied as second best. The 
former attempts to analyse the impact that each vehicle class has on road costs.  
Marginal cost pricing assessment could present results that can be utilised for the 
internalisation of external costs into road pricing in order to achieve economic efficiency of 
road use. Three road sections (D0872, M0052 & T0108) were sampled from the paved road 
of the national road network (see Section 4.3 in Chapter 4). To better reflect the candidate 
work programme in terms of location and time of a particular section, the researcher conducted 
tactical analysis in the HDM-4 model.   
6.4.3.1  Marginal Infrastructure Costs  
As described in Section 6.3.4, the marginal user costs were determined by calculating the 
difference between two NPV alternatives; one with an increased AADT by one unit compared 
to a do-nothing case with AADT. 
The calculations of MIC involve the following steps: 
1) Determine the NPV of each option: (i) NPV with a do-nothing case to AADT, and (ii) 
add an additional vehicle (ADDT plus one). 
2) Determine the difference between the two NPV alternatives and divide by the AADT 
for the candidate road in order to obtain the costs per vehicle.  
3) Obtain the costs per vehicle per kilometre by dividing the answer in Step 2 with the 
length of the sampled road (for instance 117.76 km) and multiply by ESAL factor for 
each vehicle (see Appendix D, Table 6A.1). 
4) In order to determine the costs per vehicle per kilometre per day, a correction is made 





6.4.3.2  Marginal Congestion Costs  
The quantification of congestion on the inter-urban (national) roads was estimated by means 
of parameters derived from the characteristics of the road network as per the HDM-4 
Workspace obtained from the RA. Schroten et al. (2019) argue that it is unrealistic to assume 
that all locations where congestion occurs can be identified and measured. Hence, MCC 
estimates need to be established using a case study that represents the homogenous traffic 
conditions on the sampled inter-urban roads of the national road network and different levels 
of traffic under normal traffic and congested periods28. For Period 1, the HDM-4 run comprises 
an action of adding one vehicle to the existing traffic flow on each sampled road. The total 
annual road congestion costs per sampled road could be calculated by adopting a delayed 
cost approach (which is basically a speed-flow relationship) (Schroten et al., 2019) and 
building on the values of delayed costs per vehicle kilometre for the candidate road simulating 
circumstances of a congested network.  
The simulated circumstances could represent a trunk-paved (T0108) road and level of 
capacity occupancy (free-flow speed, and congested/peak). The HDM-4 values must be 
altered with additional input values to simulate29 different levels of capacity occupancy in order 
to estimate the road congestion external costs that could reflect the scenarios under 
evaluation. The analysis in this section employed output generated from the HDM-4 run, thus 
estimating the net time loss. The available information on inter-urban roads consists of road 
network characteristics, including average speed, PCU coefficient, and traffic flow. Motor 
vehicle hourly traffic by period (in PCSE per hour) was obtained from the HDM-4 run. For 
congestion external costs, two major scenarios were considered. The first scenario entailed a 
free-flow case representing the real situation as per the available data, and this is the scenario 
that could be compared to other external costs. This scenario applied to all three case studies. 
The second scenario simulated cases of peak conditions. This allowed the researcher to 
simulate a congested scenario on the sampled T0108l road. The second scenario only applied 
to Case Study C (trunk-paved road). Since the principal objective is to estimate the MCC that 
an additional vehicle imposes on other vehicles traveling on the same road, the following steps 
were employed:  
1) Extract the speed flow for every vehicle class from the HDM-4 run and determine the 
difference in flow speed between the two AADT options; increase by one vehicle 
compared to a do-nothing case. 
                                               
28  Period 1 represents the free-flow (off-peak) period of the day and Period 2 represents the peak period. This 
allows accounting for the fact that trip purposes are not the same during each period of the day and therefore 
that the value of time and demand for the road use vary.  
29  The simulation of the different levels of occupancy was only applied to the paved trunk road and it was assumed 





2) Multiply the speed difference obtained in Step 1 with each AADT accordingly.  
3) Make a correction in order to account for the homogeneous stream in terms of the 
PCSE for all vehicle classes and for each action.  
4) Determine the aggregate flow per hour during free-flow traffic for each action. 
5) A correction is made to account for all minutes in a year and not just for that particular 
point, thus dividing the aggregate flow during Period 1 with the hours (8 760) in a year 
to obtain the flow per hour. 
6) Given that the vehicle travelled on each sampled road (for instance 117.76 km of a 
trunk-paved road), determine the flow per kilometre by dividing the answer obtained in 
Step 5 for each action by 117.76 km (see Column 2 in Table 6.4). 
7) The time difference between the two actions is presented in Column 3. This step 
determines the additional time coupled with an additional vehicle joining the 117.76 km 
stretch of the trunk-paved road.  
8) To determine the time loss due to an additional vehicle on the sampled road, the 
additional driving time in Column 4 is therefore multiplied by the number of vehicles 
affected (3 114) by the delay of an additional vehicle (AADT+1) imposed on other 
vehicles (see Column 4) 
9) Since there is no monetary value imposed on congestion delay in Namibia, for the 
calculation purpose in this chapter, the researcher made an assumption that time loss 
is valued at N$5 per hour (N$0.08333 per minute). Therefore, the congestion levy 
presented in Table 6.4 (see Column 5) could be determined by multiplying the answer 
in Column 4 by 0.08333 minute. Thus, at the price of N$0.08333 per minute, the time 
loss of 0.05766 may be valued at N$0.0048 per kilometre. 
Table 6.4: Calculating a congestion levy based on a speed-flow relationship 
(1) 
Vehicle per hour per 
lane 
(2) 
Diving time / 





Time loss caused by an 






6.4.3.3  Marginal Accident Costs  
Accident statistics available were obtained from the Economic manual of the RA (2014) (see 
Appendix D, Table D.3). HDM-4 gives the option to include or exclude accident costs. In order 
to calculate the marginal accident external costs, the two HDM-4 alternatives were run and 
thus determined the different accident costs between the two options. The HDM-4 Workspace 
obtained from the RA contains accident classes with configured accident rates (in number per 





The following steps were considered in estimating the MAC: 
1) Determine the VKT per year on a wide two-lane road: 117.76 km x 3114 AADT x 365 
days. 
2) Obtain annual accident rate per casualties on the road section (117.76) km. 
3) Calculate total accident costs (VKT x (AADT/100 million) x accident costs (Step 2). 
4) Determine the accident costs per casualties (fatal, injury, and damage only). 
5) Determine the costs per vehicle class. 
6.4.3.4  Marginal Environmental Costs  
The HDM-4 run provides emissions by vehicle type by quantities in grams per 1 000 vehicle 
kilometres (see Appendix D, Figure 6A.3). For the GWP, GHG is given in CO2e. The 
calculation of the CO2e includes a total of CO2 times 1, N2O times 310, and CH4 times 21. 
These emission factors are extracted from the IPCC’s Assessment report WG1 (Foster et al., 
2007; Republic of Namibia, 2016a). The impact on global warming from the emission of 
particles and other formations of secondary pollutants are not covered in the calculation. To 
calculate the environmental external costs, the researcher adopted the methodology used by 
Schroten et al. (2019).  
Steps followed: 
1) Obtain the gases from the HDM-4 run obtained from two options (see Appendix D, 
Figure A6.4). 
2) Determine the total emission per vehicle class (by adding CO2 + CH4 + N2O). 
3) Convert the grams into tonnes. 
4) Convert the individual GHG into to CO2e by multiplying the GHG by GWP. 
5) Multiply the CO2e with fuel consumption per vehicle (obtained from the HDM-4 run 
output (see Appendix D, Table D.4). 
6) To determine the environmental (climate change) external costs, the GHG emission 
per vehicle is then multiplied by environmental levy (see Chapter 4, Table 4.8) per 
vehicle. To reach the environmental external costs per vehicle, the climate change 
costs are divided by the kilometres travelled by each vehicle type on each sample road. 
6.5  RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the HDM-4 analysis for the three paved road case studies. 
In order to demonstrate the use of the HDM-4 and its possibilities to inform the setting of road 





6.5.1  Case Study A: District Paved Road 
Figure 6.8 presents a contextualised sampled road (D0872) from the district paved road of the 
national road network. Chapter 4 of this dissertation presented the full description of the road 
section for this case study (see Section 4.5). 
 
Figure 6.8: Study area 





The estimation of the external costs for vehicles using the district paved road (DO872) yielded 
results for different vehicle classes that differed slightly in terms of cost components. The 
analysis presents a variation in costs between heavy vehicles and light vehicles. When 
comparing average costs to marginal costs, the vehicle cost contribution follows the same 
pattern, although it differs percentage wise. Figure 6.9 shows heavy vehicles as a higher 
external cost contributor both to marginal and average costing. Table 6.5 contains average 
and marginal costs for all six representative vehicles in cents per kilometre.  
The results indicate that heavy vehicles contributed by far the highest infrastructure external 
costs per vehicle (see Figure 6.9). When applying average costing, articulated trucks 













When compared to marginal costing, the results follow the same pattern with a contribution 
ranging from 76% for articulated trucks, 16% for heavy trucks, to 8% for buses. In terms of 
accidents’ external costs both at average and marginal costing, light vehicles contributed the 
most as compared to heavy vehicles; the former costs contribute as much as 47% for medium 
cars to as low as 8% for mini-buses on an average and marginal cost basis. Heavy vehicles’ 
contribution to accident costs varied between 9%, 5%, and close to 0% for articulated trucks, 
heavy trucks, and buses respectively. When comparing marginal costs and average costs, the 
accident external costs are similar. These results are consistent with Fridell et al. (2011), who 
highlighted that marginal accident external cost results are usually similar or higher than the 
average accident external costs.  
For environmental external costs, the marginal costs are the same as average costs. This 
observation was also made by Schroten et al. (2019), who reason that the average and 
marginal emissions per kilometre per vehicle are equal. Environmental external cost results 
indicate commercial vehicles to be the highest contributors, with mini-buses contributing 
approximately 51%, articulated trucks 25%, heavy trucks 17%, and 5% for buses. On the 
contrary, heavy vehicles contributed the most on a marginal costing basis, namely 49%, 34%, 
and 11% for articulated trucks, heavy trucks, and buses respectively. All light vehicles 
contributed approximately 1% on an average costing basis and approximately 2% on a 
marginal costing basis. In terms of congestion costs, the results indicate no congestion on the 
sampled district paved road.  
Overall, the results for the district paved road indicate that heavy vehicles contributed by far 
the highest external costs per vehicle, both on an average cost basis, contributing 
approximately 96%, and approximately 98% on a marginal costing basis. Light vehicles 
contributed as low as 2% on an average costs basis and 4% on a marginal costing basis.  
6.5.2  Case Study B: Main Paved Road 
Figure 6.10 illustrates the estimation of the external costs for vehicles using the main paved 
road (M0052) analysed as per the full description in Chapter 4.  
For instance, as recorded in Case Study A, heavy vehicles make the highest contribution to 
road infrastructure and environmental costs. Similarly, light vehicles contributed the most in 






Figure 6.10: Main paved road 
Source: Author (Shapefiles from RA, 2018) 
 
Table 6.6 contains the average and marginal costs for all six representative vehicles in cents 
per kilometre. Looking at Figure 6.11, heavy vehicles cause overall external costs of 
approximately 97% both on average and marginal costing bases. The light vehicles’ overall 
external costs contribute approximately 3%, which is over 32% lower than the external costs 





(M0052) road, heavy vehicles cause higher infrastructure external costs on average, ranging 
from as high as 70% to as low as 12% for articulated trucks and buses respectively. The 
marginal costs on the main paved road ranged between 63% to 12% for articulated trucks and 
buses respectively.  
The highest environmental external costs of road use on the sampled main paved road are 
caused by commercial vehicles, ranging from 38% by articulated trucks, 27% by mini-buses, 
24% by heavy trucks, to 8% by buses. The environmental external costs for light vehicles on 
the sampled inter-urban road is even lower, with 4x4 vehicles and medium cars contributing 
only approximately 1%.  
The results indicated accident external costs to be highly caused by light vehicles in terms of 
both average and marginal costing. The pickups or 4x4 vehicles contribute approximately 48% 
to external accident costs on average cost and about 31% on marginal cost bases. Other light 
vehicles, including medium cars and mini-buses, contribute approximately 48% and 6% to 
marginal costing respectively. The literature review indicated that light vehicles often result in 
higher accident costs as they drive relatively fewer kilometres with a lower occupancy rate 
(Schroten et al., 2019). In terms of congestion costs, the results for the main paved road 
shared similar findings as those of district paved roads with close to zero congestion, with all 













6.5.3  Case Study B: Trunk Paved Road 
Figure 6.12 demonstrates the estimation of the external costs for vehicles using the trunk 
paved road (T0108) analysed as per the description in Chapter 4.  
 
Figure 6.12: Trunk paved road 
Source: Author (Shapefiles from RA, 2018) 
 
 
The estimation of the MEC and average external costs for the sampled trunk paved road use 
yielded results that differ slightly from those obtained for Case Studies A and B in terms of the 














Similar to Case Studies A and B, Case Study C’s analysis presents a variation in costs 
between heavy vehicles and light vehicles. Table 6.7 contains the average and marginal costs 
for all six representative vehicles in cents per kilometre. Figure 6.13 shows that heavy vehicles 
cause high infrastructure external costs and environmental external costs on a marginal 
costing basis. Marginal infrastructure costs range from as high as 76% for articulated trucks, 
16% for heavy trucks, and to as low as 8% for buses. The average infrastructure external 
costs caused by heavy vehicle range between 70% for articulated trucks to approximately 
12% for buses.  
In terms of marginal costs, light vehicles contribute the most to external accident and external 
congestion costs as compared to heavy vehicles. The light vehicles contribute to external 
accidents costs from as high as 47% for medium cars to as low as 8% for mini-buses. Heavy 
vehicles’ contribution to external accident costs varies between 9%, 6%, and close to 0% for 
articulated trucks, heavy trucks, and buses respectively. The average accident costs of light 
vehicles are around 48% for 4x4 vehicles, 30% for medium cars, and 5% for mini-buses.  
 In terms of congestion external costs, light vehicles contribute the most to congestion on the 
T0108 trunk paved road by contributing approximately 27% by pick-up (4x4) vehicles and 
medium cars. Heavy vehicles contribute to congestion when using the T0108 trunk paved road 
with 18% for articulated trucks and 0% by heavy trucks.  
For marginal costing, the results present heavy vehicles as higher contributors to 
environmental external costs, with costs ranging between 49% by articulated trucks, 32% by 
heavy trucks, and 14% by buses. All light vehicles contribute approximately 2% to 
environmental external costs when utilising the T0108 trunk paved road. Currently, one could 
argue that marginal average costs are to a certain extent internalised into the current road 
pricing with road users paying 50.30 Namibian cents per litre as an accident levy. 
Environmental external costs (global warming) present yet another case for consideration. 
The MENVC levy is highly influenced by fuel consumption; the more the distance driven, the 
higher the chances of such vehicles to emit emissions. Other researchers (including Link et al., 
2016; Petrus & Krygsman, 2019) concur that global warming costs are better internalised into 
a fuel levy. Petrus and Krygsman (2019) share the same views concerning the marginal 
infrastructure costs. They argue that heavy vehicles impose the highest cost on the 
infrastructure in terms of wear and tear. The internalisation of such costs therefore calls for 
revamping the current manually operated system of MDC. The analysis presented a huge 
disparity between heavy vehicles and light vehicles. Overall, the MEC in Figure 6.13 present 
heavy vehicles as higher external cost contributors with approximately 81%. The light vehicles 





Table 6.5: Average cost and Marginal External Costs analysis (cents/km, Case Study A: D0872 road) 
 




















4x4 0.180 1.846 0.081 2.107 0.0001 0.0428 0.081 0.0000 0.1239 
Articulated truck 128.324 0.535 2.1945 131.0535 13.6595 0.0124 2.1945 0.0000 15.8664 
Bus 41.570 0.027 0.4829 42.0799 1.4334 0.0006 0.4829 0.0000 1.9169 
Heavy truck 59.643 0.321 1.5085 61.4725 2.9508 0.0074 1.5085 0.0000 4.4667 
Medium car 0.000 2.808 0.0813 2.8893 0.0000 0.0652 0.0813 0.0000 0.1465 
Mini-bus 0.181 0.455 0.1229 0.7589 0.0000 0.0105 0.1229 0.0000 0.1334 
Source: Own calculation 
Table 6.6: Average cost and Marginal External Costs analysis (cents/km, Case Study B: M0052 road) 
 




















4x4 0.0508 0.6963 0.0741 0.8212 0.0005 0.0037 0.0741 0.0000 0.0783 
Articulated truck 65.3169 0.1958 2.3385 67.8512 36.101 0.0011 2.3385 0.0000 38.4406 
Bus 11.6946 0.0044 0.5219 12.2209 6.8543 0.0001 0.5219 0.0000 7.3763 
Heavy truck 16.7792 0.0504 1.5067 18.3363 14.1103 0.0007 1.5067 0.0000 15.6177 
Medium car 0.0000 0.4264 0.078 0.5044 0.0000 0.0057 0.078 0.0000 0.0837 
Mini-bus 0.0508 0.0697 1.6359 1.7564 0.0001 0.0007 1.6359 0.0000 1.6367 
Source: Own calculation 
Table 6.7: Average costs and Marginal External Costs analysis (cents/km, Case Study C: T0108 road) 




















4x4 0.0286 108.805 0.0859 108.9195 0.0000 0.5943 0.0859 0.0044 0.6846 
Articulated truck 20.3299 31.397 2.3712 54.0981 2.6627 0.1715 2.3712 0.0065 5.2119 
Bus 6.5857 1.7126 0.6678 8.9661 0.2794 0.0094 0.6678 0.0025 0.9591 
Heavy truck 9.4491 1.9637 1.5413 12.9541 0.5752 0.1073 1.5413 0.0000 2.2238 
Medium car 0.0000 166.804 0.0891 166.893 0.0000 0.9111 0.0891 0.0044 1.0046 






Table 6.8: Marginal Congestion Cost for the trunk paved road (cents/km, Case Study C: T0108 
road)  
Vehicle class Free-flow Congested (peak hours) 
4x4 0.0044 0.0709 
Articulated truck 0.0065 0.1169 
Bus 0.0025 0.1205 
Heavy truck 0.0000 0.1276 
Medium car 0.0044 0.6024 
Mini-bus 0.0035 0.0850 
Source: Own calculation 
6.5.4  Comparison of average cost pricing to marginal cost pricing 
The results for both average costs and marginal costs in Tables 6.5 to 6.7 are expressed in 
Namibian cents per vehicle per kilometre. For all case studies representing the trunk, main, 
and district roads (see Tables 6.5 to 6.7), average costing yielded results that are higher than 
the marginal costing of road use.  
6.5.4.1  Infrastructure external costs 
In Case Study A (D0872 road), heavy vehicles, including articulated trucks, heavy trucks, and 
buses, on average costing, would pay 128.32, 59.64, and 41.60 Namibian cents per kilometre 
respectively for infrastructure external costs. In contrast, in terms of the marginal costing basis, 
these vehicles would only pay 13.66, 3.00, and 1.43 Namibian cents per kilometre respectively 
(see Table 6.5), which is 9.4 times lower than articulated trucks would pay on an average 
costing basis, 20 times lower for heavy trucks, and approximately 29 times lower for buses.   
The same pattern applies for Case study B (M0052) road where heavy vehicles for 
infrastructure external costs would pay approximately 65.32, 16.78, and 11.6 Namibian cents 
per kilometre for articulated trucks, heavy trucks, and buses respectively (see Table 6.6). 
Considering marginal costs, the same vehicles would, for infrastructure external costs, only 
pay 36.10, 14.11, and 6.85 Namibian cents per kilometre respectively. The difference between 
D0872 and M0052 roads is that the marginal costing for M0052 road is almost two times lower 
for all heavy vehicle classes under evaluation.   
The infrastructure external costs for T0108 road present results that are similar to those of 
D0872 and M0052 roads, with heavy vehicles causing higher external costs of road use and 
closer to zero for light vehicles. The heavy vehicles, including articulated trucks, heavy trucks, 
and buses, cause approximately 20.33, 9.45, and 6.59 Namibian cents per kilometre 
respectively on an average costing basis (see Table 6.7), and approximately 2.66, 0.28, and 





These results are in line with Andreson and Thompson’s (2014) results that the marginal 
infrastructure cost for heavy vehicles were substantially higher than for light vehicles. 
As a point of reference, Bruzelius (2004) estimated marginal infrastructure cost at SEK0.518 
(Swedish krona) per vehicle kilometres for buses (roughly N$0.82), SEK0.757 per vehicle 
kilometres for trucks (roughly N$1.20), and SEK0.135 for light trucks and heavy vehicles per 
vehicle kilometre (roughly N$0.21) respectively. Bruzelius’ (2004) results are in accord with 
those presented in this study as they indicate that heavy vehicles impose the highest 
infrastructure external costs as compared to light vehicles. Light vehicles’ marginal 
infrastructure costs range from SEK0.027 (roughly N$0.043) to SEK0.064 (roughly N$0.10) 
per vehicle kilometre for cars and pick-ups respectively. Although these results are not 
comparable in terms of the environment in which the analysis was conducted, ceteris paribus, 
given the exchange rate, one would expect Namibian estimates to be higher.  
6.5.4.2  Accident external costs 
Accident external costs are highly caused by light vehicles. Considering Tables 6.5 to 6.7, light 
vehicles cause the highest accident external costs in all case studies analysed on both 
average costing and marginal costing bases. Light vehicles using the D0872 road caused 
average external costs of around 1.85, 2.81, and 0.46 Namibian cents per kilometre for 4x4 
vehicles, medium cars, and mini-buses respectively (see Table 6.5). In terms of marginal 
costing, the accident external costs for the same vehicles are close to zero, estimated at 
N$0.04, N$0.06, and N$0.01 per kilometre respectively (see Table 6.5). In comparison to 
heavy vehicles using a stretch of 61.05 km D0872 road, articulated trucks cause external costs 
of approximately N$0.54 per kilometre, N$0.32 per kilometre by heavy trucks, and N$0.03 per 
kilometre by buses. The same vehicles, on a marginal costing basis, cause accident external 
costs between zero cents per kilometre for buses to approximately N$0.01 per kilometre for 
articulated trucks.  
The results for Case Study B of the M0052 road network show that on average costing, light 
vehicles cause external costs of N$0.69, N$0.43, and N$0.07 per kilometre by 4x4 vehicles, 
medium cars, and mini-buses respectively (see Table 6.6). The marginal accident cost on a 
22.75 km stretch of M0052 road are closer to zero, ranging between N$0.004 per kilometre 
for 4x4 vehicles and N$0.006 per kilometre with mini-buses, which cause approximately zero 
external accident costs on the main paved road. In contrast, heavy vehicles’ accident external 
costs are insignificant or relatively zero, with articulated trucks causing the highest costs of 
approximately N$0.20 per kilometre, N$0.05 per kilometre for heavy trucks, and approximately 





relatively zero, ranging between N$0 per kilometre for buses and approximately N$0.001 per 
kilometre for articulated and heavy trucks.  
Finally, the results for external accident costs on the T0108 road are quite significant, with 4x4 
vehicles causing approximately 108.81 Namibian cents per kilometre, 166.80 Namibian cents 
per kilometre by medium cars, and approximately 32.31 Namibian cents per kilometre by mini-
buses (see Table 6.7). On a marginal costing basis, light vehicles cause less accident external 
costs when compared to average costs. Medium cars cause the highest accident external 
costs of approximately N$0.91 per kilometre, N$0.59 per kilometre by 4x4 vehicles, and 
approximately N$0.15 per kilometre by mini-buses (see Table 6.7). In comparison to light 
vehicles, heavy vehicles’ accident external costs on T0108 road are quite relevant as 
compared to D0872 and M0052 roads. On an average costing basis, articulated trucks cause 
approximately 31.40 Namibian cents per kilometre, approximately 1.96 Namibian cents per 
kilometre by heavy trucks, and approximately 1.71 Namibian cents per kilometre by buses 
using the T0108 road. On a marginal costing basis, the articulated trucks cause approximately 
N$0.17 per kilometre, N$0.11 per kilometre by heavy trucks, and approximately N$0.009 per 
kilometre by buses (see Table 6.7).  
6.5.4.3  Environmental external costs 
The results for Case Study A show environmental external costs that are quite similar for both 
average costs and marginal costs. The environmental external costs for heavy vehicles range 
from N$0.48 per kilometre for buses to N$02.19 per kilometre for articulated trucks and 
N$01.51 per kilometre for heavy vehicles. For light vehicles, the environmental external costs 
range from a low N$0.08 per kilometre for 4x4 vehicles and medium cars to a high N$0.12 per 
kilometre for mini-buses (see Table 6.5).   
Case Study B’s results present that heavy vehicles cause higher environmental external costs 
of road use as compared to light vehicles using a 22.75 km stretch of M0052 road. The heavy 
vehicles’ environmental external costs vary from a low N$0.52 per kilometre for buses, 
approximately 1.51 Namibian cents per kilometre for heavy vehicles, to a high 2.34 Namibian 
cents per kilometre for articulated trucks. The light vehicles’ utilising the M0052 road cause 
approximately N$0.074 by 4x4 vehicles, N$0.078 by medium cars, and approximately 1.64 
Namibian cents per kilometre by mini-buses (see Table 6.6).   
Finally, Case Study C’s results, illustrated in Table 6.7, show similar results as those presented 
for Case Studies A and B where heavy vehicles caused higher environmental external costs 
of road use. The articulated trucks cause approximately 2.37 Namibian cents per kilometre, 





by buses. Light vehicles cause approximately N$0.11 by mini-buses, and approximately 
N$0.09 by medium cars and 4x4 vehicles when using a 117.76 km stretch of the T0108 road. 
The environmental external costs illustrated in Tables 6.5 to 6.7 are most important in the case 
of commercial and public vehicles. Sen, Tiwari and Upadhyay (2010) found similar results and 
recommended that emissions could be reduced by opting for vehicles with improved 
technology or by utilising an alternative mode.  
6.5.4.4  Congestion external costs 
Overall, congestion external costs seem not to be a major factor on the national road network 
as the results in Tables 6.6 to 6.7 show that congestion is mostly not significant on D0872 and 
M0052 roads, with less traceable cases on T0108 roads. Table 6.7 indicates that light vehicles 
cause relatively high congestion external costs on the 117.76 km T0108 road as compared to 
heavy vehicles using the same road. The former causes approximately N$0.004 per kilometre 
by medium cars and 4x4 vehicles and approximately N$0.0035 per kilometre by mini-buses. 
Heavy vehicles utilising the T0108 road cause approximately N$0.0065 per kilometre by 
articulated trucks, approximately N$0.0025 per kilometre by buses, and zero cents per 
kilometre by heavy trucks.  
The case, however, is different for analyses conducted in other countries. For instance, a 
study by Sansom et al. (2001) in Great Britain indicated that the MCC alone far exceeded the 
revenue generated per vehicle per kilometre for all representative vehicles. In India, Sen et al. 
(2010) found that congestion is the most important cost among other external costs in Delhi 
resulting from excessive use of motor vehicles in peak periods of the day.  
Table 6.8 presents estimates for marginal external congestion costs on the T0108 road of the 
national road network at both the free-flow and peak periods. As presented earlier in the 
analysis, the Namibian national roads do not experience congestion with a traceable case on 
the trunk roads. As explained in Section 6.4.3.2, an alteration was done on the traffic using 
the 117.76 km stretch of the T0108 road in order to simulate a congested road scenario. To 
that effect, an increase of 10 times of the existing AADT per vehicle class was applied. As 
presented in Table 6.8, the marginal external congestion cost is quite significant in a simulated 
congested scenario. These results demonstrate that there will be a need to curb the 
congestion on T0108 road should the traffic volume grow to 31 141 vehicles per day.  
Theoretically, marginal cost pricing reflects the additional unit costs imposed by additional 
vehicles per kilometre on a specific road under study. Externalities such as accidents, 
congestion, and infrastructure costs depend on traffic density. For instance, an additional car 





than the average external congestion costs (Schroten et al., 2019). Moreover, when an 
additional car joins traffic flow at the point where road capacity is at its peak, the MCC could 
be significantly higher (see Table 6.8). Since reforming the road pricing policy is not an 
overnight exercise, it is worth recommending that an investigation towards extending distance 
travelling to all vehicles and charges per kilometre driven should be logged. Current efforts by 
the RFA to launch an investigation into the possibilities of toll roads in Namibia are worth 
noting. Although such a call was based from the revenue generation point of view, the study 
could be coupled with demand management for road use in the near future.  
Overall, the MEC results for Namibia indicate slightly higher accident costs associated with 
light vehicles as compared to heavy vehicles, whereas marginal infrastructure presented 
higher costs for heavy vehicles as compared to light vehicles. Walter (1968) argues that in the 
long run this could lead to resource wastage as, in the case of low demand, roads would be 
underutilised, however it could yield surplus above the required resource under high demand. 
Although the analysis only covered three sections of the paved roads, the methodology could 
be applied to the whole network. The MEC of the road use for all the sampled cases appear 
below the average cost of road use. Suppose that MEC are justified from the efficient point, 
and average cost to justify the cost recovery; if the average social cost recovery applies, the 
minimum costs are likely to be recovered. If it is assumed that the RUC are set at SRMC, the 
results confirm an argument by Kahn (1988) that in a case of uncongested roads (low traffic), 
SRMC would never cover fixed costs; that is, mainly to cover the capital cost of new 
investments.  
 
Figure 6.14: Short-Run Marginal Cost on national road network (cents/km)  



















Figure 6.14 demonstrates that the SRMC under low traffic demand could never exceed the 
average costs. The SRMC could be lower or equal to the average cost. Moreover, the opposite 
applies if the demand of road use tends to be higher and roads are congested, then SRMC 
could exceed average costs.  
On the uncongested Namibian network, applying RUC based on SRMC would likely yield 
results that fall under the shaded area (see Figure 6.14), depending on the traffic volume on 
a specific road section. Applying marginal costing to achieve economically efficient yields MSC 
that are less than the average social costs and likely to generate revenue per kilometre that is 
less than on average basis per kilometre. In this case, the results seem to favour charging for 
social costs on an average basis as opposed to charging on a marginal basis.   
Suppose the charging policy follows cost recovery, an additional revenue per kilometre will 
offset externalities cost per kilometre. Without the externalities costs being internalised on the 
marginal basis, the sector may be better off charging for social costs on an average basis. 
The challenge is that average costs do not cover externalities costs on the marginal basis. 
Suppose the authorities considered charging at average costs as they offer revenue 
generation advantages as compared to marginal basis approach. Marginal costing as charges 
could be potentially affected by several factors. For instance, road users could decide to make 
use of vehicles that contribute less to externalities in terms of environmental external costs 
and consider undertaking a journey only when the benefits of doing so outweigh journey costs. 
The question is then what would happen if agency measures of reducing externalities do not 
yield economic benefits or road users decide to drive anyway. In fact, pursuing the average 
costs may be a better option as they would yield better revenue; however, it would not be 
based on the efficiency principle. It appears that low-volume traffic may force roads agencies 
not to pursue the efficiency approach.  
To summarise, generally the optimum charge for road use is one at SRMC. For an efficient 
first-best approach, no other pricing or taxes are required. However, when shortfalls exist, two-
part tariffs or mark-up may apply to enable the agency to maintain the network and make 
worthwhile investments. Walter (1968) also came to a similar conclusion and emphasised that 
such taxes should not infringe on road users, nor on any marginal-related principles. 
Notwithstanding, efficiency pricing always necessitates setting RUC at SRMC, although 
average costs would under no circumstances be consistent with the efficiency of road pricing 





6.6  SUMMARY 
This chapter demystified the MEC estimation for road use in Namibia. The HDM-4 model plays 
a crucial role in the economic valuation of road infrastructure and subsequently the road 
pricing. The RA relies on the HDM-4 for network investment and maintenance strategies. The 
HDM-4, however, seems to be more popular for funding motivation and maintenance 
strategies, with very little investigation done on utilising the same model for influencing the 
present and future prices of road use. The results indicated that it is possible to use the HDM-
4 model to estimate the MEC of road use depending on the available data and quality and that 
the model specifications and calibrations are accurate. This chapter demonstrated the 
applicability of HDM-4 to case studies (D0872, M0052 & T0108) roads of the national road 
network. The case studies’ results suggest that for external costs of road use, heavy vehicles 
constitute approximately 97% of both average costs and the marginal costs of road use, with 
the exception of accident external costs, where light vehicles showed a slightly higher cost. Of 
all the external cost components, infrastructure costs, environmental costs, and accidents 
costs appear to be more important than congestion costs, which turned out to be less 
significant in Namibia. As the results confirm, road users in Namibia certainly impose social 
costs when using the road network. It is therefore fair to argue that those utilising the road 
infrastructure should bear external costs associated with their use of the road. Ideally, as 
stipulated in the RFA Act (No. 18 of 1999), road pricing should be based on the user-pays 
principle. Furthermore, reforming the current RUC should be considered the most effective 
and efficient instrument that could reduce global warming costs and accident risks, and raise 
revenue for infrastructure maintenance and development.  
There is, however, growing interest among policymakers and transport planners in Namibia in 
the internalisation of the negative externalities of road use into road pricing. Although there 
are yet more ground to cover towards implementing the user-pays principle, in particular with 
respect to the MSC concept, from the efficient road pricing the principle offers theoretical 
realisation of optimal road pricing. The setback with the implementation of efficient road pricing 
could be associated with the literature’s emphasis on the gap between the textbook MSC 
principle and its actual implementation. Moreover, awareness of pricing holding road users to 
account for their negative externalities is growing in the Namibian transport sector, which is 
expressed in available policy frameworks, including the latest Namibia Transport Policy. For 
instance, in terms of efforts towards infrastructure damage, the RFA’s measures include 
automation of the travelling distance charges (MDC), which are reported to suffer evasion due 
to manual record keeping. Given that the major factor that influences MENVC (global warming) 
is fuel consumption, Link et al. (2016) share a similar conclusion that global warming costs 





The quantification presented in this chapter forms the basis of MEC estimation that roads 
agencies could explore to internalise externalities into road pricing, and to ensure that those 
who consume the scarce resource bears the cost of maintaining and, where possible, the 
development of new facilities. The MSC pricing as a first-best pricing approach seems not to 
be a desirable pricing for the Namibian national road network as it is likely to lead to a financial 
deficit.  
It is worth noting that the MEC estimated in this study may be underestimated due to the 
paucity of data and assumptions underlying the congestion costs. For instance, for calculating 
congestion costs on the D0872 and M005 roads, no significant congestion was traced on those 
roads. This could be coupled with the traffic volume associated with the sampled roads. 
Modifications were made to the traffic data for the T0108 road to simulate a scenario of a 
congested road during a peak period. Furthermore, for the environment costs, only emissions 
related to global warming were taken into account. Therefore, the MEC calculations presented 
in this study only hold for the specific situations under evaluation. Using the three case studies 
(D0872, M0052 & T0108) road, the researcher estimated the best possible MEC associated 
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CHAPTER 7:  
REFORMING THE ROAD USER CHARGE SYSTEM IN NAMIBIA: LESSONS 
FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 6 discussed the principle of MSC and issues surrounding the concept. The discussion 
of the theoretical concept demonstrated that charging road users at an efficient price, the 
SRMC, could be a nightmare in the Namibian case. The efficient price is centred on the desire 
to promote both the efficient use of road capacity and ensuring that road consumers also pay 
the MEC of road use. This thinking plays a principal role in the Namibian Transport Policy, 
which seeks to align the RUC and taxes to the user-pays principle (MWT, 2017). In most 
developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, governments and roads agencies are 
faced with fiscal revenue shortfalls; improving cost recovery is therefore more critical as 
opposed to improving demand management (Heggie, 1995). Challenges associated with the 
Namibian roads include an expansive network that serves a small vehicle population, as 
discussed in Chapter 5.   
The current RUC lean heavily on broader fiscal policies of revenue generation and have little 
connection to setting costs of road use at an efficient price. According to first-best efficient 
pricing, reflecting the MSC should be optimal when the MSC vary according to kilometres 
driven, driving time, location, chosen route, vehicle technology, vehicle operation conditions, 
and drivers’ driving behaviour (Mline et al., 2000:58). RUC set to reflect efficient pricing factors 
are likely to ensure optimal results in both short-run and long-run scenarios. Meanwhile the 
Transferring the MSC principle from a textbook theory to practice involves various 
complications. For instance, MSC have been perceived as an overarching goal for 
promoting economically efficient pricing; however, planners and decision makers 
responsible for implementing practical pricing systems are faced with several 
constraints, including the need to take into consideration other policy objectives such as 
revenue generation, equity, sustainability, demand management, etc. Moreover, there 
is a significant need for the applicability of prevailing technology to RUC, as well as the 
acceptability of charging instruments by road users. The literature deliberated on a few 
cases where road pricing measures have been implemented in practice, although the 
objectives motivating the move have not always in line with the efficiency principles 





gap between costs and actual charges has been growing wider, in that the user charges have 
little or no connection to transportation activity defined by optimal user charges. Chapter 6 
discussed and estimated SRMC pricing as the recommended theoretical concept aimed at 
fulfilling the efficient pricing of road use. While different aspects of pricing instruments have 
been explored within the current RUC, the pricing model is silent on marginal cost pricing 
issues. In the past years, there has been a growing literature gap regarding the efficient pricing 
theory and the possibilities of the practical implementation of the pricing theory (Milne et al., 
2000). Another area of concern that dominates the literature is that of the possibility of the 
available technologies to translate the theory into practice. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge of road pricing, particularly the efficient price aspect, the literature remains 
inadequate even though road transport in Africa is the dominant mode of transport that 
accounts for 80% of freight and approximately 90% of passenger traffic on the continent 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2009). Research on road pricing in Africa has grown over 
the past decade (for instance, see Mudenda, 2017), but does not centre on charging vehicles 
for the distance travelled on particular types of roads as a focus that could advance the 
challenge of internalising the MEC of road use in Africa.  
The implementation of the first-best pricing approach to marginal costs in Namibia poses 
pervasive challenges to roads agencies and the government. Externalities associated with the 
use of the road network involve different actors and take different forms, yet require roads 
agencies and governments to make complex arrangements. The agencies’ challenges involve 
funding capacity to acquire smart technologies that could better record actual road usage, as 
well as institutional, legal, and political constraints. 
The Namibian Transport Policy calls for the refinement of the RUCS to reach its potential 
(MWT, 2017). The policy posits that the level of the current RUC instruments needs to be 
determined according to the economic principle outlined in the RFA Act of 1999. Chapter 6 
estimated the MEC of road use and raised the need to address the issue of lack of finance 
with the second-best price rules.   
There are two principal areas of consideration when discussing RUC, namely the institutional 
framework in charge of the RUC decision making (Rothengatter, 2003) and the factors to 
consider when determining the RUC (Creightney, 1993). In Namibia, the fuel levy as the main 
component of the RUC clashes with the fuel price determination, which is regulated by the 
Petroleum Product and Energy Department of the MME (MWT, 2017). Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation illustrated road sector governance. Generally, the MoF is responsible for deciding 





Transport economists often focus on how to set RUC and raise revenue in the most efficient 
manner, described by charging road users at the SRMC (Walter, 1968; Hau, 1992; Nash, 
2015). In so doing, the RUC are set at the right level; that is, set at the SRMC of the journey 
per kilometre, which serve to influence road users’ decisions on undertaking a journey. Users 
would thus only undertake a journey if the benefits gained from a journey are set to outweigh 
the costs associated with the journey per kilometre. However, due to challenges associated 
with implementing the efficient principle of RUC, the government and the agencies are often 
forced to consider several options. RUC play a crucial role in raising revenue, managing 
demands, reducing accidents and environmental risks, and achieving transport policy goals. 
Creightney (1993) argues that embarking upon broader policy views often means that RUC 
do not conform to strict efficiency criteria.  
The motivation of this research was to determine to what extent current road users conform 
with or deviate from the optimal level of SRMC; thus to examine the extent to which revenue 
covers the costs of road use as per the users’ consumption. The government’s interest 
presented in the Namibian Transport Policy to reform the current RUC in order to 
accommodate the negative externalities that arise from road use (MWT, 2017) encouraged 
the researcher to investigate whether estimating the MSC of road use yields results in terms 
of road pricing for Namibia. This study dwells on what RUC set at the SRMC have to offer 
when compared to offsetting fuel levies as a form of RUC.   
Previous literature provided useful information concerning the growing gap in road funding 
and financing. Creightney (1993) indicates that the identified gap has been influenced by 
several factors, including the absence of clear RUC (as per road use), inefficient user-pays 
policies (with references to equity, heavy vehicles, and the fuel levy), and the nature of tax in 
place. While the RA uses the HDM-4 to strategise on maintenance expenditure and motivate 
investment required for the national road network, the use of the HDM-4 to influence present 
and future road pricing remains a grey area in the authorities’ domain. Bruzelius (2004) made 
an important argument that if road authorities perceived the HDM-4 as the relevant tool for 
planning, then why not use the same tools to factor in the marginal costs of road use in order 
to influence present and future road pricing. Of the few studies that focused on estimating the 
MEC for road users, many were conducted in the Western world (Nash, 2003; Schreyer et al., 
2004; Nash et al., 2008; Doll & Essen, 2008) or sub-Saharan Africa (conglomeration of Sub-
Saharan Africa Transport Program [SSATP] country reports), of which few of these reports 
include Namibia (SSATP, 2007; Teravanithorn & Raballand, 2009; Runji, 2015). This research 
goes beyond the estimation of the marginal externalities of road use to explore the possibility 
of setting the RUC at the SRMC to possibly address the funding challenges in Namibia. This 





could easily be synchronised to influence present and future road pricing. It is anticipated that 
the estimation will provide guidance for planners, policymakers, researchers, and others 
involved in the transportation sector in order to draw evidence-based solutions to the 
challenges faced by the road sector. This research therefore aimed to achieve the following 
objectives: 
1) To determine the implications of implementing SRMC-based RUC in Namibia; and 
2) To explore the second-best RUC based on the prevailing circumstances in Namibia. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 provides a conceptualisation of 
the current RUC and existing model. Section 7.3 is a literature review on second-best 
alternatives, while Section 7.4 discusses the research methodology. Section 7.5 examines the 
current Namibian road pricing, Section 7.6 examines alternative pricing for Namibia, and 
Section 7.7 compares Namibia’s road financing to those of Australia and New Zealand. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion and a summary. 
7.2  CONCEPTUALISATION OF ROAD PRICING BASED ON EFFICIENT PRICING 
Road externalities arise whenever one road user makes another user or society worse off, yet 
does not bear the costs associated with such costs imposed on others. As the case may be 
with road users not taking into consideration the costs they impose on others, the implications 
of not factoring external costs into road pricing also apply to the supply side. The current RUC 
do not cover externalities imposed by road users (Van Essen et al., 2019), which vary with 
space and location. As a result, this sends price signals to the road users that do not include 
externalities, thus the users only pay according to the charges imposed on them. Namibian 
roads are characterised by a spacious network that serves a small vehicle population. This 
poses a challenge to charging prices that are based on the marginal costs of road use. Figure 
7.1 illustrates the application of efficient pricing in the Namibian content by posing the 
question: if Namibia implements the recommended efficient pricing of SRMC pricing for road 
use, would the approach yield sufficient revenue to cover all the costs and provide for an 
acceptable return on investment? The opposing view is whether is indeed the aim of the 
principle to deliver sufficient revenue to cover fixed costs and provide funding for road 
upgrading and expansion. It should be noted that while the objective of marginal social costs 
pricing is to reflect the (variable) costs imposed on society, the principle can, under some 
circumstances, deliver sufficient revenue to cover fixed costs (minimum gross rerun on 


























7.3  DEVIATION FROM SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COSTING 
Rothengatter (2003) points out the possible alternatives and deviations to the textbook 
approach, which seem inapplicable in practice. Extensions to the SRMC may be summarised 
as follows: 
1) SRMC with mark-up and Ramsey pricing; and 
2) Multi-part tariffs. 
7.3.1  Mark-up and Ramsey Pricing 
The two extensions of pure SRMC are applied with the aim of achieving reasonable revenue 
for the road infrastructure. The SRMC mark-up is applied in an increased proportional 
approach in a way that the total revenue meets the total cost (Rothengatter, 2003). Ramsey 
pricing, on the other hand, implies a modification of the SRMC values per the budget 
constraints and joint demand elasticities. For instance, mark-up prices apply in a situation 
where different users using the same facilities at the same time pay different prices. Such 
application is often practised in the rail and airline industry where inelastic demand (business 
traveller) and elastic demand (leisure travellers) pay different prices. Rothengatter (2003) 
posits that both the SRMC mark-up and the Ramsey pricing scheme when applied could 
guarantee adequate revenue to cover total costs; however, the two schemes cannot 
guarantee generous incentives with respect to network characteristics and motor vehicle 
technology. Green and Pardina (1999) state three main reasons why Ramsey pricing could 
face public objection: 
1) Generally, Ramsey pricing is applicable where markets are equally monopolistic or 
competitive; otherwise the regulators would limit Ramsey pricing to a selected group 
of services that fall within similar degrees of competition. In the transport sector, 
authorities often cluster services within similar degrees of competition, for instance 
business travellers and leisure travellers, and price flexibility within each service 
cluster.  
2) Ramsey pricing, although it might be economically efficient, might not be consistent 
with government objectives of providing affordable services to the poor. Moreover, 
Ramsey pricing might not correspond with political sustainability. Therefore, whenever 
pursuing Ramsey pricing, restrictions on specific cluster services should be in place 






3) Ramsey pricing often translates into acts of price discrimination (Berg, 1998) by users 
of the particular service who perceive it as unfair for operators to impose a higher mark-
up above marginal cost on one group of users over another group of users.  
Therefore, these reasons may place further limits on authorities’ ability to implement Ramsey 
pricing. Given the above critical factors, considerations to adopt Ramsey pricing need to be 
evaluated in the context of other pricing mechanisms and welfare-maximising objectives.  
7.3.2  Multi-part tariffs 
Multi-part tariffs describe a situation where agencies charge distinct prices for different 
components of a service. Multi-part tariffs consist of both fixed and variable elements and 
consumers pay both a connection fee and a price. Andreson and Thompson (2014) state that 
products or services financed by this combined approach have the advantage of the effect of 
pricing network use at marginal costs, which may result in efficient use of the network whilst 
the fixed network access fee covers the long-run cost of developing and maintaining the 
network. The general principle is that the unit price can be set at marginal cost, which is 
efficient as long as the connection fee (fixed element) can raise sufficient revenue without 
deterring some consumers from buying the product/service (Green & Pardina, 1999).  
Advanced applications of a multi-part tariff can be traced in utility services such as electricity, 
where the user pays a monthly subscription for access and a usage fee for daily consumption 
of electricity. In the road sector, multi-part pricing can be associated with a situation where 
road users pay a fixed component included in the AVLRF, which intends to give infinite access 
to motor vehicles to utilise the road. Such cost components are often designed to achieve cost 
recovery with charges paid once off, monthly, quarterly, or annually (Berg, 1998); whereas 
variable components involve charges approximate to the road usage, such as fuel levies. 
These components can be flexibly adjusted and synchronised with the costs and the network 
demand characteristics (Rothengatter, 2003). Generally, fixed components intend to achieve 
the cost recovery target, whereas variable components focus on the additional costs of a trip 
priced at the marginal cost of road use (Sansom et al., 2001). With a two-part tariff, roads 
agencies could charge users according to marginal costs in terms of road usage, and a fixed 
element for road accessibility in terms of registration and licence fees, which could lead to 
revenue generation depending on the traffic volume of a particular road. Multi-part pricing 







Multi-part tariffs can be appropriate for transport prices for three main reasons as outlined by 
Rothengatter (2003), namely: 
 In order to generate appropriate incentives for infrastructure needs and user 
technology choices, multi-part tariffs should include information on such characteristics 
and functions. 
 Tariffs can be set to best suit the situations of different user groups.  
 Tariffs can be constructed in a way that the results are pareto superior to linear tariffs 




















In a perfect market, for transport investments (perfectly divisible) a clear rule for the network 
extension could be developed. Then the savings of marginal users should exceed or at least 
be equal to the increase of the MIC. It is an illusion to believe that first-best or optimal pricing 
Box 7.1: An example of a multi-part tariff 
 
Suppose there are two consumer groups, A and B, with demand functions Da and Db. Under a 
linear tariff (p1), which combines the marginal costs (m), with mark-up, the demand is qa and qb 
and the total demand is q. Fixed costs are assumed to be recovered through payments a+b+c. After 
introduction of a two-part tariff p2 = (a+b+c/qa) +m. Given a self-selection set {p1,p2}, B will still 
prefer linear tariff p1. A, however, will choose the two-part tariff that encourages A to increase 
demand to qa*. With this, the consumer’s surplus increases by d. If the technology is concave, a 
further scale effect occurs: marginal cost will decrease instead of remaining constant, as shown in 
the graph, and will increase welfare gain d.  
 
Figure 7.2: Superiority of the two-part tariff 





in a part of transport infrastructure would improve the situation in the whole transport sector 
(Verhoef et al., 1996; Rothengatter, 2003).  
Faulhaber and Baumol (1988:594) allude to Ramsey pricing as a great example that derives 
from the literature and that has received great attention from government agencies. The 
principle deviates from marginal pricing while offering “second best pareto optimal prices” that 
maximise welfare on the condition that roads agencies generate sufficient revenue through 
charges to cover their total costs. The concept is therefore associated with high charges to 
users, whose demand for the service is relatively inelastic.  
7.4  FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Rothengatter (2003) explains the three main reasons for failure with respect to dynamic 
financial and management issues. He affirms that once the technology of transport is concave, 
marginal costs are likely to follow an inverse pattern with the traffic activity, and then fall below 
the average costs. At this point in time, the network is more likely to generate insufficient 
revenue. For some of these reasons, roads agencies are often constrained by budgetary 
considerations and cost recovery requirements. In order to meet the financial need of the 
defined road networks, Clough, Guria and Yeabsley (2008) suggest roads to be provided 
under sub-optimal second- or third-best approaches, by means of Ramsey pricing and 
PAYGO principles, while accommodating some external effects of road use if possible. The 
literature suggests three ways to close the gap between infrastructure costs and revenue, as 
discussed below. 
7.4.1  Adding external congestion costs, accidents costs, and environment costs 
This entails charging for the external cost elements, which are excluded from RUC. In order 
to align the user decision with the use of the road, which includes the MSC, the charge must 
be introduced to cover the difference between marginal costs and average costs (see 
Appendix E, Box E.1).  
7.4.2  Cross-subsidisation from road to rail or from urban to non-urban areas 
Congestion externalities often occur in urban areas. Therefore, urban areas have a great 
advantage in terms of generating revenue through a congestion levy. In light of this view, 
several authors focused on promoting cross-subsidisation (Liu & Nie, 2011; Gwilliam, 2001). 
Surpluses from road charging must be directed to rail freight transportation or urban car traffic 
to public transport. Cross-subsiding has several shortcomings. Rothengatter (2003) argues 





argument for cross-subsidising. While both modes offer services, their services might differ 
significantly in that directing users to an inefficient alternative should not precede welfare 
enhancing.  
7.4.3  Financing by the general budget 
The benefits of RUC surpass general taxation for several reasons. General taxes could easily 
distort taxpayer behaviour, whereas charges do not. Generally, charges are designed based 
on the services offered to users. Users thus ought to pay for the services they consume. On 
the contrary, taxes are based on the values (income, sale of property, etc.) and therefore not 
on the quantity consumed. Bird and Slack (2017) argue that taxes can be easily altered to 
change the behaviour of the tax obligation as opposed to the services that these taxes fund. 
When users do not pay the full costs of road use, Bird and Slack (2017) suggest that taxpayers 
must make up the difference although taxes could distort behaviour and impose deadweight 
losses. User charges are also preferred over general taxes because they send the correct 
signal to the consumers regarding the correct prices they ought to pay. When charges are set 
to cover the MSC of providing the services, users only consume the services up to the point 
where benefits received from the service are at par with the price they pay for the service. Bird 
and Slack (2017) posit that suppliers that are financed at full-cost pricing have an incentive to 
embrace the most effective and efficient way of providing services up to the point that 
consumers are willing to pay for them.  
User charges also give a chance to politicians to easily assess service managers’ 
performance. However, citizens have limited access with respect to assessing politician 
performance concerning their taxes. The literature discusses financing road revenue deficits 
by the general budget as a seemingly comfortable solution (Schiavo-Campo, 2007); however, 
this is only found to be welfare enhancing if the welfare loss for taxpayers is lower than the 
benefits that users obtain from subsidisation (Rothengatter, 2003). 
7.5  CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS AND REVENUE 
The principal cause of the gap between the current RUC and the marginal costs mainly lean 
on two major factors, namely externalities and non-optimal taxes (Runhaar, 2001).  
7.5.1  Externalities 
Transport activities produce several externalities, positive or negative, which may have 
unintended consequences for parties not directly involved in decision-making processes or 





too high or too low externalities. Drivers often take into account their private cost of road use 
and hardly consider any negative externalities that arise from their use of the network. 
Negative externalities and associated external costs are illustrated in Figure 7.3. Externalities 
affect victims outside the system. For instance, society suffers air pollution, noise, and global 
warming. Other drivers using the same network suffer congestion (time delay) and accident 
risks (see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion). Runhaar (2001) argues that all these victims 
have no obligation to decongest the network, clear the air, or prevent the noise. In addition, 
even if they had to, the process requires negotiation, which often yields undesirable results 
because of the cost involved.  
 
Figure 7.3: Classification of external costs of road transport 
Source: Verhoef (1996:15) 
7.5.2  Non-optimal taxes 
Transportation taxes that are generally designed with the principal objective of raising 
revenues as opposed to correcting externalities contribute to the deviation between transport 
prices and marginal costs. General taxes are not related to external costs or transportation 
facilities.  
7.5.3  Pricing as a policy instrument  
Prices play a crucial role in the transportation sector as they provide information to both the 
roads agency (supplier) and the road users (demand) regarding resource scarcity. Basic 
economic principles imply that prices are likely to increase proportionally with demand. Due to 
scarcity, in the short-run the service is provided to consumers with the highest willingness to 
pay for the desired service or product. Thus, in a competitive market, prices will increase up 







When the service is supplied in excess of the demand, the opposite occurs. Transport 
economists argue, however, that scarcity does not apply to transport prices (Runhaar, 2001).  
The scarcity rationale for the transportation sector follows the queuing approach, thus 
willingness to wait; however, this approach comes with extra costs, including time costs. 
Therefore, time delays could be avoided if pricing plays a role, as users who value their time 
more will be more willing to pay to avoid spending excess time on a journey. In the transport 
sector, willingness to pay is tied to the value placed on time (Runhaar, 2001). Generally, 
shorter travel times are associated with reliable arrival times, thus accompanied by lower 
transport costs and higher willingness to pay. In the case of congestion, transport prices are 
likely to increase with travel costs; however, reliability in arrival time decreases, which may 
result in lead-time costs30.   
7.6  METHODOLOGY 
As explained in the methodology chapter of this study (see Chapter 4), this research adopted 
a case study design. The data sources utilised in this research included desktop research, 
secondary data and documentary review, and the HDM-4 Workspace obtained from the RA. 
To achieve the research aim outlined in Section 7.1, this chapter divided the two objectives 
into two groups. The first task tackles the implications of setting RUC at SRMC in Namibia, 
and the second task explores the second-best RUC for Namibia by leaning on some lessons 
learned from New Zealand and Australia. 
In order to determine the implications of implementing the SRMC pricing as RUC in Namibia, 
this chapter uses the estimated MEC obtained in Chapter 6 and compares the MEC to the fuel 
levy (as a proxy of the current RUC instruments) estimated on the same sampled sections of 
the road network. The implication focus is solely on pricing (comparing external costs to the 
fuel levy) and thus no attempt is made to quantify potential efficiency gains when road use is 
charged at efficient pricing.  
7.6.1  Fuel levies and data sources 
The fuel levy charged per litre of petrol and diesel is the only instrument among other RUC 
that could be related to the variable costs (per litre) of road use. It was on this basis that the 
researcher opted to estimate the fuel levy income generated from vehicle representatives 
using the sampled section of the road and compare such to the marginal costs per vehicle per 
kilometre estimates from the same portion of the road section. Motor vehicle owners and road 
users pay in total 186.3 Namibian cents fuel levy per litre, of which 136 Namibian cents fuel 
                                               
30  Cost that arises when products are not delivered on time, such as loss of sales or productivity lost due to 





levy per litre (price at 1 April 2019) are RUC toward the RFA and 50.3 Namibian cents fuel 
levy per litre towards the MVA Fund (Republic of Namibia, 2019). The fuel levies were 
calculated based on the fuel consumption per 1 000 vehicle kilometres for each representative 
vehicle. The fuel consumption of each vehicle was obtained from HDM-4 data (see Appendix 
E)31. The calculation of the fuel levy income generated per vehicle per kilometre of the sampled 
section includes the RFA and MVA Fund fuel levy rates, the fuel consumption per 1 000 vehicle 
per kilometre, the road section length (km), and the vehicle classes (AADT).  
The income generated from the fuel levies per vehicle kilometre was then compared to the 
MSC; this hypothetical case was made merely to determine the gap between the revenue 
generated from the fuel levies as a road user charge and that generated from MSC charged 
from the same vehicle travelling on the same road section.  
7.6.2  The second task: Explore the second-best Road User Charges for Namibia 
This task aims to explore the second-best RUC based on prevailing circumstances in Namibia. 
The section applies secondary data, including annual reports, research reports (published and 
unpublished), policies on transportation, newspaper articles, and documents that deal with 
RUC mainly from the RFA, the MWT, the MoF, the RA, and the MVA Fund. The desktop 
research was applied to New Zealand and Australia.  
7.6.3  Desktop research 
This entailed desktop research on road pricing literature available, including the RUC 
instruments applied by Australia and New Zealand. The criteria considered for choosing New 
Zealand and Australia included a country that has an expansive road network and a relative 
vehicle population, as well as interventions in place to fund the road network. Therefore, the 
desktop research section established what is known about road pricing with a particular focus 
on inter-urban roads or national road networks and informed the researcher on designing a 
RUC framework that could possibly inform planners and decision makers on the options for 
consideration for an MSC basis for the Namibian national road network. 
7.7  RESULTS 
In this study, demand costs for road use, as well as the price interaction at the macroeconomic 
level that could provide insight into price fluctuation, did not fall within the scope of this study, 
thus the results obtained cannot be interpreted to reflect the magnitude of price changes.   
                                               
31  The amount of levy imposed on petrol and diesel on every litre sold is 136 Namibian cents, therefore no 





7.7.1  Comparison of estimated Marginal Social Costs to fuel levy revenue 
The comparison of the marginal costs of road use with revenues presented a larger 
differentiation in charges than the current fuel levy could offer. The results for all paved road 
sections (T0108, M0052, & D0872) yielded revenue generated per vehicle per kilometre that 
far exceeded the MEC of road use for both heavy and light vehicles. This implies that charging 
for MEC on these sampled sections of the national road network is worse off in comparison to 
the fuel levy as an instrument for charging for road use. These results are in line with Heggie’s 
(1995) findings, which emphasised that most developing countries’ roads do not experience 
persistent congestion; setting prices equal to SRMC therefore has a high chance of resulting 
in financial deficits, which is the case with Namibia.  
7.7.1.1  Case Study A: D0872 Road 
Marginal costs for all vehicle classes yielded charges per kilometre that are below the current 
fuel levy generated from the same portion of the road. Table 7.1 indicates the revenue 
generated from the fuel levy and marginal cost pricing bases. Charging external costs for all 
vehicle classes on D0872 road is relatively low as compared to fuel levies as a charging 
instrument.  
Table 7.132: Case Study A: Comparison of marginal costs and fuel levy (cents-veh-km) 










MIC 0.000 13.660 1.433 2.951 0.000 0.000 
MAC 0.043 0.012 0.001 0.007 0.065 0.011 
MENVC 0.081 2.195 0.483 1.509 0.081 0.123 
MCC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sub-Total Costs 0.124 15.867 1.917 4.467 0.146 0.134 
Revenue: 
RFA Levy33 15.286 74.305 39.168 61.6216 15.194 18.692 
Accident Levy34 5.654 27.482 14.486 22.791 5.620 6.913 
Sub-Total Costs 20.940 101.787 53.654 84.413 20.814 25.605 
Difference (Cost - Revenue) -20.816 -85.920 -51.737 -79.946 -20.668 -25.471 
Source: Own calculation 
*Note: Costs were only based on the estimated marginal costs of road use and excluded VOC. Revenue was only based on fuel 
levies, and other RUC were not considered. 
 
The total external costs ranged from a low 0.12 Namibian cents per kilometre for 4x4 vehicles 
to a high 15.87 Namibian cents per kilometre for articulated trucks. When compared to the 
                                               
32  See Appendix 7 for detailed calculations and steps followed to determine the amount generated per vehicle 
kilometre. 
33  The analysis used the fuel levy as applicable from April 2019. The RUC fuel levy for both petrol and diesel was 
set at 136 Namibian cents per litre. 
34  The analysis used the fuel levy as applicable from April 2019. The MVA Fund (accident) levy for both petrol 





fuel levy, the gap ranged between 20.82 Namibian cents per kilometre for 4x4 vehicles to 
85.92 Namibian cents per kilometre for articulated vehicles. The results indicate that marginal 
cost pricing is likely to generate less revenue as compared to the fuel levy; however, the finding 
does not imply that the fuel levy is excessive. As a matter of fact, the latter has been below 
inflation for the past decade (see Chapter 1). For heavy vehicles, the MIC cost of 13.66 
Namibian cents per kilometre, 1.43 Namibian cents per kilometre, and 2.95 Namibian cents 
per kilometre for articulated trucks, buses, and heavy trucks respectively are far below the fuel 
levy. MAC on the district road for all vehicles present results that are low compared to the 
accident levy per vehicle kilometre. The light vehicles, including 4x4s, medium cars, and mini-
buses, would pay N$0.04, N$0.07, and N$0.01 per kilometre respectively for external 
accidents when travelling on a district paved road as opposed to the accident levy at 5.65, 
5.62, and 6.91 Namibian cents per kilometre respectively for the same vehicles. 
7.7.1.2  Case Study B: M0052 Road 
The results of the analysis of motor vehicles (4x4s, articulated trucks, buses, heavy trucks, 
medium cars, and mini-buses) using the M0052 road of the national road network are 
presented in Table 7.2. The results relate to all vehicle classes of the same group travelling 
on the same section of the road. As is the case on the district road, the fuel levy exceeds the 
marginal cost charges per vehicle kilometre by a greater margin.  
Table 7.2: Case Study B: Comparison of marginal costs and revenues (cents-veh-km) 










MIC 0.001 36.101 6.854 14.110 0.000 0.000 
MAC 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.001 
MENVC 0.074 2.339 0.522 1.507 0.078 1.636 
MCC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sub-Total Costs 0.079 38.441 7.376 15.618 0.084 1.637 
Revenue: 
RFA Levy 14.374 75.409 35.617 60.544 14.646 17.922 
Accident Levy 0.558 2.918 1.378 2.343 0.567 0.693 
Sub-total Costs 14.932 78.327 36.995 62.887 15.213 18.615 
Difference (Cost - Revenue) -14.853 -39.886 -29.619 -47.269 -15.129 -16.978 
Source: Own calculation 
 
On average, the revenue generated from the articulated trucks (78.33 Namibian cents per 
kilometre) exceeded more than double (38.44 Namibian cents per kilometre) the MEC 
charges. For heavy trucks, the revenue generated from the fuel levy (62.89 Namibian cents 
per kilometre) exceeded marginal cost charges (15.62 Namibian cents) by approximately four 





almost 1% of the revenue, ranging between 14.93 Namibian cents per kilometre, 15.21 
Namibian cents per kilometre, and 18.62 Namibian cents per kilometre for 4x4s, medium cars, 
and mini-buses respectively. In terms of MIC, the heavy vehicle charges exceeded that of the 
light vehicles; however, this does not imply that the heavy vehicles are paying their fair share 
of costs imposed on using the road network. Significant MAC were recorded for light vehicles 
as compared to the heavy vehicles (see Table 7.2). Congestion on the main road is not 
significant or closer to zero.  
7.7.1.3  Case Study C: T0108 Road 
The analysis of the six representative vehicles travelling on T0108 road yielded results that 
are not very different from those obtained from M0052 and D0872 roads (see Table 7.3). At 
least there was a trace of congestion on the trunk road, although not very high. MCC for light 
vehicles were approximated at N$0.004 per kilometre for medium cars, mini-buses, and 4x4 
vehicles. Moreover, articulated trucks and buses also contributed to congestion costs on the 
trunk road, ranging between N$0.0065 for articulated trucks and N$0.0025 for buses.  
Table 7.3: Case Study C: Comparison of marginal costs and revenues (cents-veh-km) 










MIC 0.000 2.663 0.279 0.575 0.000 0.000 
MAC 0.594 0.172 0.009 0.107 0.911 0.148 
MENVC 0.086 2.371 0.668 1.541 0.089 0.114 
MCC 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.004 
Sub-Total Costs 0.684 5.209 0.958 2.223 1.004 0.265 
Revenue: 
RFA Levy 16.021 78.645 41.729 63.422 16.223 16.223 
Accident Levy 6.199 30.429 16.146 24.539 6.277 6.277 
Sub-Total Costs 22.220 109.074 57.875 87.961 22.500 22.500 
Difference (Cost - Revenue) -21.536 -103.865 -56.917 -85.738 -21.496 -22.235 
Source: Own calculations 
 
MIC and MENVC presented a case for charging heavy vehicles for the cost they impose on 
the infrastructure and environment when making use of the road network. The MIC for heavy 
vehicles range between N$0.28 per kilometre, N$0.58 per kilometre, and N$02.66 per 
kilometre for buses, heavy trucks, and articulated trucks respectively. The MENVC for heavy 
vehicle range between N$0.67 per kilometre, N$01.54 per kilometre, and N$02.37 per 
kilometre for buses, heavy trucks, and articulated trucks respectively.  
The overall results for the marginal charges analysis presented similar trends across the three 
road types, with a substantial margin between MEC and the fuel levy. The results could be 





terms of the MIC, the highest cost of N$02.66 per vehicle kilometre (see Table 7.3) is 
associated with heavy vehicles. This could be explained by the relatively high proportion of 
damage that heavy vehicles impose on infrastructure when using the trunk road. 
7.7.2  The implications of implementing Short-Run Marginal Costs-based Road User 
Charges in Namibia 
Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 indicate the discrepancies between the costs incurred and revenue 
generated from the sampled paved roads of the Namibian national road network. Table 7.4 
shows the roads agency cost (see Column E) incurred to preserve the stretch of 117.76 km 
trunk road of the national road network. The MEC per vehicle per kilometre on the same road 
are set out in Table 7.4 in Column F (MIC), Column G (MAC), Column H (MENVC), and 
Column I (MCC). The vehicle operation costs per vehicle per kilometre are illustrated in 
Column A. Fuel levy charges and MDC per vehicle kilometre are presented in Column K (RFA 
fuel levy), Column L (MVA Fund accident levy), and Column P (travelling/MDC).  
The results shows that RUC based on marginal pricing in Namibia would result in substantial 
financial deficits. Given the costs versus revenue on the sampled trunk road, the financial 
deficit is approximated at N$5 million. It should be noted that only charges that stand to vary 
with road use were taken as a proxy (fuel levy and MDC) for efficient RUC in addition to the 
estimated external costs of road use. Therefore, this figure could be lower when other costs, 
including ownership costs charged on an annual basis to grant access to utilise the road 
network, are included. As per the literature, in order to bridge the funding gap that arises from 
setting RUC at SRMC as an alternative to the first-best pricing, the second-best pricing must 
be employed.  
The departure point would then be on strategies to finance such a deficit. The traditional way 
has been to increase the RUC on annual basis in order to increase revenue or raise general 
taxes that could subsequently increase budget votes for the road sector. The literature also 
referred to generating revenue from those who benefit from the provision of roads, mainly 
property owners such as residential streets, businesses, and rural access roads (Bird, 2001; 
Bird & Slack, 2002). This study, however, focused on inter-urban roads that primarily provide 
services to traffic and not to beneficiaries to a large extent. The literature provides several 
debates on other options such as reducing the maintenance and investment expenditure in 
order to reduce road deficits. Faiz and Harral (1988) oppose that idea by arguing that it is not 
economically efficient. They further argue that reducing road expenditure increases user 
costs. For every dollar saved on maintenance, VOC increase by $2 to $3 (Heggie, 1995). To 





vehicle populations, road charges priced at SRMC are likely to result in greater deficits. As 
per the literature, the second-best alternative of charging some services priced below average 
costs and others above (Heggie & Fon, 1991) could yield results for Namibia in terms of 





Table 7.4: Roads agency costs and efficient Road User Charges simulation on a trunk road (N$ at 2019 prices) 
 


























MDC Charges  
117.76 km (N$)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M)
VOC (c/km) PCSE ESAL (mill) AADT  HDM-4 Results MIC MAC MEC MCC Total N$ 136 N$ 0.503 N$ 186.3
4x4 5.029 1.00 0.02 1024 2,062,451.61   0 0.594 0.086 0.004 0.684 16.021 6.199 22.22 27.933 12,006.27           
Articulated Truck 19.146 2.20 7.10 371 747,235.89      2.663 0.172 2.371 0.007 5.213 78.645 30.429 109.074 133.433 57,352.71           1,716,898.96        
Bus 12.92 1.70 2.30 20 40,282.26        0.279 0.009 0.663 0.002 0.953 41.729 16.146 57.875 71.748 30,839.01           14,355.20             
Heavy Truck 18.412 1.80 3.30 232 467,274.19      0.575 0.107 1.541 0 2.223 63.422 24.539 87.961 108.596 46,677.17           199,000.32           
Medium Car 4.958 1.00 0.00 1569 3,160,143.15   0 0.911 0.089 0.004 1.004 16.223 6.277 22.5 28.462 12,233.65           
Mini-Bus 15.64 1.20 0.01 256 515,612.90      0 0.148 0.114 0.004 0.266 16.223 6.277 22.5 38.14 16,393.49           
Totals 3472 6,993,000.00   3.517 1.941 4.864 0.021 10.343 232.263 89.867 322.13 408.312 175,502.30         1,930,254.48        
(P)






7.7.3  Success and major issues associated with the Namibian Road User Charge 
System 
Currently, the RFA Act of 1999 outlines who should pay RUC, the charging instruments 
available, the basis of charges (ownership, mass/load, and distance), and refund mechanisms 
that govern the Namibian RUCS. The institutional arrangements and their mandate (including 
the collection and distribution of the revenue) were discussed in Chapter 5. One noteworthy 
achievement is the current RUCS-recorded link between the RUC and the revenue that 
accrues to the RF and therefore a strong link between revenue generated from the roads and 
allocated back as an investment into the road network (see Section 5.5 of Chapter 5). 
It suffices to say that the current RUC in Namibia were designed to amplify the two-tariff 
approach consisting of both flat charges (vehicle registration and licence fees) and a 
combination of variable charges (proxy), including fuel levies and travelling distance charges 
(MDC). What is not clear is whether these charges were exploited at market price to reflect 
the marginal costs of travelling on the road network or whether the application of a two-part 
tariff was optimal. Efficient pricing requires pricing road services at travellers’ margina l costs 
(Andreson & Thompson, 2014). Given the low marginal costs (see Chapter 6) associated with 
the Namibian road network, an optimal two-part tariff designed on a combination of a flat fee 
and a variable fee that would internalise the MEC of road use could be a solution to Namibia’s 
road funding challenges. These could bring about sustainability in road funding mechanisms.  
7.7.4  Key observations regarding the Road User Charge System in Namibia  
The recommended user-pays principle has not been fully implemented, although it, to an 
extent, had some influence on shaping RUC instruments. The current instruments to an extent 
mimic a two-part tariff approach where road users pay a flat charge for road network 
accessibility and a quasi-user charge based on fuel consumption in the form of a fuel levy. 
There is, however, no close link between the RUC and actual patterns of road use in time and 
location. For instance, a driver travelling 500 km on the main corridors or in Windhoek’s central 
business district would pay the same charges in fuel levies as a driver covering the same 
distance on rarely used district roads. Another interesting observation highlighted in recent 
literature and applicable to Namibia is that owners of fuel-efficient vehicles pay a smaller fuel 
levy for their use of the road as compared to users with older cars (De Percy, 2018). 
Furthermore, heavy vehicles pay access fees and usage in terms of MDC (travelling), and 
there is no direct link between the damage they cause and the cost of road maintenance.    
The variable-related levies apply to both petrol- and diesel-powered vehicles paying fuel 





diesel-vehicles using fuel other than petrol consist of fuel taxes and levies, as well as travel 
distance charges on HGVs only. The travelling MDC are imposed according to the Road 
Traffic and Transport Act (No. 22 of 1999), which also contains other regulations pertaining to 
vehicle taxation. In order to fully implement the user-pays principle, the RUC should be 
charged based on road use and not vehicle ownership. Other concerns that need to be 
addressed include the following: 
 Under the current RUCS, road fees and charges are collected by various agencies, 
while the accountability for these funds lies with the RFA, which results in an opaque 
and complex system that disconnects funds generated and transferred to the RF. For 
instance, there have been debates and proposals for eNATIS (Electronic National 
Traffic Information System) to be housed under the RFA as opposed to the status quo 
(under the RA); however, the challenge observed is that eNATIS executes other duties 
that are not associated with vehicle registration and licence fees (MWT, 2017).  
 The power of the RFA to execute the adjustment of the levies is a concern.  
Following these arguments, it appears that two things are needed on the transport policy front. 
Firstly, the RUC must be modified by focusing on encouraging users to make efficient use of 
the existing network. Planning and pricing are the key instruments to improve the efficient use 
of the road network in Namibia. Secondly, investing in alternative modes such as rail could 
reduce road damage when heavy freight is efficiently transported by rail. Chief among the 
challenges are the prioritisation and funding of road projects (maintenance versus 
development), as well as lobbying for political support towards an appropriate road pricing 
system that speaks to the usage pattern so as to facilitate network efficiency while maximising 
user satisfaction.  
Road authorities should be subjected to price oversight and independent pricing 
determinations as applied to other monopoly sectors, including water, electricity, and 
telecommunication.  The current two-part tariff does not provide price signals to the users that 
can be adjusted to their behaviours. Charging road users according to the MSC has not yet 
been applied in practice as road pricing in Namibia, although road users are required to pay 
for their full consumption of the road network according to the RFA Act and the Namibian 
Transport Policy. While the current system of collecting revenue is based on the available 
instruments, the system has loopholes when it comes to fuel-efficient vehicles and electronic 
vehicles. According to the Transport Information and Regulatory Service department of the 
RA, no electrical vehicles have been registered in Namibia thus far (RA, 2019). The identified 
challenge in this study is that marginal cost pricing could only reap benefits and prove useful 





7.8  NAMIBIA IN COMPARISON TO NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA: LESSONS 
FROM SUCCESSFUL ROAD USER CHARGE INSTRUMENTS FOR ROAD 
PRICING 
7.8.1  Why Australia and New Zealand? 
The Global competitiveness report rankings on road connectivity index and quality of roads 
(Schwab, 2018) inform the comparison decisions made in this chapter. Furthermore, recent 
research conducted in the Asia-Pacific region on RUC (Clough et al., 2008; Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia, 2014; Kirk & Levinson, 2016; De Percy, 2018) gave more reasons for 
this chapter to draw a comparison on RUC instruments implemented to maintain expansive 
road networks. Both Australia and New Zealand offer notable experience for their PAYGO 
systems of road cost recovery (Clough et al., 2008). According to the World Atlas (2019), 
Namibia ranked 34th of the world’s largest countries with an area in square kilometres 
approximated at 824 000 km². Australia is at the top of the comparison, ranked in 6th position 
with approximately 7.7 million km², whereas New Zealand ranked in 75th position with an area 
of 265 000 km², which is four times smaller than Namibia. Table 7.5 provides road indicators 
that informed the comparison between the countries under discussion. In terms of the quality 
of the roads, Namibian roads outperformed Australia and New Zealand with a value of 5.1, 
4.8, and 4.7 (out of 7) respectively. In terms of the score out of 100 in comparison to the 2017 
Global competitiveness report, both Namibia and New Zealand depicted an increase, while 
Australia recorded a decrease (See Table 7.5). Namibia ranked 10 th out of 140 in terms of the 
road connectivity index, while Australia and New Zealand ranked 16 th and 56th out of 140 
countries in the world respectively.  
Table 7.5: Road quality and connectivity for the year 2018/2019 
Quality of roads 1-7 (best) Road connectivity index 0-100 (best) 
Countries 
Value out of 
7 
Score35 (out of 
100) 
Rank/140 Score (out of 100) Rank/140 
Namibia 5.1 68.2 28 92.8 10 
Australia 4.8 62.8 35 90.0 16 
New Zealand 4.7 61.3 39 70.1 56 
Source: Author (Global competitiveness report [Schwab, 2018]) 
7.8.1.1  Australia 
Australia has much in common with Namibia in terms of large landmass, a highly dispersed 
population, and the experience of remote and rural roads with low traffic levels (Fraser, 2011). 
As experienced in Namibia (see results in Chapter 5), insufficient funds and lack of available 
                                               
35  Scores are on a 0 to 100 scale, where 100 represents the optimal situation or frontier. The arrows indicate the 





revenue from traditional source of funding (public), especially for low-traffic roads, have also 
been experienced in Australia. The Australian diesel fuel excise has been in place since the 
1950s. It was introduced with the principal aim of contributing to road costs. Vehicle 
registration fees have also been in place before the introduction of the heavy vehicle road user 
charge in 1992.  
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) describes this charging instrument approach for 
road networks as opaque and blunt as it presents a limited relationship between network 
access and user charges. The explanation described the collection and distribution of charging 
to be inefficient, unfair, and unsustainable. The Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (2015) argues that users should be held accountable for at least a portion of the costs 
associated with the provision of the road network. Road pricing is believed to offer a platform 
of road use as part of the integrated transport system, to bring about environmental benefits 
and to possibly reduce congestion. Taking cognisance of these benefits, among others, the 
Council of Australian Government (COAG) believes that reforming the RUC offers 
opportunities to enhance the current system and make it more fair, sustainable, and efficient 
(Fraser, 2011). This is likely to bring about efficiency in asset use, which is a situation that 
called forth a reform as the described approach was found undesirable. Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia (2014) developed RUC reform principles as presented in Table 7.6.  
Table 7.6: Principles for Australian road pricing reforms 
Categories Descriptions 
Objectives The RUC reform scheme should provide: 
 A mechanism to sustainably fund additions to the transport network;  
 A mechanism to sustainably fund maintenance of the network; 
 A fairer allocation of costs of benefits in the transport market; 
 Funding stream security; and  
 An opportunity to improve network performance. 
Scope and 
pricing 
Road prices should be set so that the total revenue generated by direct charging matches the 
current total revenue collected from road users. Any future scheme should be structured in a 
way that does not discourage private sector investment to address Australia’s land transport 
infrastructure deficit.  
Revenue 
allocation 
Revenue generated through the scheme should be re-invested in the construction, 
maintenance, and operation of infrastructure to facilitate mobility, including public transport.  
Implementation A new RUCS should balance simplicity against the need to achieve complex reform 
objectives. If a scheme ultimately seeks to balance a range of objectives, then clear 
articulation and relative priority must be considered and priced accordingly. 
Potential impacts of new charging arrangements should be tested through pilot trials. 
Privacy Protecting the privacy of road users should be a central consideration in the design of the 
scheme. 
Technology Technology should be driven by scheme design, with final solutions to be developed through 
trials and competitive processes, including the flexibility to be delivered using a variety of 
technology solutions and allowing the market to determine the best approach. 






The RUCS in Australia underwent a reform a decade ago. The initial charges applied to HGVs 
were set through a cost recovery pricing model and based on historical cost (Australian 
Government, 2013). These user charges under discussion take the form of fixed annual 
registration charges and fuel taxes. The system managed by the NTC is referred to as the 
PAYGO model. Introduced in 1992, the hybrid model aimed to ensure that HGVs pay their 
share of marginal costs associated with the wear and tear of the road network resulting from 
their use of the network, as well as contributing to common costs that benefit all road users, 
including street lighting, rest bays, and signage (Australian Government, 2013).  
Along with addressing road infrastructure financing and investment decision making, the 
Australian government invested in good transportation policies, in particular road 
transportation shaped to deliver better information and incentives from both the demand and 
supply side. With a great focus on HGVs, COAG agreed to undertake a comprehensive long-
term road reform in 2007. The reform effort leaned heavily on the importance of infrastructure 
pricing and a case for change from the cost recovery pricing to a more direct form of charging 
(marginal cost pricing) that takes into account space and time. However, the COAG took 
cognisance of the dynamics associated with implementing marginal cost pricing options and 
identified the costs of the required technology and business system support as an impediment 
to the desired pricing option.  Eventually, in 2012, informed by a feasibility study, the reform 
took a broader scope to capture the calculation of prices, collection of charges, and the 
possibility of linking the use of revenue generated from road use to the provision of road 
infrastructure (Australian Government, 2013). From the supply side, the reform incorporated 








The Australian cost-allocation model aimed at recovering road expenditure associated with 
each vehicle class through a hybrid model of fuel excise and fixed annual charges. Revenue 
generated from access charges and diesel fuel charges are deducted from the road 
expenditure allocated to vehicle classes. The remaining expenditure thus forms the basis for 
setting the MDC, which, combined with the access charge, are wrapped up in the vehicle 
registration charges (Clough et al., 2008). The preferred charging model of the NTC has been 
that of mass-distance-location-based pricing, thus the NTC clearly indicated its motive of 
moving from the highly averaging charging system to a more accurate approach that reflects 
the costs of road use. 
Persistent efforts for accurate measures towards the use of the road network prompted the 
NTC to conduct a feasibility study on incremental pricing for heavy vehicles, which was 
completed in 2011 and implemented in 2014. The incremental pricing allows operators to carry 
additional mass above the national regulated limits on specific roads by paying extra road 
wear-and-tear costs to the councils or agencies of that specific road (NTC, 2009). The COAG 
introduced this initiative towards increasing productivity within the road sector and with the 
possibility of expanding its target on road spending (Fraser, 2011). This initiative serves as an 
important milestone for Australia towards developing a comprehensive mass-distance-
location-based charging scheme. The full implementation of the scheme is projected to 
replace the existing registration and fuel charges with the mass-distance-location-based 
Box 7.2: Australian cost-allocation approach 
 
As technologies evolve, more countries consider different charging and transport pricing reforms. 
The NTC uses the average road expenditure for the current budget year and the past two years in 
order to estimate the annual cost of road service provision. The NTC gathers data, including overall 
road network expenditure including capital and maintenance at all levels of government, to fully 
recover such costs within the period spent (Productivity Commission, 2006). This Australian cost-
allocation approach comprises three broader categories: 
 Cost allocation is based on the average level of road expenditure over three years minus 
39% deducted as amenity costs. 
 Costs are allocated to different vehicle classes as per road use as much as possible. 
 The residual costs are allocated to different vehicle classes by using a broad measure of 
road use in terms of VKT. 
 





charge on road users based on the vehicle’s mass as it travels the distance and location 
(RUCRG, 2009).  
Clough et al. (2008) propose that the common costs of each vehicle class should be estimated 
and Ramsey pricing should be employed to allocate costs to different vehicle classes in 
inverse proportion to the price elasticity of such vehicle types. In so doing, the roads agencies 
could recover costs with the least distortion of road use. In 2007, the NTC proposed an 
incremental pricing method that could be used to set charges to vehicles that exceed the 
regulated mass limit on each network. To determine the incremental pricing, the NTC 
compared PAYGO and lifecycle cost approaches to determine incremental costs and thus 
proposed a trial base of this approach. This approach, however, was criticised by the 
Austroads Pavement Technology Review Panel (APTRP, 2007), arguing that the trial 
approach may provide wrong incentives and possibly result in lighter charges for HGVs that 
create the greatest damage. To that effect, the NTC in its 2008 national incremental policy 
took broader initiatives, including migrating towards the preferred direct pricing of heavy and 
light vehicles to replace the former charging model. Notable initiatives include research and 
data collection that could inform setting direct pricing, developing tentative technology for a 
collection system, and investigating the reform of road management to facilitate the proposed 
direct pricing (Clough et al., 2008).   
Australia’s road pricing regime can provide important lessons for Namibia when reforming its 
RUCS. While applying trials on the commercial (heavy) vehicles, the reform could concurrently 
consider introducing future direct charges for light vehicles. The overall lesson from the 
Australian road pricing regime is that road pricing should be established based on charges 
that are linked to network use. This requires a multi-approach to investigate advanced direct 
charging mechanisms feasible for the Namibian environment. 
7.8.1.2  New Zealand 
The discussion of and emphasis on the potential of RUC to generate revenue prompted 
governments and roads agencies into action, and adoption across the globe has been based 
on the desire to reduce externalities. New Zealand employed the PAYGO approach as a cost-
allocation model on road use attributed to different expenditure per vehicle categories as a 
base for setting RUC.  
Cost differentiations are based on traffic, including damage to road pavement mainly attributed 






Clough et al. (2008) describe New Zealand’s road cost-allocation model as follows:  
 Total annual expenditure for the national road programme (both local and state 
highways) separates them into different vehicle class categories based on gross 
vehicle weight or axle loadings. 
 Deducts from annual expenditure the fixed revenues from local government rates and 
licence fees; thereby offsetting them against fixed cost components across all work 
categories.  
 Allocates the residual costs across revenue bases to reflect the number of vehicles 
and to forecast the VKT by each vehicle class, attribute strength and wear costs to 
heavy vehicles, and then allocate the remaining costs to all vehicles, mostly light 
vehicles, which will be collected through a combination of RUC and fuel taxes.  
 
Box 7.3: Technology innovation in road pricing reforms: The New Zealand experience 
 
In the 1970s, New Zealand introduced a variable mass-distance based charging system. The RUC 
apply to all heavy vehicles with a gross vehicle mass over 3.5 tonnes and all light vehicles powered 
by diesel or any other untaxed fuel (Kirk & Levinson, 2016). The road users are required to purchase 
a licence in a set of 1 000 km increments to use the network. All vehicles subscribed under the 
scheme must be fitted with distance recorders for reliable recordkeeping of distance travelled. All 
vehicles must display a paper-based licence on the inside of the vehicle’s windscreen. In 2008, the 
New Zealand government undertook a review of the RUC and made recommendations, including 
the need to improve the revenue-collection approach. Issues associated with the traditional 
approach include evasion and tampering with odometers and hudometers. Moreover, compliance 
costs were found to have a significant impact on users because of the need to purchase paper 
licenses.  
The review received interest from both public and private entities. The EROAD company 
approached the New Zealand government with a proposal to develop an electronic road user 
charging system (eRUCS). In 2009, the government approved a cellular-based vehicle tracking and 
fleet management system that enables users to purchase RUC licenses online. Road users expend 
an amount of $80 per month plus an additional $5 transaction fee for licence payments. The benefits 
reaped from the system are twofold; firstly, the vendor generates revenue from the vehicle tracking 
and fleet management, and secondly, the electronic payment approach has reduced the amount of 
paper administration the government associated with licence transactions. The eRUCS attracted 
approximately 15% of HGV users in 2011 – an increase from less than 1% at the inception of the 
system in September 2009.  





The principal advantage of this New Zealand system lies in its ability to allocate charges to 
vehicles according to their overall use of the network and maintenance incurred by the 
authorities due to the use of roads. It is a charging approach that added weight to the New 
Zealand RUC. For the past decade, the developed world has been marching toward the use 
of technology and envisaged charging users based on weight, distance travelled, time, and 
location associated with a journey. While recommended and utilised in countries such as the 
Netherlands, the USA, Sweden, and Australia (RUCRG, 2009), it is quite a process to install 
the appropriate technologies in vehicles, which takes even longer for light vehicles, and mostly 
depends on the incentives in place.  
Technology such as GPS or cellular-based systems could potentially serve as a platform for 
Namibian MDC. Moreover, such technology could further inform the reformed RUCS in setting 
road pricing on time and location; for instance, rate differentials for particular road types and 
different sections of the road, while serving other objectives such as managing safety issues.  
7.9  PROPOSED ROAD PRICING FRAMEWORK FOR THE NAMIBIAN NATIONAL 
ROAD NETWORK 
From the international experience discussed in this study and the Namibian RUCS, a reform 
of the current charging system could bring about charges closer to the accurate use of the 
road network. A trial of potential technologies could be a solution to the current HGV 
(travelling) MDC in Namibia. The trial could be done on a voluntary basis and the RFA could 
offer incentives to drivers willing to participate in the trial. The idea as outlined in the Namibian 
Transport Policy is to ensure that HGVs pay their fair share of using the road network. The 
results in Section 7.5 of this chapter demonstrate that HGVs impose greater costs on the road 
infrastructure and incur greater environmental costs as compared to light vehicles. Reforming 
the RUC could assist the RFA to ensure that these crucial external costs form part of the RUC. 
Dealing with the issue of equity, an investigation to introduce toll roads could be lodged 
possibly in one of the appropriate national corridors or other roads to ensure that light vehicles 
also pay for the congestion they impose on other users. This view is supported by industry 
and user representatives at various forums held by the RA toward the formulation of the 
Namibian Transport Policy: “The representative supports the investigation of toll roads on PPP 
basis as an addition to the current charging instrument in place” (MWT, 2017:10). 
Therefore, the review could examine potential options of road pricing toward revenue 






Light vehicles (weight ≤3500 kg): Enhance charges for light vehicles, to bring about a 
system that will bring various improvements to the current status quo. In combination with 
current charges, consideration of tolls road on a PPP basis is an alternative that is worth 
exploring. 
Heavy vehicles (weight ≥3500 kg): In combination with flat charges, introduce technology 
considerations toward location, time, distance-based charges for HGVs, and possibly 
introducing a CO2 tax to be charged via fuel levy, could serve as alternative. Currently, both 
options of charging for light and heavy vehicles recognise the current charging system and its 
sound principles; however, there is room for improvement.  
Integrating the aptitude to use technology-based distance measurements could offer further 
efficiency improvements within the system. Better RUC will be designed to charge vehicles 
per kilometre driven based on factors such as VKT, amount of emissions, vehicle mass, 
accident costs, congestion, and the type of road used, for instance standard design to 
withstand heavy vehicles (Atkinson, 2019). Therefore, the most efficient way to address 
externalities is by incorporating costs associated with network access into road pricing.  
Figure 7.4 provides a framework for possible charging mechanisms for private vehicles and 
commercial vehicles. This framework could serve as a solution to the road financing in 
Namibia and could be applied by following the two-part tariff approach recommended in the 
literature (Rothengatter, 2003; Andreson & Thompson, 2014), namely a charging part that 
could cover the marginal costs of using the road network and another part (flat charges) that 
could cover the capital costs. In addition, a financial transfer could subsidise the road sector 
for the first three to five years of the RUC reform trajectory.  
It is worth noting that designing a pricing scheme could be very complex and policymakers 
must ensure that they consider every possible technology that could send price signals to 
change road-user behaviours. International experience (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 
2014) has shown that RUCS reform when pricing models are designed in consideration of the 
following elements may offer a solution to the Namibian road sector: 
1. The time of day the road user accesses the network; 
2. Distance travelled (space consumed); 
3. Location (urban, trunk, main, and district roads); 
4. Associated externalities (for instance, climate, air pollution, congestion, noise, 
accidents, etc.); and  





The roads agencies and policymakers should consider these elements when reforming the 
Namibian RUCS in order to economically recover the full costs of road expenditure from those 
who make use of the network in an equitable manner. Each or a combination of these elements 
could be considered to deliver a rational price on road usage while addressing specific 
objectives such as revenue generation and/or reducing externalities. In addition to the current 
instruments, the reformed RUCS could explore tolling charging schemes. A toll system could 
be installed to collect road-user fees for accessing a section of roads in an identified network 
of the Namibian roads. Tolls could be established at a section or network where the demand 
for the road service could be found to be inelastic. This could be in urban areas or national 
corridors; on whichever road considerations for estimating economic cost or incidence of the 
charge should be a priority. Each section or network identified could be priced by applying 
price differentiation as service costs differ at various locations. The revenue generated could 
primarily be spent on maintaining the particular corridor. Revenue that is invested back into a 
particular road where it is generated appears as an improvement evident to the motorists and 
surrounding community. A tolling system may have merit within the Namibian context in terms 














Figure 7.5 presents hypothetical corridor pricing that could be considered for a reformed 
RUCS pricing regime. In this hypothetical trunk road, four or more sections could be sampled 
based on location boundaries, strategic road interception, and estimated AADT based on 
vehicle types. The charges could be based on a per-kilometre basis or accessed sections in 
a journey.  
 
Figure 7.5: National road network hypothetical toll stations 
Source: Author  
 
In the Namibian context, the RFA has called for the investigation of the feasibility of tolling of 
roads in the country. Experience from the literature indicates that equity considerations in 
terms of price for local residents and commuters should be resolved. Moreover, there must be 
an alternative route as an option for motorists. One caveat with the Namibian road network 





however, discussed that administrative costs are likely to be kept low when the traffic volume 
on a toll-targeted road section is 10 000 or more vehicle per day (See Section 5.2.2.1). 
7.10  SUMMARY 
This chapter aimed to review the RUCS towards funding the Namibian national road network 
by drawing lessons from Australia and New Zealand. The Namibian effort towards financing 
the road network both in terms of road pricing and institutional arrangement are thus highly 
praiseworthy in its own context. Moreover, there is still room for improvement, in particular in 
consideration of a system (RUCS) that has the capacity of raising the needed revenues whilst 
providing additional benefits such as reducing environmental and society externalities, more 
efficient use of the transportation infrastructure, and sending pricing signals to the road users.  
There is a need to review the current RUCS and possibly conduct a feasibility study on 
introducing road pricing that varies with distance, space, and time of network access. Indeed, 
there are lessons to learn from the developed world, in particular countries such as Australia 
and New Zealand that are faced with an expansive road network, yet have an advanced road 
sector in terms of road pricing. This chapter concludes by calling for the reform of the RUCS 
in Namibia. Moreover, there is a need to determine the optimal level of the two-part tariff 
charge approach. Furthermore, the identification of sections of the network for tolling could 
establish the viability of toll roads in Namibia. Finally, there is a need to conduct a trial in order 
to establish the relevant technologies applicable to revamp the MDC that seek to internalise 
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CHAPTER 8:  
ROAD FUNDING AND FINANCING: LESSONS LEARNT AND THE WAY 
FORWARD  
8.1 ROAD FUNDING: THE INTERNATIONAL DILEMMA 
Many countries are faced with a shortage of resources for the maintenance of their road 
networks – a situation that has led to an ever-increasing backlog of deferred maintenance, 
especially in developing countries. For many decades roads have been funded from the 
consolidated budget and had to compete with equally important sectors such as the education 
and health sectors. The danger of funding roads from the consolidated budget is that for 
various political reasons the government is likely to pump funding into developing new roads 
as opposed to maintaining existing roads. Many governments, especially in Africa, resolved 
to rescue the road sector by establishing second-generation road funds in order to 
commercialise the road sector and bringing it to the market place. Towards that, governments 
have put together several policies, legal frameworks, and charging instruments to bring about 
road pricing that is justifiable on the grounds of economically efficient pricing. The user-pays 
principle seems to have taken centre stage of these policies as the best option and as an act 
that governs the roads agencies toward economic efficiency in funding roads. Second-
generation road funds or governments have decided on how to charge the road users, and 
thus established appropriate RUC instruments. This intention of making those who use the 
roads pay for their usage was intended to solve the challenge faced by many developing 
countries on how to fund their roads. Somewhat implicit in implementing these second-
generation road funds is the confidence that the RF, based on the user-pays principle, will 
deliver sufficient funds for the road sector. 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 6, economic efficiency implies that road prices are set equal 
to the SRMC. In so doing, the agencies must ensure that road users, as the consumers of the 
scarce resource (roads), pay for their use of roads. The issue of setting RUC equal to the 
SRMC is that under circumstances of low demand and excess capacity, the efficient prices do 
not cover capital investments that must be earned by the roads agencies, as rightly explained 
by Kahn (1988). For instance, in a developed country with more users, the demand for road 
services is likely to be higher. The literature explains that when internalising external costs, 
congestion charges alone could generate significant revenue. In addition, most of these 
countries fall under the high-income category, which could be interpreted based on 
affordability and the willingness to pay for their road consumption. In contrast, most developing 





these countries are categorised as low to medium income with a low Gini coefficient. This 
implies that if charges are set higher, the poor majority who may be trying to make ends meet 
could be affected negatively by high tariffs.  
Setting RUC at an economically efficient price varies across the globe and is a complex 
exercise, which is also time consuming and requires a large budget. Among charging 
instruments for road use, the fuel levy is quite sensitive to many national objectives. For 
instance, the major issue has been setting the fuel levy on par with inflation. This challenge 
has been more acute in developing countries, where the fuel levy has been the highest 
contributor to the revenue generated from RUC. Therefore, year in year out, roads agencies 
are faced with a funding gap, which puts immense pressure on the government fiscus. The 
argument in the literature and transportation policies has been in support of efficient charges 
and that users should pay for their consumption when using a road network. This concept, 
however, seems not to have been properly understood by many planners. Therefore, on the 
journey towards implementation of this principle, there is a need for researches to be more 
scientific about how road agencies should set RUC or tariffs. Roads agencies need to use the 
tools at their disposal, including the HDM-4 currently used for maintenance strategies and 
determining road network investment needs. 
8.2 NAMIBIA: COUNTRY PROFILE  
Namibia is situated within the southern region of the African continent. According to the World 
Bank (2016), Namibia is categorised as an upper-middle income country, with a GDP 
established at US$10.3 billion and a per capita income of US$4 140 (N$55 114). The country 
has a total land area of approximately 825 614 km² (a population density of approximately 2.6 
person per km²). Namibia has a relatively large national road network of approximately 48 399 
km that serves a vehicle population of approximately 371 281 registered motor vehicles (RA, 
2016), about 266 673 foreign vehicles and a population of 2.3 million inhabitants (NSA, 2017). 
Approximately 52% of its inhabitants reside in the rural areas of Namibia’s 14 regions. This 
presents a need for better transport connectivity and improved welfare of the citizens. The 
implication of funding an extensive road network that serves few users is that the network 
requires more funds to maintain the existing network; not to mention the development of new 
roads to ensure connectivity and better services to its citizens. In Namibia, the potential for a 
self-funded road sector is not yet being fully exploited. Among other constraints to insufficient 
revenue generated from the RUCS is the inability of RUC to meet the national road network 
expenses. Namibia established a second-generation road fund supported by earmarked 





generation road funds is that they create the impression that all the revenue generated from 
the RUC should be sufficient to cover the full expenditure of the road network. 
8.3 INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH ROAD FUNDING AND ROAD TARIFFS 
There is a common understanding in both developed and developing countries on charging 
for road use. The argument across the globe is to ensure that the users of roads should fund 
the maintenance and provision of the required infrastructure. However, because continents 
and countries are unique, the application of charges differs per continent and per countries, 
although similarities can be traced. For instance, each country charges a tax or levy on fuel 
sold per litre. In addition to the fuel levy are other taxes and charges (see Chapter 5).  
The theoretical economic principle that governs setting RUC is the user-pays principle, which 
is justifiable by holding accountable users of the network to pay the full costs of road provision 
and use. The price set at the SRMC aims to internalise the negative external costs imposed 
by the user at the point of using the network. Attempts to estimate these values has seen the 
European Commission committing resources and funding several studies to develop 
methodologies (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1). Due the complexity and limitations associated 
with setting tariffs or charges at the SRMC of road use (see Chapter 6), most roads agencies 
and governments have, however, opted to deviate from the so-called first-best road pricing 
and resolved to set tariffs at the second-best road pricing. The latter, when followed, allows 
the agencies to price road services by recovering costs from the users while minimising market 
distortions (see Chapter 7).  
8.4 RESEARCH FOCUS 
This dissertation sought to address three objectives, which examined the issues surrounding 
the funding and financing of the national road network in Namibia. The research aimed to 
investigate funding and financing of the national road network in Namibia. The research 
focused on the RUCS and how the charging instruments have been utilised to generate funds 
and what charging principles and planning tools the roads agencies use to inform the setting 
of road pricing. The following chapters addressed the research objectives:  
8.4.1 Chapter 5  
In this chapter, the researcher evaluated the relationship between the RGR and its allocation 
towards national road network expenditure and related these to international standards. This 





8.4.2 Chapter 6  
In Chapter 6, the researcher determined the methodology to estimate the road-use cost based 
on the efficiency principle of SRMC and compared the marginal costing of road use to the 
average cost pricing of road use. This chapter laid the foundation for the second objective by 
estimating the MEC of road use, which were further utilised to determine the implications of 
implementing the theoretical economic principle of user charging.  
8.4.3 Chapter 7  
In Chapter 7, the financial implications of implementing MSC as a charging principle for road 
use were determined. The estimated MEC were compared to the fuel levy (as a proxy of the 
current charging instruments) per vehicle per kilometre on D0872, M0052 and T0108 roads. 
The researcher explored the possible second-best RUC based on the circumstance 
surrounding the Namibian road pricing towards addressing the funding challenges. To that 
effect, the researcher examined the government’s efforts towards road pricing and compared 
Namibian road pricing to Australia and New Zealand in order to draw possible lessons. This 
chapter addressed the second and third objectives.  
To achieve the objectives, the research used secondary data and explored the HDM-4 model, 
to estimate the MEC of road use. Other secondary information sourced from roads agencies 
and relevant line ministries included financial reports, Acts, organisations’ websites, published 
articles, budget speeches and documents, strategies, development plans, newspaper articles, 
and policy documents, which were found relevant to further support the analysis. These tools 
provided an in-depth understanding of the road pricing, revenue generation, allocation, and 
expenditure of the national road network. For instance, the study used the HDM-4 model to 
estimate the MEC of road use, which have mostly been overlooked by several studies in 
developing countries and in sub-Saharan African, particularly Namibia, which makes the 
investigation conducted by this study more fact-finding than previous studies.   
Furthermore, previous studies focused on examining pricing for urban roads (Ferrai, 2010; 
Hau, 1992; Cavallaro, Giaretta & Nocera, 2018) towards reducing urban congestion and 
environmental risks. Other studies focused on pricing the national road network using 
experimental models (De Borger & Proost, 2012; De Palma & Lindsey, 2011). This study 
focused on the Namibian national road network managed by the RA and used data used from 
this authority for maintenance plans and investment needs, which provided base estimates for 





Apart from providing a methodological base for estimating the marginal costs of road use in 
Namibia, the study also initiated a new dimension to the debate and the controversial topic of 
efficient pricing in developing countries, particularly in Namibia as a country with an expansive 
road network and few users. This study thus contributes to the existing body of knowledge 
relating the supply side of funding an expansive road network with few users (a small vehicle 
population). This is different from previous studies, which mostly examined the issue of 
expansive networks but with a reasonable number of users that could possibly fund the road 
network, depending on the policies and charging instruments employed. This study provides 
possible benefits that roads agencies could reap by utilising the available tools (such as HDM-
4); not only for making informed decisions towards price setting that covers the externalities 
of road use but they also present possibilities for a system that could potentially send clear 
signals to the users of the total price they ought to pay when using the road network.   
8.5 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
8.5.1 Evaluation of National Road Network Funding in Namibia: The Curse of Efficient 
Road User Charges 
The road funding discussed in Chapter 5 confirmed that Namibia finances its national road 
network from two main funding sources. These sources are (i) revenue generated through the 
RUCS, which accrues to the RFA and (ii) revenue generated from general tax, which forms 
part of the SRF.  
In addressing the first objective, the VKT on the national road network for the year 2015/2016 
and revenue generated from the RUC amounting to N$2.095 million for the fiscal year 
2015/2016 were used to determine road-user spending per kilometre on national road 
network, ceteris paribus. The results indicated that users spend N$0.54 per kilometre on RUC, 
which accrues to the RFA. At the broader level, when considering revenue generated from 
other taxes, approximately N$0.70 was spent per kilometre. Therefore, the total spending per 
kilometre on the national road network amounted to N$1.24 for the financial year 2015/2016. 
This implies that during 2015/2016, the allocation from the SRF outweighed the revenue 
generated from the RUC. 
The RFA presents high transparency in allocating RGR towards the preservation of the road 
network. This places Namibia among countries with a high dedication of 80% and above 
towards road expenditure, together with the USA and Switzerland when compared to 
international standards (see Figure 5.10). While revenue generated from the road users is 
largely allocated back to the preservation of the road network (0.96 ratio), the researcher 





other means of financing itself. This research supports previous literature that pricing roads at 
an economically efficient price could be a solution to road funding in Namibia.   
8.5.2 The Use of the HDM-4 to Determine the Marginal External Costs of Road Use 
Chapter 6 explored estimating the external costs of road use for Namibia using the HDM-4 
model and discussed issues surrounding implementing the MSC concept. The chapter used 
the HDM-4 Workspace obtained from the RA and sampled three case studies from the national 
road network representing each road category (district [D0872], main [M0052], and trunk 
[T0108]) to demonstrate the applicability of the HDM-4 model to estimate the MEC of road 
use. The results indicated that heavy vehicles imposed the highest costs in terms of 
infrastructure damage and environmental costs when using the network. Overall, light vehicles 
contribute the most to congestion and accident costs. When average costing is applied as a 
pricing approach, the results indicate that heavy vehicles impose approximately 96% of the 
costs and light vehicle impose approximately 4% when traveling on D0872 road. The results 
yielded similar results as for heavy vehicles, with approximately 97% and approximately 3% 
for light vehicles when travelling on M0052 and T0108 roads. When applying marginal costing, 
the results indicated that heavy vehicles impose approximately 98% of costs and 
approximately 2% by light vehicles when traveling on D0872 road. On the M0052 road, the 
results indicated approximately 97% and 3% imposed by heavy and light vehicles respectively. 
The results for T0108 road indicate that heavy vehicles impose approximately 81% and 
approximately 19% by light vehicles. The variation that appears when charging per marginal 
costs is associated with congestion costs. On D0872 and M0052 roads, the congestion is not 
quite significant and the light vehicles’ cost contributions were thus found to be low. However, 
on T0108 road, the results presented a traceable percentage of congestion imposed by light 
vehicles, thus increasing the cost contribution from 2% (D0872 road) and 3% (M0052 road) to 
approximately 19% on T0108 road.   
The results of this chapter could allow roads agencies to take stock of the progress made 
towards implementing the user-pays principle and identify options for further internalisation of 
road transport external costs. Based on the findings, road users impose some negative 
externalities when using the road network and it would make economic sense to internalise 
such costs into the RUC. 
One possible reason why roads agencies do not pursue MSC pricing is attributed to the fact 
that measuring marginal externality costs varies with time and space, which makes it a 
challenging exercise that is time consuming and requires an extensive budget. While marginal 





that most Namibian roads are defined as low demand yet exhibit excess capacity. The existing 
MDC attempted to solve the challenges associated with charging heavy vehicles according to 
distance travelled; however, the current MDC is a blunt instrument that does not adjust 
charges according to weight, time, and location. The marginal pricing approach in the 
Namibian context (expansive road network serving few users) might not necessarily raise the 
revenue required for the investment and maintenance of the road network. Therefore, there is 
a need for an alternative approach to marginal pricing.  
8.6 REFORMING THE ROAD USER CHARGE SYSTEM IN NAMIBIA: LESSONS FROM 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
The findings presented in Chapter 7 addressed the second and third objectives. The fuel levy 
and MDC were used as a proxy to determine the revenue generated from the three sampled 
cases per vehicle per kilometre. The MEC estimated in Chapter 6 represented the cost 
imposed on each sampled road per vehicle kilometre. A comparison of the marginal cost 
pricing with the current RUC findings confirmed that the revenue generated from the fuel levy 
exceeded the MEC of road use per vehicle per kilometre (see Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3). The 
researcher contributed to the ongoing debate (see, for instance, Van Rensburg & Krygsman, 
2016; Krygsman, 2018) by arguing that the fuel levy may not be regarded as a reliable source 
in the long run, especially with fuel-efficient, hybrid, and electric-powered vehicles (Van 
Rensburg & Krygsman, 2015).  
The findings on the hypothetical trunk road demonstrated the implications of setting charges 
at the efficient price (SRMC) in Namibia. Section 7.2.2 (see Table 7.4) indicated that it costs 
the RA approximately N$6 million to preserve the 117.76 km stretch of trunk road; however, 
RUC set at SRMC could only generate a total revenue of approximately N$1 million. In order 
to fund the Namibian low-volume roads, roads agencies should seek an alternative to the first-
best road price, the so-called second-best pricing.  
Towards addressing the third objective and exploring the second-best pricing approach for 
Namibia, the study assessed the current Namibian RUCS regarding reforming the current 
system in order to internalise MEC where possible. Taking cognisance of the efforts made 
towards implementing the recommended user-pays principle, the researcher designed an 
RUC framework that could form the basis for the roads agencies to launch investigations 
towards reforming the current charging system (see Figure 7.4). Moreover, the research 
leaned on countries such as Australia and New Zealand, which are described by expansive 
land space similar to Namibia and which have successfully reviewed their RUCS, particularly 





for exploring some charging mechanisms that foresee being sustainable in the long run in 
terms of revenue generation whilst reducing externalities. Reforming the current system with 
the focus on distinguishing suitable charges for light and heavy vehicles to account for their 
use of the road network per vehicle per kilometre according to time and location is a lesson 
that Namibia can learn from Australia and New Zealand.  
Given the findings presented in this study, it is evident that the Namibian road sector is faced 
by the dilemma of an expansive road network to be funded by a small vehicle population. 
Interventions should be directed at exploring long-run sustainable revenue-generation 
alternatives from the current highest contributor, namely the fuel levy. Collaborating efforts 
from both the public and private sectors could be another step towards road financing 
solutions.  
8.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR A ROAD FUNDING POLICY 
The results of this study demonstrated that it is possible for roads agencies to utilise tools such 
as the HDM-4, which is currently used only for planning, to be extended to estimating the costs 
of road use per vehicle per road categories. This would further inform transport planners and 
policymakers on setting charges that are closer to the road use. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
this study laid the foundation for reforming the current RUCS to consider internalising the 
negative externalities of road use. By internalising the external costs of road use, roads 
agencies could generate more revenue while at the same time reducing air pollution, putting 
in place safety measures, and managing demand. A holistic policy approach would help the 
roads agencies and the government to set prices that send the right signals to road users, 
thus road users would only consider taking journeys when necessary.  
8.8 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research investigated the revenue generated from the RUCS and allocated to roads 
agencies. Although the RFA allocates funds to the local authorities, there are no records of 
the network length of urban roads maintained. The estimates of amounts spent by users per 
kilometre were limited to kilometres travelled on the national road network. It is recommended 
that the RMS be extended to local authorities for planning for investment needs and 
maintenance strategies. This would enable future studies to conduct in-depth research that 
includes urban road networks. 
The RMS’s supporting systems and tools utilised to facilitate the efficient management of the 





explored further to provide details on users’ willingness to pay for safety, time savings, and 
reduced VOC.  
Road funding and financing pathways require a system that is kept on par with market trends 
and evolving technology. This requires further studies on sustainable charging mechanisms 
for each vehicle class, be it light or heavy, used for private or commercial purposes. 
Furthermore, integrated transportation is necessary to ensure that users have a variety of 
options for moving goods or traveling from one place to another. 
Another area of research could be attributed to privacy and human rights. The literature has 
expressed concern with regards to the privacy and human rights issues (Glaister & Graham, 
2004) associated with recording and tracing vehicle movements. In order to conduct a 
successful RUCS reform, research should be conducted to obtain public views on using 
technologies and devices that record individuals and their travelling information.  
Equity is another concern that deserves analysis in terms of the effect that the envisaged 
RUCS reform could have on different classes of road users. Experiences from the literature 
indicated that RUC might be a disadvantage to users. A detailed study on the macroeconomic 
assessment impact that transport prices would have on the whole economy is needed. In the 
same vein, a detailed study on the optimal level of RUC and revenue projection from each 
instrument given traffic demand by 2025 can be undertaken. To that effect, the roads agencies 
should strive to collect data on travel demands for the whole network, VOC, motorists’ value 
of time, traffic speeds, elasticity of travel demand, and a thorough analysis of external costs 
of road use covering all components.   
8.9 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This dissertation recommends necessary interventions for the enhancement of road pricing 
that could subsequently lead to an improvement of funding and financing of the road network. 
Efforts should be directed at reviewing the current RUCS in particular to make a distinction 
between light and heavy vehicles, as well as available technologies that could be utilised to 
charge users per kilometre. There are benefits to revisiting the current approach to road 
pricing. The following points are of specific concern for further research:  
 Roads agencies should explore utilising the HDM-4 model, to estimate the values of 
external costs on a marginal basis that would be of great benefit in internalising the 
external costs of road use when setting charges. 
 Priority areas should be directed towards investigating possible charging instruments 





externalities by charging users on kilometres driven based on distance driven, amount 
of pollution emitted, motor vehicle weight, congestion, and the type of road used.  
 Introducing the possibility of vehicle owners utilising on-board distance measurement 
units presents a better alternative to odometer readings. It will, however, be unwise to 
discard the current system that is well understood by users in pursuit of improvements 
based on untested substitutes.  
 Roads agencies, the RFA in particular, should consider available technologies towards 
automation of (travelling) MDC. The RFA should offer incentives for drivers to 
voluntarily participate in a trial that could indicate the feasibility of opted technologies 
under Namibia’s specific operating conditions. Automating MDC, using technology to 
log kilometres travelled, and charging vehicles on accurate distance could possibly 
result in collecting greater revenue from hybrid and electric vehicles in the near future.  
 Examples of reforming RUC, in particular utilising several experimental trials on 
implementing charges on kilometres driven by heavy vehicles, should be studied from 
other countries, including New Zealand, Australia, the USA, Germany, and the 
Netherlands.  
 Further investigation into the feasibility of tolls could be conducted and trials could be 
carried out on a PPP basis.  
 Namibia needs a minimum provision of infrastructure independent of actual use 
patterns because this is essential. This implies that in the short run, the government 
should continue to support the road sector from consolidated revenue, as is the case 
while reforming the current RUCS.  
The overall message from this study is to ensure adequate funding that will enable the roads 
agencies to preserve the great asset (roads) that would continuously place Namibia on the 
map for having a quality road network ranked number one in sub-Saharan Africa and 28th out 
of 140 by the Global competitiveness report (Schwab, 2018).  
Road pricing often does not take externalities into account and this is a huge oversight 
associated with developing countries. Moreover, it is a fact that there are negative externalities 
associated with the use of the road network that both supply and demand of roads should take 
cognisance of when planning for network investment or when planning for a journey. Failure 
to price the value of time spent on a congested road, accident and environmental risks, as 
well as damage imposed on infrastructure when using the road network result in false signals 
to the users of the network, which may lead to more damage to the network as drivers might 
end up making unnecessary trips. For an expansive road network, Namibia could draw 





and New Zealand underwent RUCS reforms towards implementing charges by distance and 
weight that could replace the fuel levy, given the fast-moving market of hybrid and electric 
vehicles. Therefore, it is wise to put in place charging mechanisms with the ability to charge 
users according to their overall use of the network. Both Australia and New Zealand’s reforms 
yielded great RUCS reforms with successful results in terms of road pricing.  
Lastly, consultation with users and educating them on well-maintained roads, as well as great 
transparency of the revenue generated from road use and its allocation, would serve as a 
basic motivation for users to do their part and willingly welcome reforms.  
8.10 CONCLUSION 
Road funding and financing constraints are attributable to the policies and institutional 
frameworks in place. Furthermore, roads agencies are not subjected to rigorous market 
discipline. Road expenditure is financed depending on the employed mechanisms, mostly 
RUCS supported by general tax revenue, as is the case in Namibia. This study showed that 
insufficient funding for road networks is governed by several aspects, including lack of clear 
road pricing that could send signals to both supply and demand, as well as the huge disparities 
that appear between land space and the number of users to fund an expansive network. The 
findings suggest that in addition to promoting institutional arrangements for the road sector, 
getting the price right could be a solution to road funding and financing.  
With respect to road pricing for a national road network, setting the “right” price equal to 
economically efficient SRMC is one of the major challenges that face roads agencies. Several 
shortcomings associated with implementing the theoretical pricing concept of MSC are 
thoroughly deliberated in the literature, including the complexities of undertaking such an 
exercise. Gathering necessary data is quite time consuming and requires an extensive budget. 
MEC are situation based and location specific, which makes it difficult to translate the concept 
into practical use. This study demonstrated the importance of the HDM-4, in estimating the 
externalities costs of road use. The MEC estimated for Namibia could form the basis for 
internalising external costs of road use into road pricing. Moreover, the objectives of reducing 
road externalities could easily be achieved when the value associated with such externalities 
per vehicle per kilometre is known.  
This study compared the efforts made by the government of Namibia, in particular the RFA, 
to charge users for their use of the road network towards implementing the user-pays principle 
according to international standards. The Namibian government has put in place noteworthy 
institutional arrangements that seem to serve as a benchmark for other countries in sub-





pricing, funding, and financing. There is, however, much room for improvement, especially 
when it comes to implementing the user-pays principle. The RUC framework designed in this 
study could therefore be a starting point to lodging an investigation towards reforming the 
current system. 
Lessons learned from the current RUCS indicate that efforts towards the implementation of 
the user-pays principle and revisiting the achievement of the goals and targets of the RUCS 
could yield results. This requires the efficient pricing and internalisation of MEC to be 
accounted in the Transportation Policy, pricing, strategy, and investment needs. The biggest 
shortcoming of all remains the translation of policies and strategies into actual action in a 
timely manner within a constrained budget, which will require political and user advocacy. 
There is therefore a need to gather the necessary data, which could methodologically be 
translated into calculating the external costs of road use and the application of HDM-4 to 
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Appendix C: Spending per kilometre (given the budget and VKT per year) 
 
𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
Revenue generate from RUCS
VKT per year
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 =
Budget funded by RFA
VVKT per year
 
*At the broader level = comprises total revenue generated inside and outside the RUCS, as 






Appendix D: Estimating the Marginal External Costs of road use: A worked 
example 
 
This annex depends on a case study sampled from the trunk paved road of the national road 
network using the road pricing and policies developed in Chapter 6 to estimate the MEC of 
road use in order to ensure that the external costs of road use are considered when setting or 
determining RUC. Illustrations made here reflect Case Study C: Trunk road. 




Box D.1: Methods for estimating the Marginal External Costs 
 
HDM-4 analysis 
Requires a calibrated workspace to the local environment and updated data inputs. Define a series of maintenance 
strategies (see Table D.1) in order to define the optimal NPV. It is crucial to ensure that the value of ESAL is 
assigned to each vehicle representative. Run an analysis twice: full traffic as measured and with an additional 
vehicle (this is merely to measure the impact an additional vehicle has on the infrastructure, on other network 
users in terms of congestion and accidents, and on the environment). In principle, the marginal cost of an 
additional vehicle could be determined by the difference between the NPV of the two actions (see Table D.1).   
 
Steps for each component of MEC:  
(i) MIC:  
Determine the difference between the NPV (see Box D.1) as obtained from the HDM-4 run. 
Determine the marginal cost of users by taking into account the sampled road section length, 
the ESAL, and AADT per vehicle representative. Table D.2 presents the average roughness 



















Figure D.1: Average roughness by year 
Source: Author
Case Study A                                                                                                   Case Study B 
  






Table D.2: HDM-4 net present value for the International Roughness Index = 2.22 m/km (2019) 
Source: HDM-4 Output (Own calculation) 
 
(ii) MCC 
From the HDM-4 output, estimate the net time loss of defined actions (see Box D.1); that is 
the free speed-flow difference. Determine the time loss, considering the 21.48 PCSE, 117.76 
length (km), and the time value per hour (an assumption of N$5 per hour).  
Table D.3: Calculating a congestion levy based on speed-flow relationship 
(1) 














Time loss cause to an 
additional vehicle 
(min) 
(6)   
Levy per 
N$/km 
3 114 6.790191 0.057661 
3 115 6.792371 0.05768 
Source: Author’s calculation (Blauwens et al., 2012:410) 
 
(iii) MAC 
Estimate the accident costs per casualty, including fatal, injury, and damage-only costs. 
Determine the annual accident costs taking into account the accident rates (in number per 100 
million vehicle kilometres) for the wide two-lane road for paved trunk and paved main roads, 
as well as a standard two-lane road for main district road as obtained from the HDM-4 run. 
Estimate the accident costs per casualties by multiplying the total accident cost with the 
accident rate per 100 million for each. 
Table D.4: Components of accident costs (2011 value and price) 
Cost per casualty: N$ 
 Accident rates Costs base year 2011  
 Fatal  1 023 650   
 Injury 159 350   
 Damage only  35 270   
Vehicle classes Fatal cost per veh. Injury cost per veh. 
Damage cost  
per veh. 
Total marginal costs 
per veh-km 
4x4 0.00094 0.00055 0.00445 0.00594 
Articulated truck 0.00027 0.00016 0.00128 0.00171 
Bus 0.00001 0.00001 0.00007 0.00009 
Heavy truck 0.00017 0.00010 0.00080 0.00107 
Medium car 0.00145 0.00084 0.00682 0.00911 
Mini-bus 0.00024 0.00014 0.00111 0.00148 
Total 0.00309 0.00179 0.01454 0.01942 
Source: Accident rates, RA (2018), accident costs per vehicle (author’s calculation) 
Vehicle classes AADT ESAL 
ESAL % of 
marginal cost-
veh/km-day 
Aggregate cost per 
veh/day 
Marginal cost per 
veh-km (N$) 
4x4 954 0.02 0% 1.05636E-05 2.113E-07 
Articulated truck 275 7.1 56% 0.003750076 0.026626 
Bus 15 2.3 18% 0.001214813 0.002794 
Heavy truck 172 3.3 26% 0.001742993 0.005752 
Medium car 1461 0 0% 0 0.000000 
Mini-bus 238 0.01 0% 5.2818E-06 5.28E-08 







Table D.5: Emissions by vehicle type in quantities (in grams per 1 000 veh-km) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 





1 000 veh-km 




4x4 0.12324 8.024E-08 2.860E-07 2.110E-05 2.146E-05 0.000859 
Articulated truck 0.60496 2.627E-06 9.044E-06 5.811E-04 5.928E-04 0.023712 
Bus 0.32099 6.413E-07 2.272E-06 1.640E-04 1.670E-04 0.006678 
Heavy truck  0.48786 1.975E-06 6.624E-06 3.767E-04 3.853E-04 0.015413 
Medium car 0.12479 2.334E-08 1.552E-07 2.211E-05 2.229E-05 0.000891 
Mini-buses 0.14118 2.639E-08 1.846E-07 2.833E-05 2.854E-05 0.001142 
Total  1.80302 5.373E-06 1.857E-05 1.193E-03 1.217E-03 0.048695 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table D.7 presents the marginal and average social costs of road transport in Namibia (cents 
per kilometre) for each vehicle class (light or heavy) per road category (district, main, and 
trunk).  
H D M - 4 Emissions by Vehicle Type
HIGHWAY  DEVELOPMENT  &  MANAGEMENT Study Name: 2019-3038 Tactical Analysis
Run Date: 09-03-2019
Quantities in grams per 1000 vehicle-kilometres
Vehicle Classes HC CO Nox Par CO2 SO2 Lead 
PB
GWP 
4x4 1064.93 1065.51 3796 213.1 280016 911.75 0 Carbon dioxide C02 1
Articulated truck 7102.94 6529.78 24454 1306 1571212 5132.18 0 Methane Ch4 21
Bus 3267.7 3224.13 11580 644.8 835917 2723.09 0 Nitrous dioxide N2O 310
Heavy truck 6622.05 5694.96 22210 1139 1263071 4138.78 0
Medium car 305.89 1933.5 2034.5 14.33 289784 92.33 37.18





Table D.7: Average costs and Marginal Social Cost of road transport in Namibia: 2019 (cents/km) 
  MEC Average costs 



























Infrastructure  0.000 18.044 0.001 86.282 0.000 3.517 0.361 229.537 0.102 64.574 0.057 36.365 
Accidents  0.119 0.020 0.010 0.002 1.654 0.288 5.109 0.883 1.192 0.251 307.919 35.073 
Environmental   0.285 4.186 1.788 4.367 0.289 4.580 4.634 4.186 1.788 4.367 0.289 4.580 
Congestion  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.004 - - - - - - 
Total 0.369 22.244 6.373 91.441 1.955 9.850 10.104 234.606 3.082 69.192 308.266 76.018 






Appendix E: Fuel levy estimation 
 
In order to compare the estimated marginal costs to income generated from each sampled 
candidate road, the fuel levy generated from each vehicle travelling on the sampled road was 
estimated. The following steps were utilised to estimate the fuel levy income:  
1. Obtain the fuel consumption per 1 000 vehicle kilometres of all vehicle classes from 
the HDM-4 output. 
2. Obtain the current fuel levy per litre of petrol and diesel paid by road users as outlined 
in the Government Gazette. 
3. Determine the annual AADT of each vehicle class. 
4. Determine the total income generated from vehicle classes utilising the sampled road 
section per year. 








To determine the fuel levy paid by each vehicle class per kilometre: 
 
 
Table 7.1 Case A: Fuel levy estimation an illustration 
 
For instance, calculating the income generated from a 4x4 vehicle, the following steps were 
followed similarly as illustrated above: 
 Fuel consumption per 1 000 vehicle kilometre (obtained from the HMD-4 run output): 
112. 
 VKT: 25 185 annual AADT. 
 The district paved road: 61.05 km length. 
Fuel Levy Estimation 
RFA fuel levy Income per veh/km =
Total income per year (step 4) 
Road length (km) 
÷  Annual AADT 
Where                Total income = Annual AADT x fuel consumption rate per vehicle kilometre 
                             Road Length= Kilometres travelled (distance) 
                             Annual AADT = AADT per vehicle class on a sampled road x 365 days 
 
 
𝑹𝑭𝑨 𝑭𝒖𝒆𝒍 𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓 − 𝒗𝒆𝒉/𝒌𝒎
=
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ (𝑘𝑚)
1000 veh − km 











 The fuel levy comprises 136 Namibian cents that accrue to RFA and 50.3 Namibian 
cents towards the MVA Fund. 
 
RFA fuel levy Income per veh/km =
Total income per year (step 4) 
Road length (km) 
÷  Annual AADT 
                                                              = (235 035.16/61.05) ÷ 25 185.00 
                                                              = N$ 0.15286 
For every kilometre driven on the 61.05 km district road, the 4x4 will pay 15.29 Namibian 
cents. 
Box E.1: An example of marginal costs in the presence of increased return to scale 
 
The economics of roads rely on the fundamental fact that the LRAC curve is downward-sloping due 
to the high fixed costs of constructing roads. Due to the falling LRAC, marginal costs not only fall 
but must be below the LRAC. At this point, the usual efficiency rule to price road services at marginal 
costs will not generate sufficient revenue to cover the costs of the road network. In Figure 7.4 
demand curve (D) also represents the marginal revenue (curve and the average revenue curve). 
When the efficient pricing rule applies (P=MC), in order to obtain the efficient amount of road use, 
revenue generated will be equal to rectangle 0𝑞1ab; whereas the total costs of providing 𝑞1 units of 
road service is the rectangle 0𝑞1cd. This implies that when applying the efficient pricing rule in the 
presence of increasing return to scale, the total costs exceed the revenue generated and the 
marginal cost pricing thus results in a decifit. The desirable marginal cost pricing rule, taken from a 
competitive market context, will not work as revenue generated will be insufficient to cover the road 
costs in the long run.   
 
Figure E.1: Marginal cost pricing in the presence of increasing return to scale 







Given the situation presented in Box E.1, Andreson and Thompson (2014) state that the 
solution would be to subsidise the road from the general revenue or to implement a two-part 
tariff. A two-part tariff could be a solution that could generate revenue that meets the network 
investment needs. Under a two-part tariff scheme, road users are required to pay two fees. 
Andreson and Thompson (2014) posit that under a two-part tariff approach, road users must 
pay two fees: one fee for subscription equal to one road user’s share of the deficit abcd (see 
Box E.1) and another variable fee charged per trip. They indicate that the two-part tariff can 
be thought of as a linear price, Ρ= 𝑎 +bq, where the price (p) represents the flat fee (a) plus a 
variable fee (bq), which depends on elements b and q, where q represents the number of trips 
made and b represents the per-trip charge (see Box E.1).  
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